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Original papers that fall within the scope of the Journal shall be submitted by e-mail. An Abstract of the article in about 150 words must accompany the papers. The length of research papers shall be between 5000 and 7000 words. However, short notes, perspectives and lengthy papers will be published if the contents could justify.

1. The paper may be composed in MS-Word format, Times New Roman font with heading in Font Size 14 and the remaining text in the font size 12 with 1.5 spacing.
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4. Quotations should be placed in double quotation marks. Long quotes of above 4 (four) lines should be indented in single space.
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Articles

The Tibetan Right to Self Determination and Sino-Indian Relations

Suresh R

Abstract

This paper is an attempt to examine the Tibetan right to self determination and how it affects Sino-Indian relations. The right to self determination is the right of the people to select their own political, social and economic system. The exercise of this right by the people may result in outcomes ranging from independence to autonomy within a state. The Tibetan right to self determination is embedded in the history of Tibet China relations. The Tibetan issue has been and still remains as one of the major irritants in Sino-Indian relations. The post cold war international power structure and improved Indo US relation appears to be in favour of India to play an assertive role to resolve the six decade old Tibetan struggle for self determination. It is important to note that at present the Tibetans demand for right to self determination is based only on autonomy within the PRC and not complete independence. A solution to the Tibetan right to self determination would also pave the way for resolving the Indo China border problem.

India and China are the dominant powers in Asia and their relation is one of the decisive factors in the post cold war international politics. There are many ups and downs in Sino-Indian relations. The Tibetan issue still remains an important factor that affects the Sino-Indian relations. This paper is an attempt to examine the Tibetan right to self determination and how it affects Sino-Indian relations. The right to self determination is the right of the people to select their own political, social and economic system. The exercise of this right by the people may result in outcomes ranging from independence to autonomy within a state. The Tibetan right to self determination is embedded in the history of Tibet China relations. The British role in the Tibetan issue was well reflected in the trilateral Shimla conference of 1914 under the British initiative. Tibet was considered as a buffer zone between British India and China. Therefore it is argued that a solution to the Indo China border problem is closely connected to the accomplishment of the Tibetan right to self determination.

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The Tibetan Issue

The Tibetan issue is embedded in the history of Tibetan nationalism and Tibet-China relations. The history of Tibetan nationalism and the Tibet-China relations may be divided into four main periods (Smith 1996; Goldstein 1989; Grunfeld 1987). The first phase (630-842) is that of the consolidation of the Tibetan state from the beginning of Tibetan history up to the fall of the Tibetan empire in 842. During this period the territory and people of the Tibetan Plateau were politically unified by the Tibetan empire. It was the only time in history that all of Tibet was unified under an independent centralised Tibetan state. And it is during this period that political identities, the fundamentals of later Tibetan nationalism were consolidated.

After the collapse of the Tibetan empire in 842, Tibet was not again politically unified until the mid 13th century when Tibetan lamas established a political – spiritual relationship known as cho-yon or priest-patron relationship with the Mongol empire. Tibet was a dependent state under the Mongol Yuan (1260-1368) and Manchu Ching (1644-1911) dynasties. Tibet was independent of Chinese influence during the native Chinese Ming dynasty (1368–1644). During the second phase, Tibet was under the direct rule of China for a short span of three years from 1911-14.

In the third phase (1914–1950) Tibet experienced modern imperialist pressures and Tibetan nationalism was aroused. Tibetan nationalism was stimulated in the early 20th century by the British imperialist interest in Tibet and Chinese attempt to impose more direct control over Tibet. With the British patronage Tibet managed to achieve de facto independence. However, it failed to gain international recognition to its independence.

In the fourth period (1950 to the present) Tibetan independence was forcibly eliminated. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) marched into Tibet in 1950 and annexed Tibet through a 'peaceful liberation'. China has generally imposed its will on the Tibetan people. Tibet was forced to sign an agreement with China in 1951 known as the '17-Point Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet'. The Chinese consider this agreement as a measure to liberate Tibetan territory from imperialist forces. From the Tibetan perspective such 'liberation' was imposed and promises of autonomy stated in the agreement were not being followed. And the Tibetan national identity comes under intense pressure from China for the 'socialist transformation' of the Tibetan society. The Tibetan culture was subjected to assimilationist pressure during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). However, the Tibetan nationalism survived and grew under the Chinese rule. After 1980, in the period of liberalized Chinese policies in Tibet, Tibetan culture and nationalism revived. During this phase Tibetans gained international support to their plea for right to self-determination (Smith 1996).

I. The Right to Self-determination

Generally, the right to self-determination is the right of people to determine their own destiny. In particular, the right allows a 'people' to choose their own political status and to determine their own form of economic, cultural and social development, free of outside interference. Exercise of this right can result in a variety of different outcomes ranging from political independence to forms of autonomy or association to full integration within a state. The importance lies in the right of choice, so that the outcome of a people's choice should not affect the existence of the right to make a choice. In practice, the possible outcome of an exercise of self-determination will often determine the attitude of governments towards the actual claim by a people. Thus, while claims to cultural autonomy may be more readily recognized by states, claims to independence are more likely to be rejected by them. Nevertheless, the right to self-determination is recognised in international law as a right of process, and not of outcome, belonging to people and not to states or governments. It is important to note that self-determination has never simply meant absolute independence. Most importantly, it means the free choice of people to determine their status. This right remains an ongoing choice of the people as to their governance, and their economic, social and cultural development. It is a constant entitlement. It must also be emphasised that democracy in itself does not necessarily satisfy the requirements for the implementation of self-determination although democracy and aspects of self-determination are closely linked. In cases where democracy is defined as the rule of the majority and the people claiming the right to self-determination constitutes a numerical minority in the state in question, a democratic system does not necessarily respond to the needs of the minority people (Berkin 2000:104-13).

II. The UN and Right to self-determination

After the Second World War the principle of self-determination was developed in various UN instruments. The United Nations Charter Article 1(2) states: The purposes of the United Nations are to develop friendly relations among nations based on the respect of the principle of equal rights and the self-determination of peoples. Again article 55 enjoins each member state of the United Nations to create stability and well-being "based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples".¹ The UN Charter was followed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948.² Again, by 1960, with the adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Peoples, the principle was elevated to the position of an unconditional right.³

This declaration and the related declaration, the Declaration Concerning the Implementation of the Right to Self-determination, affirmed the right to immediate self-determination for peoples under "alien, colonial or oppressive domination" and called for a "speedy and unconditional end to colonialism in all its manifestations".⁴ The Declaration on the Granting of Independence marks a significant shift in the law of self-determination. For the first time, in the case of colonial entities, it stressed that "inadequacy of political, economic, social

or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence".⁵ Meanwhile, the Declaration Concerning the Implementation of the Right to Self-determination outlined three methods by which the self-determination of non-self-governing territories could be achieved. These methods are, independence; free association and integration; the standards of democratic participation. The General Assembly had made it clear that the favoured outcome for a process of decolonization was to be independence.

In 1966, the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights were adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession. Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states; "all peoples have the rights to self-determination. By virtue of this right they may freely determine their political status". Articles 1 (2) of Covenant note that self-determination shall include a right to dispose of wealth and resources - economic self-determination, while Articles I (3) oblige state parties to the Covenants "to promote the realisation of the right to self-determination".⁶ The ICCPR has been ratified by 161 of the 193 members of the UN. Five other countries including China have signed but not ratified. A nation which is a signatory of an international treaty such as ICCPR is obliged under international law to refrain from acts which would defeat the purpose and objects of the treaty. All nations are therefore bound both by its adherence to UN Charter and by its signature of the ICCPR to respect the principles of self-determination of the people. The International Covenants do not appear to limit the right to self-determination to people classified as non-self-governing by the United Nations. The implication is that the right belongs to 'all people' and must be respected by all states, not only those who may be in a trust relationship with a dependent people. State practice has commonly accepted the legal interpretation that the right to self-determination belongs primarily to people under colonial or alien rule. The applicability of the principles to classic colonial cases was largely unquestioned in the post World War II period. And nearly a billion people were liberated from colonial rule through its implementation during this period in the Afro-Asian region. The controversy arises particularly when applying to people other than those in classical colonial situations.

The 1971 UN Declaration on the Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, develops the rights of equal rights and self-determination still further and offers alternatives to independent statehood including self-determination through free association with an independent state.⁷ Though it declares the rights of all people to have these rights to freely determine, the Declaration sheds little lights as to how the objectives should be accomplished.

Again, the description of the 'people' that comes under the right to self-determination was controversial. In 1989, UNESCO convened a meeting of jurists and scholars to clarify the concept of 'people' rights. In its final report and recommendations the panel adopted the following description of a 'people':

A group of individual human beings who enjoy some or all of the following common features: (a) a common historical tradition; (b) racial or ethnic identity; (c) cultural homogeneity; (d) linguistic unity; (e) religious or ideological affinity; (f) territorial connection; (g) common economic life. (2) The group must be of a certain number which need not be large...but which must be more than a mere association of individuals within a State; (3) the group as a whole must have the will to be identified as a people or the consciousness of being a people... (4) The group must have institutions or other means of expressing its common characteristics and will for identity (UNESCO, International Meeting of Experts on Further Study of the Concept of the Peoples, Final Report and Recommendations 1989).

If we apply this definition, it appears that, the Tibetan people fulfill all the requirements for self-determination as envisaged in the report. Further, the UN through various instruments holds that the right of self-determination is a prerequisite to the enjoyment of all other fundamental human rights.

Again in 1993, the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna, affirmed in the final Declaration which has been adopted unanimously by all states that the right to self-determination is part of the international law of human rights. The declaration states;

All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status, and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. Taking into account the particular situation of peoples under colonial or other forms of alien domination or foreign occupation, the World Conference on Human Rights recognises the right of peoples to take any legitimate action, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to realise their inalienable right to self-determination. The World Conference on Human Rights considers the denial of the right to self-determination as a violation of human rights and underlines the importance of the effective realisation of this right. In accordance with the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, this shall not be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind (UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23).

Thus, the UN through various declarations and reports has clearly stated the significance of rights to self-determination as human rights and unambiguously described the

term 'people'. The history of Tibet clearly shows that they are a distinct people who have a distinct culture of their own.

III. Tibet's views on Right to Self-determination

Tibet was an independent, sovereign nation when the People's Liberation Army of the People's Republic of China ('PRC') entered Tibet in 1950. Tibet at that time possessed all the attributes of statehood. Tibetans argue that even the PRC does not dispute that the Tibetans are a distinct people who in 1950 occupied a distinct territory. Tibet also had a fully functioning government headed by the Dalai Lama and that government, was free from outside interference, administered the welfare of the Tibetan people through civil service, judicial and taxation systems, as well as through a postal and telegraph service, and a separate currency. The government controlled the borders and issued passports to its people, which were recognized internationally. It entered into treaties as a sovereign with other states, including Britain, Nepal and Mongolia. Tibet also negotiated as an equal sovereign nation with China and Britain at the Simla Conference of 1914 (Tibetan Centre for Human Rights & Democracy Human Rights, Human Rights Situation in Tibet, Annual Report 2009).

With regard to the basic document regarding the annexation of Tibet, the Seventeen Point Agreement of 1951, which China claims resolved Tibet's status, is not a legally binding agreement. According to Tibetan view point the Agreement was signed when PLA occupied large parts of Tibet, and it was signed under threat of further military action in Tibet. The Tibetans argued that a treaty concluded under such circumstances is not legally valid.

Tibetans further argue that once a state exists, it is legally presumed to continue as an independent state unless proved otherwise. The historical evidence not only fails to prove otherwise, but affirmatively demonstrates that Tibet has always been an independent state, despite periods during which it was influenced to varying degrees by foreign powers.

They also maintain that even if Tibet had not been an independent nation in 1950, the Tibetan people would nonetheless be entitled to exercise their right of self-determination. International law recognizes the right of the people to self-determination; that is, the right freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development. The Tibetans are unquestionably a 'people' and are eligible to claim the right to self-determination. Therefore the Tibetans argue that they are entitled to choose independence from China, autonomy with China, or any other political status.

The Tibetans are entitled to exercise their right of self-determination as against China's claim of right to territorial integrity because Beijing has not acted as the legitimate government of the Tibetan people. A government's legitimacy derives from a people's exercise of the right of self-determination and from its conduct in accordance with its obligation to protect and

promote the fundamental human rights of its entire people, without discrimination. The Chinese government in Tibet was imposed on the Tibetans by force, and not by an exercise of self-determination. Moreover, China has persistently and systematically abused the human rights of Tibetans through repression of religion, population transfer, birth control policies, discrimination, and destruction of the environment, involuntary disappearances, arbitrary arrest, torture and arbitrary executions. Therefore, PRC is not the legitimate government of the Tibetan people and it has no claim of the right to territorial integrity to assert against the Tibetans right to self-determination.

The Tibetans further maintain that a balancing of the fundamental values of the international community also weighs heavily in favour of enforcing the Tibetan's right to self-determination. A non-militarized independent Tibet would enhance peace and security in the region by serving as a buffer zone between the two most populous nations in the world, India and China. The Tibetan's exercise of self-determination will not only promote the international values of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms but also international peace. Thus, the Tibetans plea for self-determination is mainly based on historical, legal and human rights factors. The latest proposal put forth by the Tibetans demand for a genuine autonomy within the PRC. This proposal is known as the mid way approach or Strasbourg proposal which demands for Tibetans freedom to decide on their own social, economic and culture practices while defence and foreign relations rest with the PRC. Therefore, the Tibetan demand for right to self determination in its present form is based on a claim for true autonomy within the PRC and not for complete independence.

IV. China's views on Right to Self-determination

The views of the PRC on the Tibetan issue are well reflected in the white paper report issued by the Chinese government in 2009 and also in other official publications. The report stated that the Tibetan people enjoy the democratic right to be masters according to law. The Chinese Constitution provides all citizens of China who have reached the age of 18 to exercise their right to vote and stand for election, regardless of ethnic status, race, sex, occupation, family background, religious belief, education, or length of residence. The report claim that since the establishment of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), the Tibetan people have actively exercised the right to vote and stand for election of deputies to the National People's Congress (NPC) as well as the people's congresses at all levels in the TAR, and participated, through deputies to the people's congresses, in administration of state and local affairs.

The report further argues that Tibetan people have become masters of their own affairs and enjoyed full democratic rights and extensive economic, social and cultural rights. The report also set aside the argument that Tibet's regional ethnic autonomy, is "devoid of essential contents". It also rejected the proposed institution of 'one country, two systems' and 'a high degree of autonomy' in Tibet, after the model of Hong Kong and Macao as untenable.

While denying any further revision in the present political set up in Tibet on the lines of Hong Kong and Macao, the official report maintain that the “situation in Tibet is entirely different from that in Hong Kong and Macao”. It further argues that the “Hong Kong and Macao issue was a product of imperialist aggression against China; it was an issue of China's resumption of exercise of its sovereignty”. With regard to Tibetan plea for autonomy it argues;

Since ancient times Tibet has been an inseparable part of Chinese territory, where the Central Government has always exercised effective sovereign jurisdiction over the region. So the issue of resuming exercise of sovereignty does not exist. With the peaceful liberation of Tibet in 1951, Tibet had fundamentally extricated itself from the fetters of imperialism. Later, through the democratic reform, the abolition of the feudal serfdom under theocracy and the establishment of the TAR, the socialist system have been steadily consolidated there and the various rights of the people have been truly realized and constantly developed. So the possibility of implementing another social system does not exist either. Regional ethnic autonomy is a basic political system of China, which, together with the National People's Congress system and the system of multi-party cooperation and political consultation led by the Communist Party of China, forms the basic framework of China's political system. The establishment of the TAR and the scope of its area are based on the provisions of the Constitution, and the law(s) on regional ethnic autonomy and decided by the conditions past and present. Any act aimed at undermining and changing the regional ethnic autonomy in Tibet is in violation of the Constitution and law, and it is unacceptable to the entire Chinese people, including the broad masses of the Tibetan people (‘People Republic of China, Fifty Years of Democratic Reforms in Tibet,’2009).

Thus, it is clear that China is not ready to accept any proposals for the revision of the existing political set up in Tibet.⁸

Though the official version of PRC maintains that Tibet is an autonomous region, the prevailing system of ‘democratic centralism’ and party control over the administration has given little scope for autonomy to Tibetans in the present administrative set up. Again, the indifferent attitudes towards Tibetan by the majority Han population in China, who run the government at the local and central levels, and the treatment of the Tibetan as ‘splitters’, limit the entry of Tibetans in the party organs and other decision making bodies.

Though the Tibetans are ready to come down from their earlier claim for independence to cultural autonomy, China was not ready to discuss the Tibetan issue even at the bilateral level. In this context it is important to note that the recent visit of Dalai Lama to the US and his meeting with the President Barrack Obama was criticised by Chinese leadership as interference in the internal affairs of another nation. Thus China is neither ready to discuss the Tibetan issue at the bilateral level nor by the mediation of a third party.

V. India and the Tibet Right to Self-determination

When the People's Liberation Army entered into Tibet, India did not hesitate to deplore China's invasion of Tibet. In a note dated October 26, 1950, the Indian foreign office told the Chinese foreign office how it looked at the event: "In the context of world events, invasion by Chinese troops of Tibet cannot but be regarded as deplorable and in the considered judgment of the Government of India, not in the interest of China or peace" (Mehrotra 2000:14). This statement clearly shows India's stand on the Tibetan issue in the initial period.

Again, Jawaharlal Nehru stated in the Indian Parliament on December 7, 1950: "It is not right for any country to talk about its sovereignty or suzerainty over an area outside its own immediate range. That is to say, since Tibet is not the same as China, it should ultimately be the wishes of the people of Tibet that should prevail and not any legal or constitutional arguments – the last voice in regard to Tibet should be the voice of the people of Tibet and of nobody else".⁹ Nehru's statement of December 7, 1950 in the Parliament of India was significant in many respects. It reflected India's stand on right of the people. It also manifests a clear understanding of the Tibetan question.

In the beginning, India had supported Tibet's claim for self-determination. However, a marked change in India's stand on self-determination was visible after the Indo - China bilateral agreement of 1954, known as Panchseel.¹⁰ As per the agreement India had accepted China's claim on Tibet. Though India failed to provide any support to the Tibetans right to self-determination when it had taken up at the UN General Assembly in 1958, India had provided political asylum to Dalai Lama and his followers in 1959. Recently the Tibetan settlers in India had celebrated their 50 years of stay in Dharamsala.¹¹

The 1954 Panchseel agreement between India and China was clearly violated in 1962 when the Chinese troop invaded Indian territory. Even the Chinese attack did not deter India from supporting the PRC entry into the UN.¹² India had followed a policy of appeasement with regard to China and accepted China's claim on Tibet. The Indo China border problem is embedded on Tibet as China had no border with India except through Tibet and India's border with Tibet was a well-settled border.¹³ Thus a solution to the Indo - China border problem also lies in the acceptance of Tibetan claim for the right to self-determination.

In this context the Dalai Lama's five-point peace plan for Tibet, known as the Strasbourg Proposal of June 1988 assumes great significance. The proposal called for the transformation of "the whole of Tibet, including the eastern provinces of Kham and Amdo," into a zone of peace and nonviolence. The establishment of a peace zone "would be in keeping with Tibet's historical role" as a "buffer state separating the continent's great powers." Dalai Lama explained the relevance of Strasbourg Proposal:

Historically, relations between China and India were never strained. It was only when Chinese armies marched into Tibet, creating for the first time a common border that tensions arose between the two powers, ultimately leading to the 1962 war. Since then numerous dangerous incidents have continued to occur. A restoration of good relations between the world's two most populous countries would be greatly facilitated if they were separated-as they were throughout history-by a large and friendly buffer region (Lama 1988:6).

The proposal that Tibet should become a buffer region is almost identical to the Indian government's proposal for the demilitarization of Tibet, an idea India toyed with prior to independence (Zhao 1996:255). After independence, India advocated this idea until the 'liberation of Tibet' by the People's Liberation Army in 1950. However, the Dalai Lama's call for the establishment of a peace zone or demilitarization of Tibet has failed to draw a positive response from the Chinese government, to which it was addressed. A demilitarized buffer zone along the Indo-China border would have brought peace in the region. It also would have accelerated the bilateral interaction between the two major Asian powers, India and China.

As long as the Tibetan refugees continue their stay in India, international pressure on China to resolve the Tibetan issue would mount. India's appeasement policy towards China initiated during the Nehru period need to be reviewed and it is time to change the covert support to the Tibetan cause to overt support. The Tibetan demand for a cultural autonomy within the PRC short of complete independence also sounds reasonable especially in the post cold war context. In the changed international situation, the initiative from India and the US along with the EU would compel China to address the 60 year old peaceful struggle for preserving one of the ancient cultures and its unique identity.

VI. Sino-Indian Bilateral Relations – An Overview

Sino-Indian relations date back to ancient period. India and China have had ancient civilizational contact. In recent times, the process of development and diversification of bilateral relations has gathered momentum. The main focus of the present relation is on enhancing mutually beneficial cooperation.

There were many ups and downs in the relation between India and China. The PRC was established on October 1, 1949, and India was the second non-communist country to recognize it. On April 1, 1950, India and China established diplomatic relations. The two countries also jointly framed the Panchsheel in 1954.

The Indo China war in 1962 led to a serious setback in bilateral relations. India and China restored ambassadorial relations in August 1976 after 14 years. Higher political level contacts were revived by the visit of the then External Affairs Minister, A.B. Vajpayee in

February 1979. The Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua paid a return visit to India in June, 1981.

An important milestone in India China relation was Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in December 1988. During this visit, both sides agreed to develop and expand bilateral relations in all fields. It was also agreed to establish a Joint Working Group (JWG) - to seek fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution on the boundary question - and a Joint Economic Group (JEG) to promote economic relations.

Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao visited China in September 1993. The Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the India-China Border Area was signed during this visit. President R. Venkataraman paid a state visit to China in May 1992. This was the first Head of State-level visit from India to China. President Jiang Zemin's state visit to India in November 1996 was similarly the first by a PRC Head of State to India. The four agreements signed during his visit included the one on CBMs in the Military Field along the LAC covering adoption of concrete measures between the two militaries to enhance exchanges and to promote cooperation and trust.

The Chinese side reacted sharply to India's nuclear tests in May 1998 and India's defence ministers' statement about the threat from nuclear China as the rationale for nuclear test. During the then External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh's visit to China in June 1999, both sides reiterated that neither country is a threat to the other. President K.R. Narayanan visited China in May-June 2000, marking a return to high level exchanges. Premier Zhu Rongji visited India in January 2002. MOUs and Agreements signed during the visit covered wide areas including tourism, water, space, science and technology etc.

The Prime Minister of India A.B. Vajpayee visited China in June 2003 during which a Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation was signed. This was the first comprehensive document on development of bilateral relations signed at the highest level between India and China. Both the countries concluded a border trade protocol to add a border crossing between Sikkim and Tibet Autonomous Region. The two Prime Ministers appointed Special Representatives to explore from the political perspective of the overall bilateral relationship the framework of a boundary settlement. Premier Wen Jiabao visited India in April 2005. The two sides issued a Joint Statement establishing a Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity. It reflects the consensus that bilateral relations transcend bilateral issues and have acquired a global and strategic perspective. The agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles signed during the visit represents a successful conclusion of the first phase of the work of the Special Representatives on the boundary question. The Chinese President Hu Jintao visited India in November 2006. During the visit, the two sides issued a Joint Declaration containing a ten-pronged strategy to intensify cooperation in all areas and to give greater content to India- China Strategic and Cooperative Partnership.

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited China from 13-15 January 2008. During the visit, he had extensive discussions with Premier Wen Jiabao and met with President Hu Jintao and NPC Chairman Wu Bangguo. A joint document entitled "A Shared Vision for the 21st Century of the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China" was issued during the visit, outlining common positions on a number of international and some bilateral issues.

The President of India paid a state-visit to China from 26-31 May, 2010. In Beijing, she held talks with Chinese President Hu Jintao and met with NPC Chairman Wu Bangguo, Premier Wen Jiabao and CPPCC Chairman Jia Qinglin. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao paid a three day official visit to India from 15-17 December 2010. During his visit, six agreements on cultural exchange, green technologies, media exchanges, hydrological data, and banking were signed and a Joint Communiqué was released. Again, a bilateral trade target of 100 billion USD was set to be reached by 2015. A Strategic Economic Dialogue and a CEO's Forum were established; and 2011 was declared as 'Year of India-China exchange'. The establishment of hotline between the Indian Prime Minister and the Chinese Premier, a mechanism of annual Foreign Ministers Meeting and a regular high level exchange mechanism were also announced. India and China have stepped up functional cooperation in all areas. The two foreign ministries have instituted dialogue mechanisms on issues relating to counter-terrorism, policy planning and security, besides strategic dialogue and regular consultations. There are also close cooperation in areas as diverse as water resources, judiciary, science & technology, audit, personnel, finance, labour etc. There is also a close and regular interaction between strategic and foreign policy think-tanks¹⁴. However, the Sino-Indian border problem still remains as an unresolved issue. The Indo China border problem is closely connected to the Tibetan issue. It appears that once the historic status of Tibet as a buffer zone between British India and China is resumed it would resolve the border problem between India and China.

VII. Tibet as a factor in Sino-Indian Relations

The Tibetan issue has been and still remains as one of the major irritants in Sino-Indian relations. At the same time it appears that a solution to the Tibetan issue would also helps to resolve the Indo-China border problem. India's policy of appeasement towards China prompted India to take a passive stand at a crucial time when the Chinese occupation of Tibet took place in 1951. Indian diplomacy had failed to assess the long term implications of the Tibetan annexation by China. Once India had recognized Tibet as an integral part of China, the validity of India China border line, the Mc Mohan line was also challenged by India's action. The Chinese diplomacy gained a major victory by the Indian recognition of Tibet as part of China. When Indian decision makers realised the mistake about the Tibetan policy it was too late and irreparable damage was already done to India's national interest. Finally India's decision to provide political asylum to the Tibetan leader Dalai Lama and his followers in 1959 further worsened the Indo China relations. The 1962 Indo China war was the culmination of India's

diplomatic fiasco. The Panchsheel agreement signed between India and China in 1954 was grossly violated when China attacked India in 1962. The 1962 war resulted in India losing a major portion of its territory and severance of diplomatic relation for a long time. The Indo-China diplomatic relations were resumed only after the lapse of 17 years.

It appears that China was always suspicious of India's Tibetan policy. The Tibetan refugees in India pose a major challenge to Chinese diplomacy. The human rights situation in China and especially the Tibetan Autonomous Region has been sharply criticized by various international human rights protection forums. Though India had repeatedly maintained Tibet as an integral part of China it is highly suspicious of India's real intentions.

It appears that it was the appeasement policy towards China that prompted India to take the official stand of considering Tibet as an integral part of China. It was reiterated by President Ms. Pratibha Patil in the recent visit to China. She had stated: "Tibet is a part of China and India would not allow its soil to be used for anti Chinese activities."¹⁵ However, the emerging international power structure as well as the international movement towards democratization and human rights protection and promotion initiated by international/regional organizations, nation states and civil societies demand formal support for the Tibetan right to self-determination from India, the largest democratic country in the world. India's nuclear power status also appears to be a supporting factor to play an assertive role in the Tibetan issue. India had played an assertive role in the protection and promotion of right to self-determination of the Bangladesh people in 1971. It appears that the Tibetan demand for genuine autonomy within the PRC sound reasonable especially in the post cold war application of right to self determination in Eastern European countries. The post cold war international power structure and improved Indo US relation appears to be in favour of India to play an assertive role to resolve the six decade old Tibetan struggle for self determination. It is important to note that at present the Tibetans demand for right to self determination is based only on autonomy within the PRC and not complete independence. A solution to the Tibetan right to self determination would also pave the way for resolving the Indo China border problem.

Notes

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2. Text of the UDHR, see Year Book of the United Nations, United Nations Publications, New York, 2006.
3. UNDoc.Res.1541(XV) www.un.org/Depts/dpi/declaration/decolonisation.htm
4. *Ibid*,
5. *Ibid*.
6. Text of the International Covenant on Civil Political Rights. Year Book of the United Nations, United Nations Publication, New York. 2006. see www.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm
7. UN Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States 24 Oct 1970.Res. 2625(XXV).

8. See For a comparative study of the views of Tibet, China and others see A. Tom Grunfeld, *The Making of Modern Tibet*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1987. pp 223- 231. Randall Peerenboom, *China Modernizes Threat to the West or Model for the Rest?* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.
9. Quoted in L.L Mehrotra, *India's Tibet Policy: An Appraisal and Options*, Tibetan Parliamentary and Policy Research Centre, New Delhi, 2000. P 14
10. (i) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; (ii) mutual non-aggression (iii) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; (iv) equality and mutual benefit; and (v) peaceful co-existence.
11. On 30 April 2010 the 50th year of Tibetans arrival in Dharamsala was celebrated.
12. In the wake of its full scale and wanton invasion of India in the early hours of October 20, 1962, Prime Minister Nehru said in a broadcast to his countrymen, "Perhaps there are not many instances in history where one country (that is, India) has gone out of here way to be friendly and cooperative with the Government and people of another country (that is, China) and to plead their cause in the councils of the world, and then that country returns evil for good". Quoted in L L Mehrotra *India's Tibet Policy: An Appraisal and Options*, Tibetan Parliamentary and Policy Research Centre, New Delhi, 2000 p 21
13. *Ibid.* p.25
14. www.meaindia.nic.in accessed on 04/08/2011.
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Armed Conflicts and Impact on Environment

Sailaja Gullapalli and Mamta Tyagi

Abstract

Since ages wars and armed conflicts have taken a heavy toll on mankind. They have resulted in the loss of millions of lives and rendered many a people destitute and crippled for life. While these are highlighted time and again, one area of the impact usually goes unnoticed, i.e. the ecology or environment. This consists of crucial resources for the survival of mankind. Be it air pollution, water and land pollution- they have a devastating effect on the life of people. The solution to this problem lies in many factors- from the individual effort to international endeavour. Apart from the obvious solutions involving government and other agencies, one of the most tried and tested positive method, i.e. the Gandhian method is likely to bring the conflicting parties to the table and negotiate or create awareness regarding the problem and root out the deficiency in every possible manner. This paper attempts to highlight the impact of armed conflicts on environment and also attempts a Gandhian resolution to the conflict.

In its Report on 'Protecting the Environment during the Armed Conflict', the United Nations Environment Programme categorically states that 'the toll of warfare today reaches far beyond human suffering, displacement and damage to homes and infrastructure. Modern conflicts also cause extensive destruction and degradation of the environment. In turn, environmental damage, which often extends beyond the borders of conflict affected countries, can threaten the lives and livelihoods of people well after peace agreements are signed'. This paper examines these observations in general and how environmental destruction takes place during armed conflicts, mostly the internal ones, between naxal or insurgent groups and the government forces in particular.

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Armed Conflict

An armed conflict is defined as a contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.¹The incompatibility may be a desire for seceding from the state, opposition to government policy or the need to address issues of social and economic importance like poverty, hunger and deprivation.

Naxalism

`Naxalite` or `Naxalism` is an informal name given to the extreme Left-wing ideology, and radical, often violent, revolutionary communist groups that were born out of the Sino-Soviet split in the Indian Communist Movement. Ideologically, they belong to various trends of Maoism.² Initially, the movement had its epicenter in West Bengal that later spread into less developed areas of rural Central, Eastern and Southern India, such as Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh. The 2009 estimates show that Naxalites are active across approximately 220 districts in 22 states of India accounting for about 40 percent of India's geographical area. The Indian Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, recently declared them as the most serious internal threat to India's national security. The Naxalites are opposed by virtually all mainstream Indian political groups.

Insurgency

An insurgency is an armed rebellion by any irregular armed force that rises up against an established authority, government, administration or occupation. Those carrying out an insurgency are "insurgents". Insurgents engage in regular or guerilla combat against the armed forces of the established regime. They usually are in opposition to a civil authority or government primarily in order to overthrow or obtain a share in government, to further a separatist or revolutionary agenda, or highlight their social and economic deprivation and improve their condition.

Insurgency, as a movement, is a political effort with a specific aim. This sets it apart from both guerilla warfare and terrorism, as these are methods available to pursue the goals of the political movement. The ultimate goal of an insurgency is to challenge the existing government for control of all or a portion of its territory, or force political concessions in sharing political power. Insurgencies require the active or tacit support of some portion of the population involved. External support, recognition or approval from other countries or political entities can be useful to insurgents.³

Causes of Armed Conflict with Special Reference to India

The recent conflicts, as Kofi Annan states, are the result of a number of motives and factors including ideology, access to resources, ethnicity, religion, greed, distribution of power among social groups and even between countries and weak states that lack effective leadership. The armed groups are active in areas with valuable natural resources that can be easily accessed and distributed or marketed. These groups do not necessarily operate under a single organization; there may be many independent groups that share similar ideology or tactics. Differences among them usually end up in factionalized and fragmented groups. The basic purpose of the Naxals finds origins in addressing various economic and social injustices relating to the uneven distribution of croplands, tribal issues, and issues of oppression by the local landlords and state authorities.

Insurgency is rampant in the Northeastern part of India that consists of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, Manipur and Nagaland. Due to the backwardness of the region, tension exists between the states and the central government, between the tribal people, who are natives of these states, and migrant people from other parts of India that has led the natives of these states to seek greater participation in self-governance. There are also existing territorial disputes for example, between Manipur and Nagaland. There is a rise in insurgent activities and regional movements in the northeast, especially in the states of Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram and Tripura. Most of these organizations demand independent state status or increased regional autonomy and sovereignty.

Effect on Environment and Forest Resources

An armed and lawless society can have both direct and indirect impacts on the environment and forest resources. The main impact of armed conflict on the environment occurs through habitat destruction and loss of wild life, over-exploitation and degradation of natural resources and pollution.⁴

Saundry observes that armed conflict has multiple, long- and short-term impact on development and on environmental and human well-being.⁵ Conflict undercuts or destroys environmental, physical, human and social capital. It results in the loss of lives, livelihoods and opportunity, as well as of human dignity and fundamental human rights. Livelihoods are directly affected through decreased access to land and inadequate access to natural resources, as a result of exclusion, displacement and the loss of biodiversity and trigger new tension and conflict over critical resources, such as water or food. Each injury to the environment accumulates and interacts with all the other injuries, and as a result the welfare of future generations is endangered.⁶ Urdal, in the work on Demographic Aspects of Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Armed Conflicts observes that impoverished and institutionally weak countries, usually measured by low GDP per capita, have an exceptionally

high risk of armed conflict and civil war. However, the victims of insurgency or armed conflicts include one and all as given in the following paragraphs.

Environment: While the armed groups damage forests by taking shelter there, the anti-insurgency operations lead to denudation of forests. The conservation activities and other forestry operations are hampered, resulting in the loss of valuable natural resources and pose grave threat to the fragile ecology of the region. Most of the forest products are sold to illegal traders; the animals are caught or killed through hunting and are occasionally sold for cash.

Tribal Population: These groups have been losing their traditional rights on forests and other natural resources. Tribal people who had originally lived in the forest areas but due to constant penetration of outside forces for security maintenance purposes, have lost much of the knowledge on traditional rites, rituals and ceremonies because of migration due to insurgent activities.

The wildlife: Animals and other species not only lose their habitat but also killed for their skin and other products, to the extent where certain plants and animals species are threatened of extinction. These skins are priced high in the national and international markets and are often smuggled illegally.

General Population: It is not only the tribals but also the general population who depend overwhelmingly on resources like forests, rivers and other natural elements for their daily requirements.

Habitat, Forest and Wildlife

The former General Secretary of the United Nations, Kofi Annan observed that the habitat destruction and the accompanying loss of wildlife are among the most common and far-reaching impacts of conflict on the environment, and occur for subsistence, strategic, or commercial reasons. Habitats are sometimes directly affected during armed conflict. For example, vegetation may be cut, burned, or defoliated to improve mobility or visibility for troops. Apart from this when large numbers of displaced people are temporarily resettled, they often clear away vegetation, for farming and to obtain firewood—practices that swiftly lead to deforestation and erosion.⁷

Over-exploitation of natural resources is often directly linked to armed conflict, and occurs for both subsistence and commercial reasons. Due to instability caused by war and armed conflicts people are deprived of food and other daily needs and thus are forced to depend on forest resources. At the same time, displaced people usually collect firewood, food plants, and other natural resources in the newly settled areas. The situation may be made worse when

displaced people return to their homelands as they are often forced to rely heavily on natural resources until they can re-establish their normal livelihoods, including agriculture.

Armed Conflicts and Impact on Environment

Another serious environmental impact of armed conflict is pollution. Pollution can take many forms, and can result directly from actions by military or other armed groups, as well as indirectly from the human and economic crises created by conflict.⁸ The soft target of the insurgents is the resource based industries like petroleum and tea which form the core of the modern organised sector in the region. As the articulated economic grievance hovers around the idea of so called regional colonialism based on the alleged drain of rich resources of the region, any violent political movement makes petroleum and tea as targets. Oil pipelines are often blown up by the insurgents; tea gardens are targeted for extortion and sometimes, tea garden executives are abducted. Tea gardens constitute the soft targets of the insurgents as these are in the vicinity of forests and away from the populous localities. It is easy to understand that disrupting industrial activities centering on petroleum and tea are bound to block the wheel of progress in the region. Insurgent attack on tea and petroleum is bound to convey a negative signal to the prospective investors. The potential of using gas reserve of the region will also be seriously hampered because of the insurgency situation. It may be pointed out that in the post-liberalisation period; there has been fierce competition between the States for attracting domestic and foreign investments. In this race, the North East often lagged behind and continues to do so due to the insurgency. The natural resources are being used by the armed groups to fuel their conflict. Since they are in need of immediate revenue, to fund their military activities, they often turn to commercial-scale extraction of natural resources such as timber, ivory, and diamonds.

Forests are also exploited to provide refuge, funds and food for combatants in armed conflicts. The groups may also use forested regions to hide from government troops and the government may be unable to reach them for they concentrate in remote forested regions. Case studies of Burma, Cambodia, and other countries show that forest resources have served to fuel armed conflict. Several scholars and NGOs have portrayed this as a world-wide problem. But some studies show that the duration of the conflict is longer when forest resources are available in the conflict zone.

In his work on *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*, Jeremy offers an explanation that in initial conditions – particularly because of the availability of natural resources – a prospective insurgent group faces and shapes its propensity for violence against the civilian population. Insurgent groups with access to resources attract people by promising them incentives and good rewards and thus motivate people to join the insurgency. The resource rich environments tend to favour opportunistic insurgencies, and help them in driving the native population in their favour by promising them profit. Resource poor environment tend

to favour activist insurgencies. Thus the initial conditions produce different kinds of insurgencies with varying propensities for violence. What emerges from his work is not an overly reductive model of an insurgency or one that focuses too simply on extractable wealth. Rather his conception of initial endowments is expansive, ranging from economic endowments (such as resources that can be looted) and social endowments (such as readily available social networks to mobilize). The author provides a much richer account of “greed” than is normally provided in the literature on civil wars. This model also yields counter-intuitive but important findings: for example, states with weak governance and rich in resources that can be looted are also those most prone to opportunistic rebellions, and sadly also to indiscriminate violence.

Although forest resources are not argued to be the major cause of the length of conflict, there has been an increased attention on how forest resources and armed conflicts may be interrelated, for instance, in two recent reports (FAO 2005; USAID 2005). According to these reports, forest resources may contribute to the havoc for two reasons. Firstly, forest may be transformed into commodities (timber), which may finance or sustain armed conflicts. Secondly, forests can provide safe havens where insurgents may be out of reach from government troops. Similar reasons can be found from the conflict literature, more generally, on how natural resources may be linked to armed conflicts. It is often argued by experts that natural resources serve as an economic resource for rebels and secondly, the forest can be a safe haven for rebels.

Economic Opportunities - The Greed Argument

Another crucial argument related to this field is the involvement of ‘economic opportunities and greed’. According to “greed motivated wars” argument, rebellion is a violent way of generating profits, which reflect the opportunity of seizing profitable opportunities through large-scale banditry. In this view, armed conflicts are driven by greed and the opportunity of looting abundant and internationally tradable natural resources.⁹

Several authors highlight how prominent natural resources, including forest resources, are major sources of war economies¹⁰. Natural resources are often the only economic resource in poor countries where most armed conflicts take place. The extraction of timber does not require much technology or specific know-how; therefore, this increases the chances of its extraction. Another aspect of how important forest resources are in war economies is their location. Forest resources located in remote areas are susceptible to looting or extortion, and the government’s ability to tax, exploit, or trade them may be minimal. In the language of Le Billion, timber is a diffuse and distant resource. Consequently, because conflict may need to respond and adapt to the characteristics of available resources, Le Billion concludes that some types of conflicts are more likely than other. Warlordism is particularly likely in forest rich areas as for example in Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Liberia and the Philippines.¹¹

Forests serve as safe havens for the armed groups for they provide safe exit points. Fearon & Laitin (2003) argue that mountains increase the risk of conflict because insurgents can use it as safe havens. Forest provides cover, particularly against detection and aerial attack, and due to a lack of local knowledge, it is difficult for government forces to track down rebel groups. This can help explain why some rebel groups are able to sustain the fighting. Insurgency in Nagaland is a good example of this.

The effects of these have been equally devastating in the region of Jammu and Kashmir, once known as Paradise on earth. The cross-border infiltration and militancy has taken a massive toll on the region in terms of human as well as ecological factors. It continues to get affected by the armed conflicts and would do so till an amicable solution is worked out. Ejaz-ur-Rehman, in his work on Impact of Armed Conflict on Environment in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, points out to a study by the scientific journal 'Conservation Biology' the findings of which point out that 80 percent of the world's major armed conflicts from 1950-2000 have occurred or are occurring in the most biologically diverse and threatened places on the earth. The study points out 34 bio-diverse hotspots in the world and one among them is the Himalayan region with its multiple conflicts - Afghanistan, Kashmir, Tibet and North-East India''(Kashmir Times,2009). Armed conflict remains a critical concern in many parts of the world and it is also a very serious problem in parts of Jammu and Kashmir today. The conflict has wrecked havoc on the forests and water resources of Jammu and Kashmir. Though there may be other reasons for the threat to the environmental degradation of the Himalayan region including Kashmir, the two decade long conflict has only doubled the speed of destruction. The highly militarised space has not only usurped agricultural lands and residential areas, it has also taken a heavy toll of the forests (Kashmir Times, 2009).¹²

Suggestions for Resolution of the Problems

1. Wars and armed conflicts have brought havoc on human beings as well as environment. Just as human beings are guarded in the likelihood of an attack, the impact of damage on water and natural resources may be taken up on a priority basis as these are vulnerable to attack and exploitation (for example, poisoning of water resources). Vandalism of human kind and environment are to be abhorred with equal intensity and degree of condemnation.
2. While the onus lies on the government and its agencies, non-governmental agencies too could take a lead in minimising the damage and creating awareness of the impact in remote corners of the country. They do have definite and better access to people, infact, more than the governmental agencies do. Their contribution would minimise the impact of damage to a greater degree.

3. The military forces may be urged to take care of the ecological concerns during armed conflicts, combats and attacks by the opponents. Though it would seem ambitious, given the context, efforts may be put in to sensitise the forces regarding the likelihood of the impact.
4. Ejaz ur Rehman lists environmental awareness and training as a very important exercise involving an environmental impact assessment. He also argues that environment should not be used as a weapon. Attacks on installations or infrastructure, he observes, should be avoided and prohibited.
5. Apart from the military forces, the task forces involved in the protection of wildlife may be given necessary training so as to combat the crisis situations with utmost precaution and avoidance of damage on environment.

Finally, though considered as outdated or out of context as far as approaches to conflict resolution especially involving armed conflicts and impact on ecology are concerned, in all likelihood, the Gandhian method spells the possibility of finding a solution. Going into the basics of the subject, the prime issues involving the conflicts include resolution of political, social and economic problems that have been long overdue in the society. The disgruntled elements take up arms and violence having little or no faith in non-violent and peaceful approaches. Gandhi opines that the above methods have been blatantly surpassed giving way to addiction to war, cruelty, and bloodshed. He found no ethical or rational approach to it. To him, conflicts in the society arise if there is inequality, discrimination, deprivation and exploitation. He suggested that a society should be based on equality, fraternity, mutual trust and understanding.

Problems related to Naxalism arise mainly out of land and livelihood issues apart from exploitation of the poor by the rich. The main contention of the naxals is the inaction of the government settings and bureaucracy that are inactive in finding permanent solutions to these problems. Naxalism started in a small village in West Bengal, in 1967 in Naxalbari village when a farmer was attacked over a land dispute. Maoists in the guise of farmers retaliated by attacking the local landlords and escalated the violence. They advocated that the Indian peasants and lower classes should overthrow the government and land-holding upper classes that are responsible for the plight of the poor farmers.

Gandhi clearly advocated that the root of the problem needs to be probed first. In this regard he says that to believe that capitalists or the Zamindars are all exploiters by inherent necessity is incorrect; to treat the capitalists or the Zamindars as the permanent enemies is also not correct. In fact, according to Gandhi, those who are exploited are themselves their own enemies; exploitation is based on the cooperation, (willing or forced), of the exploited. So, there would be no exploitation if the exploited refuses to obey the exploiter. Unless there

is a transformation in the present relationship between the landholders and farmers into a healthier one, through non-violence as against violence, Gandhi saw no hope resolving this conflict. Gandhi also ardently advocated including all the sections of the society in a regeneration scheme; his Constructive Programme is an astounding example wherein he spoke of the welfare of all, the programme to attain real 'sarvodaya'. To Gandhi natural resources are prized possessions, that are finite and that which have to be judiciously used. His way of living and his Ashram rules indicated a sustainable way of life.

If environment is to be saved from degradation we have to stop targeting natural resources and their use to fuel armed conflicts. People in general and the environment, in particular can be prevented from these kinds of conflicts only when we resolve conflict through peaceful means. There is an intense need for rural development and to resolve farmers' problems which are the main issues of the armed groups. Gandhi's schemes for promotion of village industries and his constant calls for involvement in constructive work are some of the basic solutions to the problems mentioned above. Gandhi thoroughly advocates an inclusive society as we call it today and includes the welfare of the deprived sections and women who are not yet treated as equal members of our society. Health and hygiene are wanting in rural India. Gandhi once said, "The earth has enough resources for our need, but not for our greed." What greater message is there to save this earth from the environmental disaster?

Gandhi termed these problems as part of structural violence- economics, politics, social systems and the education-system. Evil, according to Gandhi, was a by-product of the social structure. Therefore Gandhi "hated capitalism, not the capitalist; racism, not the white English men and women; untouchability, not the untouchables; modern civilization, not the Western people living in it. He saw very clearly the evil or violence present in the social structure itself." He saw violence in the economic and political systems of India, as well as of the world. Thus, the first solution lies in the need to adopt the policies of sustainable development and welfare for all (Sarvodaya). Gandhi's Sarvodaya means 'development of all'. His concept Sarvodaya through Antyodaya, implies the welfare of all down to the weakest of the society. Sarvodaya emphasizes harmony and ethical virtues of life rather than class struggle or domination. The concept of Sarvodaya upholds moral and human values in economic and social reconstruction. Secondly, agriculture is considered by Gandhi as the most appropriate basis for providing for one's livelihood. Necessary steps should be taken to improve the condition of those who are heavily dependent on this sector for their livelihood. Principles of cooperation and collective endeavour are central to society. Thirdly, education, moral uprightness, non-violence, simplicity, self-restrained life-style, etc., are the values which effect development of the Antyodaya, and subsequently, the development of the weakest in society.

The concept of equality finds a central place in the Gandhian philosophy. All human-beings are equal and economic equality is the key to non-violence. Land is the gift given to us by the Supreme Being. As humans are his stewards, the land can neither be sold nor misused.

Gandhi called for "a revolution of consciousness, based on high moral values" and a clear realization of the true destiny of man. Such a revolution must be "based on simplifying our life-styles and reducing consumption as a precondition of peace with the poor, with nature, and with and within ourselves." It is no exaggeration to say that Gandhi is a bridge to the 21st century and a symbol of peace, whose spiritual approach constituted his concepts of Satyagraha (non-violence) and Swadeshi (self-reliance).

Conclusion

Armed conflicts consistently deplete the resources of biodiversity and natural resource. These tend to proliferate the tension between authorities dealing with the problems and armed groups, leading to further destruction of resources. Moreover, conflicts weaken the opportunities related to establishing permanent peace and security; they also affect the chances of sustainable livelihoods for tribal people at large. With no scope for resolution in sight, they escalate into and end up in massive resource depletion and environmental degradation, thus making it a vicious circle of poverty, deprivation, exploitation, political, social and economic instability, proliferation of arms and escalation of conflicts for addressing the social and economic imbalances, thus completing the circle. Thus armed conflicts drastically vary the political, social, and economic equations that have a long-term impact on not only the balance of political power but also result in deteriorating law and order, imbalances in fiscal conditions, impacting the national economies. Armed conflicts obliterate the integral societies, destroy traditional natural resources and their management, redirect the resources meant for development and conservation, finally leading to the non-resolution of the problems of conflicts and their negative impact on the measures of conservation in general.

Notes:

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Human Security and Gandhian Ethics in a Globalised World

Dharitri Parija and Mohanan B Pillai

Abstract

The concept 'security' has undergone fundamental changes from that of a narrow military-strategic one to a broad and multi-dimensional understanding of human security. The term human security encompasses areas that are determined by people's need starting right from political, economic, social, technological and environmental factors to basic individual freedom. Though economic development is always a vital and immediate concern for individual development, the negative impact of globalization has caught our attention to re-think the mainstream development paradigm. Much of this have been brought about by an unsustainable economic system, driven by the corporate world - imperialism in a new form supported by Government policies based on consumerism, militarism and an unregulated economy. Treating nature as a resource to be plundered, food as a commodity and agriculture as an industry is degrading the earth, causing water shortage and desertification, polluting water and the air we breathe and poisoning the food we eat. In this scenario, the end user of this development paradigm, the common man, is not even assured of his basic needs. Keeping this dilemma in mind, the present paper tries to deal with the relevance of Gandhian ethics in economic development in the present crises prone world.

Introduction

Much has been debated about the far reaching consequences of neoliberal globalisation which has touched the life of every one directly and indirectly ever since the last quarter of the 20th century. In fact, the neo-liberal policies have intensified both interdependence and competition among the economies of the world and it has in turn made the life of common man vulnerable and insecure. Rising inequality, exploitation, poverty and environmental degradation are the net outcome of neoliberal reforms in every country of the Third World (Zifcak 2005). India is also very much within the clutches of this growth paradigm where more than half of its population still live in the villages. The government in its efforts to turn India into a leading global exporter and technology hub is not paying proper attention to the basic issues of poverty and mal-development.

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The idea of holistic development, which is still a distant dream, was an integral element of the philosophy of Indian freedom movement and it got well enshrined in the Constitution of India. However, Gandhi and his ideology are treated as redundant by the new generation politicians and policy makers who are the apostles of neo-liberal globalisation. In this context, the present paper attempts to reinvent the Gandhian legacy with a view to reconstruct the concept of human security. Accordingly this paper has been divided into three sections. The first section briefly highlights the consequences of liberalisation in the life of the common man. The second section conceptualises human security against the backdrop of the new growth paradigm of liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation. The third section analyses the Gandhian legacy and in the light that the concept of human security is redefined.

Effects of Globalisation: An overview

The 21st century, according to several studies, belongs to China and India in particular and Asia in general. The end of the Cold War and the growing impact of globalisation through economic liberalisation influenced India to redefine its position and role both at the regional and global level. The liberalisation of the economy since the early 1990s led to growth rates of 6-7 percent p.a., and India's global presence has been steadily visible since then (Bava 2007).

But this is an ongoing process, not a signpost, and so it is important to examine how industrialization and liberalisation which have created a new world order are most hotly-debated topics. This has come to dominate the world since the nineties of the last century with the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the former Soviet Union. With increased reliance on the market economy and renewed faith in the private capital and resources, a process of structural adjustment spurred many of the developing countries as guided by the World Bank and other multilateral organisations. In the words of Samir Amin, the postwar period inaugurated a new phase of world system followed by massive economic, political and social transformations in all parts of the world which were the products of social regulations imposed on capital by the popular classes. However, they were the products of a false liberal ideology of market expansion which has defined a new framework for the challenges that confront the people of the world now in the twenty-first century (Amin 2000). Many scholars noted that liberalisation did not benefit the masses in any significant manner. This new state apparatus helped to create a market for Western consumer goods. The manipulation of Third World economies by large scale multinational companies with the encouragement of local elites was part of a wider malaise which some identified as the domination of the periphery of the global economy by those who lived in the core areas of Europe and America. Neoliberalism can best

be described as a discourse and practice which aimed to curtail the powers of labour and to construct a society of capitalists and entrepreneurs (Read 2009). David Harvey has interpreted neoliberalization as a utopian project which is intended to create a theoretical design for the reorganization of international capitalism or as a political project to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation with a view to reposition the economic elites. Though it has not been much effective in revitalizing global capital accumulation it has succeeded well in restoring and in certain instances creating the power of the economic elite. The volatility of uneven geographical development has enabled certain territories to advance at the expense of others (Harvey 2005:19). The current economic downturn has witnessed the fact that neoliberal policies and globalization put the burden of the economic and fiscal crises unto the common mass where as the benefits go primarily to the transnational corporations and to the political class. Moreover, economic policies give priority to save big businesses and banks and neglect the needs of the vast majority which in turn is definitely re-intensifying the class divided contemporary society and widening gap in income distribution. And the capitalist societies have become polarized between a small group of powerful owners where as repressed masses are suffering due to ever increasing economic inequalities. These capitalist economies are undoubtedly exploiting both human beings and nature with new types of policies and deepening social and environmental crises the world over (Itoh 2001:121).

Undoubtedly, globalisation has brought new opportunities for developing countries through greater access to the developed country's markets and new technology. This in turn has improved productivity and ensured higher living standards at least for a section of the people. In almost every area of human activity, the international interconnectedness of peoples, institutions, states and systems, has increased exponentially. This applies to whether or not the activities are political, economic, social, cultural, technological or environmental. But globalisation has also thrown up new challenges like growing inequality across and within nations, and volatility in financial markets and environmental deteriorations. Another most important aspect of globalisation is that a majority of developing countries remained isolated from this so called development process. An eminent scholar Guy Brainbant says that "the process of globalisation not only includes opening up of world trade, development of advanced means of communication, internationalisation of financial markets, growing importance of MNCs, population migrations and more generally increased mobility of persons, goods, capital, data and ideas but also infections, diseases and pollution" (as quoted in Goyal 2006:166) The huge cross-border flow of people, massive movement of capital, the spread of diseases, environmental degradation, the widening poverty gap between North and South, the proliferation of terrorist networks, and the abuse of human rights are some notable examples.

While economic inequality, rural poverty, and hunger seem to have been exacerbated for many by economic liberalization, the end user of this developmental process, the common man has been particularly affected. Economic liberalization has not improved the lives of the millions of rural poor. In fact, these neoliberal policies have created a kind of apartheid in the economy where the wealthy seems to have separated their lucrative sectors from the rest of the economy. The government also seems to care less about rural redistribution and still the poor are available as cheap labour in both rural and urban India. As the Indian government has reduced state support for agriculture, rural development programmes and food subsidies, the rural poor has lost some of the most essential means of survival. Farmers can no longer access to affordable credit and find themselves competing in the international markets against heavily subsidized competitors. The truth of the matter is that economic liberalization has favoured a small class of commercial farmers, multinational corporations and urban service sectors. Neoliberal policies have driven the poor to a vulnerable state in rural as well as urban areas and this in turn aggravated social division (*Ibid*). Higher levels of poverty, higher levels of illiteracy, lower levels of nutrition and health care, unemployment, cross border migration, terrorism have made the lives of the people more miserable. Despite economic progress, a large part of the population in the country continue to face serious problems concerning social and economic security, health care, education as well as food and housing all of which remain in an unsatisfactory condition. One does not feel safe at home, in the office, at a public place or while travelling or even while surfing the net. Each of these threats can cause large scale deaths, socio-economic disruption, prolonged human misery and massive demoralization. In a clearer sense we can say that globalisation has placed the very simple but difficult question of 'human security' in the epicentre of the entire gamut of discussions on growth and development.

Human Security

Before coming to the term human security we have to revisit the concept of security per se. In fact, the term security carries with it different meanings and values for scholars, policy makers and analysts. We need to understand and broaden the concept of security keeping in mind our own social structure. Traditionally, the concept of security has been associated more with the state than with the people. With the emergence of the modern state system in the 17th century, international security has been understood and practised with reference to the needs and interests of the states. For a long period of time, security has been equated with threats to a country's borders and nations have sought arms to protect their security. The changes that came into effect from the days of Cold war to the notion of security, which was based on the East-West stability and its maintenance through nuclear deterrence and nuclear

power, could not address properly the security requirements and interests of the third world countries. It was based on the military dominated understanding of national security. Most of the third world Countries gave importance to their domestic security through state-building and establishing a secure system for dealing with food, health, trade and commerce as much as it was about building up the military.

In the post-Cold war era, the traditional conceptualisation has been revisited by security scholars and more attention was paid to the threats emanating from non-state actors i.e. the individual, social groups, global civil society. The post-Cold War era, accompanied by a series of developments and followed by a series of growing disparities in economic opportunities both within and between states, witnessed increasing marginalisation of the people of developing countries by a globalising world economy, diminishing recourses and violence leading people to become refugees, growing inter-state conflicts and pressure for humanitarian intervention. These developments have led to an exploration of individual and societal dimensions of security. As a result, the term human security has got a place in the broader conception of security.

During the last decade, human security has become a central concern to many countries, institutions and social actors searching for innovative ways and means of tackling the many non-military threats to human life, peace and security. Of late, the term human security has got wide currency. Even though the term itself was in circulation earlier, the particular phrase, "human security," was coined and popularised by Mahbub ul Haq, who was associated with the 1994 *Human Development Report* on Human Security. The basic intent of human security was to provide the people the freedom from want and freedom from fear. The Report identified five steps: a human development conception with emphasis on equity, sustainability and grassroots participation; a peace dividend to underwrite the broader agenda of human security; a new partnership between North and South based on justice and equitable access to global market opportunities and economic restructuring; a new framework of global governance built on reform of international institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and the United Nations; and finally, a growing role for global civil society. Again, the UNDP Report listed seven components or specific values of human security. These are, economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security (Upadhyaya 2004:76). As long back as June 1945, the then U.S. Secretary of State reported this to his government based on the results of the San Francisco Conference: "The battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the security front where victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic and social front where victory means

freedom from want. Only victory on both fronts can assure the world of an enduring peace....No Provisions that can be written into the Charter will enable the Security Council to make the world secure from war if men and women have no security in their homes and their jobs” (as quoted in Sabina Alkire 2003:13). It recognizes that people and communities are fatally threatened by events well beyond their control: a financial crisis, a violent conflict, AIDS, a national policy that undercuts public and private investments in health care, a terrorist attack, water shortages, chronic destitution, or pollution in their country.

Various attempts have been made to conceptualize the term human security. There are two main contemporary theories of international relations which have contributed in broadening its scope. The first one is the neo-realist theory which is called ‘new security thinking’ approach and which emphasises the primacy of the state within a broadened conceptualization of human security. Secondly, the Postmodernist or ‘critical human security’ approach rooted in the pluralist theory of international politics talks about the interdependence and trans-nationalisation of non-state actors without giving priority to state. The neo-realist theory advocated by Barry Buzan (1992) broadened the scope of human security by including political, economic, social and environmental threats, in addition to militaristic threats. Buzan examines security from three angles .i.e. the international system, the state, and the individual, and concludes that the most important and effective provider of security is the sovereign state. In the ‘critical’ or postmodernist approach to human security, Ken Booth (1994) advocates a broadened conceptualization of security which goes beyond a military determination of threats. The advocates of the postmodernist approach stress and encompass a wide range of non-state actors, such as individuals, ethnic and cultural groups, regional economic blocs, multinational corporations (MNCs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and just about all humankind. In expanding the concept of security, Booth argues that human security is always more important than state security (Naidoo 2001:2).

Today, in this globalized world, the most pernicious threats to human security emanate from the conditions that give rise to genocide, civil war, human rights violations, global epidemics, environmental degradation, forced and slave labour, and malnutrition. All the current studies on security thus have to integrate the human dimension of security (Tabyshalieva 2006). This has been explained in the UNDP report (1994): “For too long, security has been equated with threats to a country’s borders. For too long, nations have sought arms to protect their security. For most people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Job security, income security, health security, environmental security, security from crime, these are the emerging

concerns of human security all over the world” (UNDP 1994:3). To make it more clear, the former U N Secretary General Kofi Annan, in his 2000 Report to the United Nations, gave a broad description of human security. He says “Human security in its broadest sense embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her own potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing conflict. Freedom from want, freedom from fear and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment – these are the interrelated building blocks of human security– and therefore national security” (As quoted by Alkire 2003:14).

In this highly complicated world order which generates human insecurity, Gandhian thought system which focuses on the development of the human being as the basic unit of the developmental paradigm, is highly relevant. His ethics deal with a sustainable way of life, an economic system based on trusteeship for universal welfare and a society in which everyone gains, rather than a few becomes rich at the expense of the many. At a conference in Delhi, which was held to mark the centenary of the start of Gandhi’s nonviolent movement, in a video message, Nelson Mandela said “in a world full of violence and strife, Mahatma Gandhi’s message of peace and non-violence holds the key to human survival in the 21st Century” (Nixon 2007:5). Despite the great advancement of science and technology, Gandhian ideals still fit very well into economic, social and political fields. Gandhi realised that the soul of the Indian economy rests on its rural heartlands.

In this materialistic world, where economics has become all important, the present generation has begun to consider Gandhi and his principles as totally irrelevant in the present context. Here we will analyse how Gandhi is more relevant today and his ideas are required to be urgently practiced more than ever before.

Human Security and Gandhian Ethics: A Synthesis

Gunnar Myrdal remarks that “my Indian friends will not be offended when I say, that if Indian planning has not been more successful than it has actually been, the main explanation is that they have not kept so close as they should to the fundamentals of the teaching of the Father of the Nation” (Myrdal 1974).

Gandhian ethics basically deals with the maximization of social welfare and for this he gives prime importance to the welfare of the individuals by reducing inequality in income and

wealth. In the views of Gandhiji, every person should be provided with bare minimum necessities i.e. food, shelter, and clothing. Concentration of wealth among a few certainly will shatter the dream of a society which will be socialist in nature. However, for attaining smooth development of the economy, it is imperative to develop all the regions of the country simultaneously. Bhuimali describes that overall progress of the entire economy depends on the balanced development of all the regions. But in India, there exists a huge regional disparity due to neoliberal globalisation and industrialisation. While some states in India are advanced economically, others are backward. Even within a state some districts are more backward than the rest. As a result, this problem gives rise to the problem of socio-economic inequalities and further leads to depression, conflict and violence and the ultimately human insecurity. In this context, Gandhian economics is relevant which supports the attainment of self-sufficiency level of industrialisation or uniform economic development for each region. Gandhi's views on economics reflect the common man's perception about his well-being. In his views, every man should increase his personal income and standard of living by utilising the existing natural and human resources fully in an eco-friendly manner (Bhuimali 2004).

The increasing craze for material progress in developing countries is based on the Growth Oriented Development Model. Today, economic growth has become the standard measure of power, strength and virtue at all levels i.e., individual, national and global. The IMF, World Bank, WTO and other multilateral institutions are trying to impress upon nations to accelerate their growth rate in order to integrate themselves into the process of globalization, despite the fact that it has brought about ecological imbalances, environmental problems and increasing disparity of economic well-being among nations. In this scenario, Gandhi's ideas appear to be rejecting the capital intensive growth model which is based on greed and selfishness. When we are experiencing war between man and nature through global warming, melting of glaciers, rising of sea levels etc, Gandhian ideas are required to be seriously studied and implemented by every state and individual human being. Industrialisation and urbanisation are no doubt placing India in a club of global power. But this is at the cost of the human life as is evident from increasing farmer suicides and the selling of children in order to get basic common necessities.

In the *Hind Swaraj*, Gandhi critiqued the modern western development paradigm and its resultant civilization. Gandhi said that this civilization is enslaving men by offering temptation of money and luxuries as its fruit. Alternatively, Gandhi propounded the model of "Sarvodaya"—the good for all. He said that economics has to be infused with spiritual values. It should create social prosperity in terms of cordial relationship, among different layers of

society rather than accumulation of wealth in certain pockets only (Lele 2006). Today, it is a growing realization that even the so-called affluent societies created by the growth based economic model are experiencing isolation, emptiness and are losing their own perspectives. At the personal level, it is causing acute stress, depression and insecurity. Gandhi says that an economy based purely on material considerations and totally devoid of any value base would not bring happiness to mankind. Only that economic system which is regulated by ideals, rooted in permanent order of things would achieve the vision of a sustainable world.

Gandhi favoured the self-sufficient village economy where the villages would be independent economic units. Gandhian approach has always emphasised upon need based self-sufficient village communities and wanted to maintain a balance between man and nature. So, he proposed the application of appropriate technology in agriculture and small scale industries which would not deplete the soil and pollute the environment. Farmers should use eco-friendly production techniques by using lesser and lesser amount of fertilizers, insecticides and pesticides. However, in Gandhi's view, the agricultural sector alone cannot solve the problem of rural poverty and unemployment. That's why he specified on the growth of the rural industries like khadi, handlooms, sericulture and handicrafts. He is often criticised for his stand on industrialisation. But what he taught was that machinery, being capital-intensive, displaces labour and naturally augments unemployment and under-employment. Replying to a question whether he was against all machinery, Gandhiji said:

“How can I be when I know that even this body is a most delicate piece of machinery? The spinning wheel is a machine; a little toothpick is a machine. What I object to is the craze for machinery, not machinery as such. The craze is for what they call labour saving machinery. Men go on ‘saving labour’ till thousands are without work and thrown on the open streets to die of starvation. I want to save time and labour not for a fraction of mankind but *for all*. I want the concentration of wealth, not in the hands of a few, but in the hands of all. Today machinery helps a few to ride on the backs of millions. The impetus behind it all is not the philanthropy to save labour, but greed. It is against this constitution of things that I am fighting with all my might.... The supreme consideration is man. For instance, I would make intelligent exceptions. Take the case of the Singer Sewing Machine. It is one of the few useful things ever invented, and there is a romance about the device itself” (Gandhi 1938:7-8).

In fact capital intensive production benefits a few at the cost of many unfortunate rural people leaving them unemployed and exploited. Therefore, it is a situation of two-person zero

sum game. But what is disappointing is that it reduces the welfare of a large section of the rural population. Concentration of industries in a few cities has led to a number of problems. Large scale industries generally grow in the big cities which creates major problem of overpopulation in industrialized areas. With this there arises the problem of pollution of air and water of which the ultimate consumer of insecurity is the common man. In addition, large-scale industries promote monopolistic trends and unequal distribution of income. Gandhi's idea of rural industries, on the other hand, helps decentralization of economic activities and a large proportion of income generated in these industries get distributed among the workers and among a very large number of people. However, his economic ideas are not completely based on cottage industries and handicraft. He visualises that industrialization leads to maximum exploitation of man and nature. Though it is based on large scale and highly sophisticated technology it leads to unemployment, poverty, urbanization, deforestation, desertification, pollution etc. So large scale industries should be owned by the state and administrated wholly for common good and development of the state as a whole. The effects which we are experiencing out of large scale industrialisation remind us how Mahatma had visualised it quite a long time before. According to him, an increase in personal income is an indication of the growth of national income. But the growth of national income is not always benefiting every man in the society.

In a nutshell, Gandhi is above all a champion of human dignity. All his ideas revolve around the betterment of the common man. It does not mean we should stick to traditional behaviour but it means that we should reject the ways of life and practices which is not in the true interest of mankind. The nature of global security has changed. However, climate change, financial instability, trade, food, energy security etc., require different thinking and different responses. There is a need to enquire into the fundamental causes of today's problems. Traditional way of thinking has no answers to these problems. There is no military solution to any of these problems. It should be recognized that behind each of the present day problems lies the question of ethics and values. These have to be addressed. We should analyse the root causes behind the present day insecurities. Exploitation of resources without thinking of nature, maintenance of luxurious life style, differentiated activities pave the way for climate change and global warming. Likewise deprivations, clash of ethnicities', identity, moral superiority, intolerance, injustice, inequality etc., are leading to terrorism and secessionist activities. Socio-economic inequalities, greed, selfishness, financial instability, competition for resources etc., are causing poverty, organised crime and the end result is human vulnerability. Mahatma Gandhi thus offers us an integrated approach and solution to the calls and cries of the present times. Gandhi says that science and technology should be so regulated to work for public good

and not as tools to exploit hapless masses. In Gandhi's words, "True economics never militates against the highest ethical standards, just as all true ethics to be worth its name, must also be good economics" (as quoted by Lele 2006). However, in this scenario, what is needed is to work upon our own social structure which is quite different from that of the West. As rightly pointed out by Schumacher "Development does not start with goods, it starts with people..." (as quoted by Choudhury 1998). Amartya Sen also argues that, there is evidence that even with relatively low income, a population that guarantees health care and education to all can actually achieve remarkable results in terms of longevity and quality of life for the entire population. He called it as human capital which can contribute more in this developmental pattern. Human development has extraordinary social and demographic reach. The creation of social opportunities, expansion of education, health care etc., contribute to the expansion of human capabilities and the quality of life of the masses which in turn also greatly facilitates economic and industrial expansion and improves efficiency and wide reach of market economy (Sen 1999). Gandhiji's message to the world was to build a federation of free nations in a world without war and hatred. He called upon nations to abjure violence against one another and to fight the dreaded enemies of poverty, ignorance, disease, human suffering and social injustice. He advised nations to employ scientific and technological knowledge to further the ideals of a peaceful world order respecting and promoting human rights and human welfare (George 2010). However, David Harvey has rightly pointed out the need to initiate a political process that can lead the world to a point where feasible alternatives, real possibilities become identifiable. In this critical situation he further discusses three alternative visions for getting out of the market ethics imposed by the neoliberalisation;

Firstly, the primitivists who believe that the only hope for humanity is to return to that stage of hunter-gathering that preceded the rise of civilization and, in effect, start human history all over again.

Secondly, those who are influenced by movements like Crime Think and authors such as Derrick Jensen, who seek to purge themselves of all traces of incorporation into the capitalist market logic.

Thirdly those who seek a world of mutual support through the formation of local economic trading systems (LETS) with their own 'local moneys' even in the very heart of a neoliberal capitalism (Harvey 2005:186).

The third one seems to be practical, relevant and the most viable alternative in the present world of poverty, hunger, disease and despair. This is very much a recreation of Gandhian ideas. Though Gandhian ethics are the products of a particular historical setting, they find themselves to be the best possible solution in the present world order. We have been able to create prosperous countries, but we have failed to create better human beings, a better future and a better world. Therefore, again we have to keep faith in our villages and rural masses. By creating local industries and local market, the poor will get the actual value for his labour. In this way, Gandhian thought system can be of eminent relevance for the attainment of a better world. His ideas are by no means outmoded; on the contrary it can be well applied in today's context.

Concluding Remarks

To sum up, the eye catching economic growth followed by globalization in the world reflects only one side of the whole picture. The period of globalization that allows the capital to move around freely within and outside a country has widened income disparity and poverty among the populations. Not only have the products of the growth not been shared equally but most of them have been left behind without the opportunities to catch up with the main stream. In this manner a single problem is leading to a series of sufferings for the common man, making life more vulnerable. Excessive reliance on market economy for satisfying the greed of a few has become the root of all economic and social problems. For a large section of people who have been left outside the market system without the support and protection of social structures, poses the urgent need of theoretical and practical inquiries into our existing condition and seek to derive possible alternatives. In this context Gandhian economic ideas appears to be the most pragmatic one to address the question of human security.

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Terrorism and Nuclear Security in South Asia: The Case of Pakistan

C Vinodan

Abstract

Although nuclear weapons may no longer be at the forefront of great power diplomacy with the familiar Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union fading into history, nuclear weapons remain an important consideration for international policy makers. Even though Cold War-era deterrence strategies fall short when faced with non-state nuclear threats because of the underlying state-centric assumptions, the lack of rational motives exhibited by certain non-state groups and the problems of retaliating against an actor with no territorial base, the theoretical framework on which Cold War deterrence rests still offers much advice to policy makers today even when considering threats from non-state actors. The South Asian region is most prone to these new challenges. Risks of nuclear terrorism and blackmail have increased significantly in recent years mainly because of three factors: the growth and spread of nuclear weapons, the expansion of civilian nuclear programs and the increase in extremist political groups waging campaigns of terror.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the international security agenda is witnessing profound change. We are confronted with a shifting face of violence. We are no longer primarily confronted with traditional threats, such as violence between states or coalitions of states. Today, most conflicts are of a non-traditional nature - from intrastate conflict to translational challenges. The South Asian region is most prone to these new challenges. Risks of nuclear terrorism and blackmail have increased significantly in recent years mainly because of three factors: the growth and spread of nuclear weapons, the expansion of civilian nuclear programs and the increase in extremist political groups waging campaigns of terror (Saideman and Zahar 2008). It is one of the few remaining parts of the world to have failed meaningfully to move its security away from the exercise and manipulation of military threat and towards the building of transparency, cooperation and trust, and the creation of frameworks and institutional arrangements within which security issues can be handled at the political level and without violence. One aspect that has received inadequate attention is the relationship between terrorism and the regional politics of nuclear weapons.

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The South Asian region is characterized by the active presence of terrorists who have the potential for indiscriminate mass violence, and by the growth of nuclear tensions, particularly after the nuclear tests in 1998 by India and Pakistan (Hersh 2009). The longstanding hostility between India and Pakistan has the potential to facilitate nuclear/radiological terrorism in a number of ways. The scope for terrorists to determine the course of events in the region parallels the nuclear stances of India and Pakistan. Each form of nuclear posture carries some risk of terrorist involvement. This growing danger encompasses much of the world (Spector 2009; Riedel 2009). Lax or inadequate security over nuclear materials and weapons in one country could be exploited to trigger atomic blackmail and terrorism elsewhere. Inadequate security at nuclear facilities also could provide extremists waging a campaign of terror within a nation an opportunity to create a situation of national terror by seizing or sabotaging a civilian nuclear power plant or a research reactor or a laboratory. The increasing level of technological sophistication among terrorist groups, coupled with a renewed determination to achieve political goals, has significantly raised the potential for nuclear terrorism. This paper analyses the growing menace of terrorism and nuclear risks in South Asia. The concerns regarding safety, security and stability of South Asia attracted global attention following the Indo-Pak nuclear stand off and the fragile state structure of Pakistan. The paper argues that link between the terrorist groups and the Pakistani military establishment is posing danger to the region in particular and to the entire world.

Social science research on efforts to maintain safe operations in many modern technological systems suggests that serious accidents are likely over time if the system in question has two structural characteristics: high interactive complexity and tight-coupling. While the Indian and Pakistani nuclear arsenals are small and not complex, it is also clear that the South Asian nuclear relationship is inherently tightly coupled because of geographical proximity. With inadequate warning systems in place and with weapons with short flight times emerging in the region, the time-lines for decision making are highly compressed, and the danger that one accident could lead to another and then lead to a catastrophic accidental war is high and growing. The proximity of New Delhi and Islamabad to the potential adversary's border poses particular concerns about rapid decapitation attacks on national capitals. Moreover, there are legitimate concerns about social stability, especially in Pakistan, that could compromise nuclear weapons safety and security (Sagan 2001). Military stability and deterrence in South Asia continue to pose sources of regional and international concern. Despite efforts both within and beyond the region to achieve greater regional stability, conflict between India and Pakistan continues over Kashmir. In recent years, Islamabad's support for the Taliban has elicited widespread international criticism. And the violent actions which it

promotes both within and beyond Pakistan have worked to heighten regional tensions. Beyond this, turmoil in Afghanistan has generated refugee flows, which are raising tensions in Pakistan's border regions. Still, Islamabad's principle source of external concern remains India with past history and geopolitics both playing a central role in its threat calculus (Chakma 2010). Lacking the territorial depth, economic power and population of its eastern neighbour, and having suffered considerable damage at India's hands in 1971, insecurities run deep -- with New Delhi viewed not only as a regional rival but as a deadly threat to the continued integrity of the nation itself.


Nuclear Security in South Asia

Pakistan is passing through an extremely delicate phase in its history. Recent instability in Pakistan, including the Taliban's advance into settled areas, prompted the Pakistani military to undertake large-scale military operations in the Swat Valley. As military and Taliban forces fight in the rugged tribal terrain, several Western analysts have raised concerns about the future of nuclear Pakistan (Riedel 2009; Bender 2009). Now a days the immediate risks involving the proliferation of nuclear weapons is from terrorist threat rather than from state using these weapons in a war front as an ultimate deter. Since the proliferation of nuclear weapons happened across the various regions including South Asia which involved state actors claimed it as foremost for securing its national security. But the intentions behind these vary greatly. In such a context, the involvement of rational and irrational actors getting into the sphere of proliferation of WMD looming large. So the risks of nuclear weapons falls into the hands of irrational and non-state actors such as Al-Qaida remain the principal threat to the safety and stability of South Asia. This is the negative effects of proliferation as against the ideas conceived by proliferation optimists like Kenneth Waltz,¹ who supporting proliferation of nuclear weapons across the regions that decrease the chances of war. When these nuclear weapons spread across the world the concern of safety and security arises. It needs high degree of command and control and high alerts. In the present situation transnational character of terrorist's organizations can increase the vulnerability of security of nuclear weapons such as theft of fissile material or attack against nuclear facilities. In such a context nuclear deterrence cannot be used against international terrorist's organizations because terrorists do not have land, industries, people, or standing armies that can be targeted retaliatory strikes (Sethi 2010). The future goal of the terrorists will push both countries to persuade a nuclear standoff between the two countries which will destabilize the subcontinent. This will led to the favourable environment for non-state actors to indulge in violence. That is why they are continuously organizing terror attacks like the 26-11, 2008 Mumbai terror attack and the 03-03, 2009

terrorist attack on SriLankan cricketers in Lahore. The continuing political instability in Pakistan and lack of democratic roots led to the country sides of Pakistan especially North Western Frontier which is sharing its border with Afghanistan fall into the hands of extremists. This was more evident in the Swat Valley where Pakistan government compromised with Taliban outfits and agreed to implement *Shariyat-Law* and this was one of the explicit example of the extent of extremist influence in the governance of Pakistan.²

Islamist extremism and militancy has been a menace to Pakistani society throughout the post- 2001 period, becoming especially prevalent since 2007 (See Chart 1). Pakistan is the site of numerous armed insurgencies of various scales that represent an increasingly severe threat to domestic, regional, and perhaps global security.³

Chart 1: Comparison of Attacks and Casualties (2007-10)



Source: Pakistan Security Report (2010)

With over 10,000 killed in violent incidents across the country in 2010, Pakistan was the most volatile country in the region, pushing war-ravaged Afghanistan — which saw its most lethal year since the beginning of the Global War on Terror in 2001 — to second position

in this regard. As against 7,123 people killed in Afghanistan through the year, 10,003 were killed in Pakistan in incidents of violence and terrorism. Still, this is an improvement over 2009 when 12,623 fatalities were reported in incidents of violence and terror.⁴ On the other hand, more civilians lost their life in 2010 than the preceding year as terrorist attacks in the Federally Administered Tribal Agencies increased by 28 per cent despite ongoing military operations in South Waziristan, Bajaur and Orakzai. Though there has been a significant decline in casualties in incidents of violence in the region stretching from South Asia to West Asia, it is not indicative of any substantial improvement in the regional security situation on the whole. A particularly alarming development in recent years is the significantly increased incidence of militants making direct attacks on Pakistani security institutions.⁵ There was a growing trend of militants garnering support by promising to fill a vacuum left by “ineffective” government structures (Fishman, 2010). The myriad and sometimes disparate Islamist militant groups operating in Pakistan, many of which have displayed mutual animosity in the past, appear to have become more intermingled and mutually supportive in recent times (*Chicago Tribune*, 2009).

Nuclear Risks in South Asia

The nuclear risks currently present in South Asia, and which are likely to grow and mutate in the coming years, can be broadly categorized as “arsenal risks” and “employment risks.” The former stem from the very existence of nuclear arsenals in the two countries and are largely related to the areas of safety and security. The latter are concerned with the employment and seizure of nuclear weapons, either deliberately or inadvertently.⁶ In the narrow sense it connotes the launching of a nuclear strike by one side because of systemic problems in the areas of intelligence, command and control, and decision-making. The increasing leverage of Non State Actors and fragile state structure in Pakistan added much attention to this argument. In the broader sense it also incorporates unplanned but deliberate escalation wherein despite the original intention to keep risk-taking below the nuclear threshold, matters get out of hand because of the escalatory tendency inherent in crisis and war. The “arsenal risks” present in South Asia with regard to safety and security are difficult to evaluate. Both countries put out virtually no information on these matters in the public domain. More important, it is difficult to estimate how the 1998 shift from a “non-weaponized” posture to a “non-deployed” posture has impacted safety and security issues. The shift has not reduced the opacity of the two arsenals but it is clear that warhead and missile numbers are now rapidly increasing, limited more by production capacity than by international restraints. Pakistan’s difficulties in this area are likely to stem from its first-use posture and from its technological and financial constraints.⁷

The “employment risks” in South Asia, as elsewhere, can be broadly categorized as preventive, preemptive, inadvertent, and deliberate. Politically, a bolt-from-the-blue preventive strike is very difficult. Operationally, while such a strike might catch many delivery systems in their peacetime concentrations, it would not catch them all. In the case of bombs and warheads, the numbers destroyed are unlikely to be significant. Destroying the bulk of one another’s arsenals after the systems have been dispersed on crisis warning is operationally impossible for both countries.⁸ Poor intelligence about the opponent’s decision to launch a nuclear strike can pose an excruciating dilemma in South Asia. An inadvertent strike from either side stemming from deficiencies in intelligence, command and control, and decision-making cannot be ruled out.⁹ Poor decision-making can also spell danger, particularly in Pakistan where narrow military considerations have tended to dominate strategic decision-making dysfunctionally (Hoyt, 2001). To complicate the situation, Pakistan has sought to subvert rational deterrence by trying to sap all its three main components. The rationality of actors is sought to be undermined by projecting a disdain for relative cost calculations, the unitary nature of actors by the possibility of political-military and radical- conservative splits in decision-making circles, and sensitivity to costs by a supposed Islamic nonchalance towards death. The other type of inadvertent war risk—decisions rolling out of control in an escalatory spiral—is also possible in the India-Pakistan context. There is deep hostility, mistrust, poor communications, and, most dangerously, a mutual discounting of one another’s resolve and capability.

Nuclear Safety in Pakistan

Pakistan is a vitally important country in the contemporary global political system. It is a de facto nuclear state, and a pivotal country in the War on Terror. The fragile state structure in Pakistan and the increasing influence of Non State Actors in to military and nuclear establishment raises serious concern across the globe. The assassination of Benazir Bhutto on December 27, 2007 was a sharp reminder of that countries institutional collapse. A simple truth in vast regions of Pakistan today is that the state has withered away and the Non- State Actors are extended their influence in the Swathe valley, North West Frontier Province, Federally administered tribal areas and Baluchistan. The security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons and infrastructure has been the subject of much coverage and debate in recent months as Pakistani government forces have stepped up their fight against insurgents. Growing extremism, an expanding nuclear portfolio, and continuing instability challenge Pakistan's ability to protect its nuclear arsenal. Non –proliferation experts and researchers warns in particular against the slow leak of nuclear expertise and materials to Non State actors (Arms Control Association 2009). The state of Pakistan also failed to address the new challenge in a serious manner. The other

stake holders India and the United States failed to address the issue in a meaningful way. A potentially much greater threat comes from flawed assumptions and rhetorical excesses, which could lead Pakistan, India and the United States down the wrong path. Pakistan's nuclear program is nearly three decade old (Albright 2000). Guided by its animosity towards and rivalry with India, Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability is aimed at matching and undermining India's regional influence. Domestic imperatives play a significant role in shaping Pakistan's nuclear policy. Pakistan's nuclear weapons program is the preserve of its anti-Indian military establishment. Its political bureaucracy assumes a subordinate role. Even during Pakistan's brief democratic interludes, the military retained control over the nuclear weapons programme.

The country became an overt nuclear weapon power in 1998, when it carried out several tests in response to India's resumption of nuclear tests. In recent years, Pakistan has continued to expand its nuclear weapons program both in terms of delivery systems and through more effective warheads by proceeding from highly enriched uranium (HEU)-based devices to those based on plutonium (Norris & Kristensen 2009). According to analyses in 2010, a second plutonium production reactor is likely to have begun operations by late 2009.¹⁰ Construction of a third plutonium production reactor at Khushab began in 2006. In addition, associated facilities are being expanded, especially plutonium separation facilities at New Labs, Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology, to reprocess spent fuel from the new reactors at Khushab (Albright and Brannan 2009). Thus, Islamabad appears to be expanding and diversifying its nuclear weapons capability through the plutonium route's more compact and powerful warheads in its quest for a secure second-strike capability against India (Nelson 2006). There is no confirmed data regarding the location and production sites of Pakistan's nuclear weapons, but Islamabad is considered to have more than half-a-dozen storage locations (Norris & Kristensen 2009) (See Table 1).

It is commonly believed that the fissile cores of Pakistan's arsenal are stored separately from the non-nuclear components (Albright, O'Neill and Hinderstein 2001). However, during the Kargil conflict, Pakistan is believed to have armed its nuclear capable missiles in possible preparation for nuclear strike on India, and Islamabad has hinted at having considered the nuclear option during the Indo-Pak confrontation in 2002 (*BBC News Online*, 2002). None of the Pakistani nuclear materials is under International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards. The enrichment of weapon grade material has progressed and the number of Pakistan's nuclear weapons has increased since the initial weapons tests in 1998. In 2002, after a year of frequent tensions with India, Pakistan has reported to have accelerated work on its nuclear arsenal, with workers putting in around-the-clock shifts (Mc Carthy 2002). Estimated Pakistan's nuclear

strength before 9/11 was about 425-800 kilogram (kg) of weapons-grade uranium, about 600 kg of plutonium and up to 7 dozens nuclear weapons (Albright 2001). A recent report suggests that Pakistan possess up to 70-90 nuclear weapons and has fissile material for up to 52 more (See Table 2). Thus, one can assume that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal will continue expand at a rapid pace, and the requirements for securing it will concomitantly increase.

Table 1: Estimated Locations of Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons, 2009.

COUNTRY	LOCATION	REGION	WEAPON SYSTEM	REMARKS
PAKISTAN	Faisaljjang National Defense Complex	Punjab	SSMs	Missile development and potential warhead storage capability.
	Mazroor Weapons Depot	Sindh	Various	Possible storage of bombs for Mirage Vs at Mazroor Air Base and/or warheads for SSMs.
	Sargodha Weapons Depot	Punjab	Various	Possible storage site of bombs for F-16s at nearby Sargodha Air Base and warheads for SSMs. ¹³
	Shankar Dera Missile Complex	Punjab	SSMs	Missile development and potential warhead storage capability.
	Three kilometers north of Quetta Air Base	Baluchistan	Bombs	Possible storage site with underground facilities in high-security weapons storage area.
	Wah Ordnance Facility	Punjab	Various	Possible warhead production, disassembly, and dismantlement facility. ¹⁴
	Unknown air force facility	Unknown	Bombs	Central air force storage facility with bombs for F-16s at Sargodha Air Base and Mirage Vs at Kamra Air Base.
	Unknown army facility	Unknown	SSMs/SLCMs	Central army storage facility with warheads for SSMs and Pakun-1000 missiles.
SUBTOTAL	8			

Source: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/ December, 2009

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Table-2: Estimated Global Nuclear Weapon Inventories, 2009

Russia	13,000*
United States	9,400**
France	300
China	240
Britain	180
Israel	80-100
Pakistan	70-90
India	60-80
North Korea	?
TOTAL	~23,360

Source: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/ December, 2009

The concern regarding the safe custody of Pakistan's nuclear weapons have arisen because of the steady growth of Jihadi culture supported by the ruling establishment. The process started during the regime of Ziaul Haq who promoted Nizam-e-Mustafa in the country; American sponsored against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan accelerated the spread of religious extremism in Pakistan. Brigadier S.K. Malik *The Quranic Concept of War*, with forward by General Ziaul Haq, is a notorious example of religious concept being imported in to the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence (Zuberi 2001). It is generally believed that the military, as the important player in the nation, has full responsibility for command and control of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. However, after the events of September 11, 2001, there was in international circles considerable concern about, and analysis of, the safety of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal (Ramusino and Martellini 2002). There were reports that nuclear arsenal had been dispersed to multiple locations after the September 11 attacks (*Global Security Newswire* 2001). Dispersion could itself result in an increased internal threat to the arsenal by increasing the number of

locations that could be targeted by terrorists. The Musharaff government was quick to dismiss concerns about the Pakistani arsenal. Musharaff himself claimed that it was safe and that there was no chance of its falling in to the hands of fundamentalists. However, given Pakistan's history and its extensive and persistent links to Islamic radicals, such claims need to be viewed with some skepticism. Potential dangers to Pakistan's nuclear assets include loss of control over nuclear technology, weapons, weapons components or fissile material. The most commonly discussed threat is from terrorists or their sympathizers within Pakistan military and nuclear establishments. In addition, a coup could instantly transfer control of Pakistan's nuclear assets to a new regime with unknown intentions. There is also the possibility (albeit a relatively remote one) of the Pakistani establishments knowingly passing some of its nuclear assets to another nation, or to a non-state actor. Under any of those circumstances, the dangers to region security would increase. Possession of nuclear weapons by terrorists is an especially grave concern in India after the December 13, 2001, terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament.

The Khan Network and the New Challenge of Nuclear Terrorism

After the events of September 11, 2001, no one doubts that terrorists might be interested in killing a lot of people. In our effort to understand the level of risk of nuclear terrorism in the future, it is therefore worth considering the relationship, if any, between the spread of nuclear weapons to fragile states and the danger that terrorist organizations will get and use nuclear weapons. Some terrorists, like Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaida network, have been quite open in stating their desire for nuclear weapons. Indeed, after Osama bin Laden declared a Jihad (holy war) against the United States, he was asked about reports that he wanted nuclear weapons and replied, "...to possess the weapons that could counter those of the infidels is a religious duty." Any terrorist leader with this kind of strategic vision is not likely to be deterred from using nuclear weapons or radiological weapons against the moderate states. Pakistan is clearly the most serious concern in this regard. Prior to September 11th, there were no specialized Pakistani teams trained on how to seize or dismantle a stolen nuclear weapon. No dedicated personnel reliability program (PRP) was in place to insure the psychological stability and reliability of the officers and guards of Pakistan's nuclear forces. The danger of terrorists gaining access to a Pakistani nuclear weapon is heightened during crises when Pakistan is likely to go on a nuclear alert and disperse weapons from secure storage sites to make them invulnerable to an Indian attack. Dispersal, however, makes such weapons more vulnerable to attack or seizure by terrorists or terrorists aided by military insiders. The existence of this "vulnerability/invulnerability paradox" should provide a strong incentive to avoid military threats and crises in South Asia (Sagan 2001). In February 2004, Dr. Abdul

Qadeer Khan, the former head of Khan Research Labs, confessed to the illicit transfer of nuclear weapons technology to Iran, Libya, North Korea and other countries. Khan is reported to have amassed millions of dollars from the transfers. According to media reports, Khan reportedly told Inter Services Intelligence officials that he transferred nuclear weapons technology so that other Muslim countries could use it to enhance their security (Agence France-Presse 2004). Khan was pardoned by President Musharraf in the wake of these revelations for his involvement in smuggling, in return for cooperating with Pakistani authorities to uncover the extent and scope of the smuggling network. Despite his pardon, Khan remains under house arrest while subject to questioning by Pakistani security services. In addition, several scientists and security officials have been detained and questioned, but the Pakistan government did not take any concrete action against any of these groups and individual including Khan (*BBC News* 2004).

It was reported that Khan used his national status as one of the leaders of Pakistan's nuclear efforts to conduct his black market sales of nuclear material and technology. He had established black market channels initially to acquire nuclear technology for Pakistan, but slowly the direction of the flow reversed. His old black market channels became the new channels by which Khan distributed nuclear technology and material to Iran, North Korea, and Libya. Khan did not appear to take advantage of the loopholes in the old Pakistani export control system. He had little or no oversight from the government. According to an aide close to President Musharraf, "Khan had a complete blank check. He could do anything. He could go anywhere. He could buy anything at any price" (Broad, Sanger, and Bonner 2004). In the aftermath of these revelations concerning the black market smuggling network of A.Q. Khan, the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared new export control regulations to address future concerns raised by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United States (*The News* 2004). On June 7, 2004, the Pakistani government introduced a bill in the National Assembly, known as the Export Control on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act, 2004. The bill was subsequently passed by the Pakistan National Assembly and Senate on September 14 and 19, respectively.¹¹ The bill stipulated that any violation of the act would result in up to 14 years' imprisonment, forfeiture of all property and assets to the government, and a fine of 5 million rupees (about \$86,500). Any individuals attempting to commit or abetting the commission of such offenses would be charged as if they had themselves committed the violation (Hussain 2004). The act also called for the creation of an oversight board to administer export control regulations, enforcement of the act, and licensing for export and re-export of nuclear- and biological-related goods and technology. Furthermore, exporters will also be required to

maintain records of all transactions and report them to the designated government agencies. All government agencies involved in the licensing process will be required to maintain records of all recommendations and decisions involving licensing. The control lists of items subject to licensing requirements will be reviewed periodically and updated as required by the government (The Pakistan Newswire 2004).

In spite of all these legislations and rhetoric by the Pakistani military and civilian leadership, the international community remains concerned with the growing menace of nuclear terrorism in South Asia. In the late 2007 and early 2008, some observers expressed concern about the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal if political instability were to persist (*Global Security Newswire* 2007). Former Prime Minister late Benazir Bhutto said in a November 5, 2007, interview that, although then-President Musharraf claimed to be in firm control of the nuclear arsenal, she feared this control could weaken due to instability in the country.¹² Similarly, Michael Krepon of the Henry L. Stimson Center has argued that "a prolonged period of turbulence and infighting among the country's President, Prime Minister, and Army Chief" could jeopardize the army's unity of command, which "is essential for nuclear security."¹³ During that time, U.S. military officials also expressed concern about the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons (CQ Transcripts 2007). Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed El-Baradei, also has expressed fears that a radical regime could take power in Pakistan, and thereby acquire nuclear weapons (*Dar Al Hayat* 2008). Experts also worry that while nuclear weapons are currently under firm control, with warheads disassembled, technology could be sold off by insiders during a worsened crisis.¹⁴ However, U.S. intelligence officials have expressed greater confidence regarding the security of Islamabad's nuclear weapons. Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte in testimony to Congress on November 7, 2007 said he believed that there is "plenty of succession planning that's going on in the Pakistani military" and that Pakistan's nuclear weapons are under "effective technical control."¹⁵ Similarly, Donald Kerr, Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, told a Washington audience May 29, 2008, that the Pakistani military's control of the nuclear weapons is "a good thing because that's an institution in Pakistan that has, in fact, withstood many of the political changes over the years." A Department of Defence spokesperson told reporters December 9, 2008, that Washington has "no reason at this point to have any concern with regards to the security" of Islamabad's nuclear arsenal. More recently, Maples stated March 10, 2009, that Islamabad "has taken important steps to safeguard its nuclear weapons," although he pointed out that "vulnerabilities exist." Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated in a January 21, 2010, interview that the United States is "very comfortable with the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons."¹⁶

Other governments have also voiced opinions regarding the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. For example, former Indian National Security Adviser M. K. Narayanan said that the arsenal is safe and has adequate checks and balances (The Press Trust of India 2007). Similarly, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs David Miliband told the *Charlie Rose Show* December 15, 2008 that Islamabad's nuclear weapons "are under pretty close lock and key." Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov, however, sounded somewhat less optimistic in a March 24, 2009, television interview, stating that Moscow is "very much concerned" about the security of Pakistan's arsenal (Pronina and Pinchuk 2009). Pakistani officials have consistently expressed confidence in the security of the country's nuclear arsenal. Then-President Musharraf stated in November 2007 that Pakistan's nuclear weapons are under "total custodial controls" (Agence France Presse 2007). More recently, President Asif Ali Zardari told CNN December 2, 2008, that the country's nuclear command and control system "is working well." Additionally, a Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated May 21, 2009, that "there is simply no question of our strategic assets falling into the wrong hands. We have full confidence in our procedures, mechanisms and command and control systems."

In addition to the above scenarios, the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons could also be jeopardized by another conflict between India and Pakistan, Michael Krepon argued, explaining that an "escalating war with nuclear forces in the field would increase the probability of accidents, miscalculations, and the use of nuclear weapons." This is because when tensions rise precipitously with India, the readiness level of Pakistan's nuclear deterrent also rises. Because the geographical coordinates of Pakistan's main nuclear weapon storage sites, missile, and air bases can be readily identified from satellites—and therefore targeted by opposing forces—the dictates of deterrence mandate some movement of launchers and weapons from fixed locations during crises. Nuclear weapons on the move are inherently less secure than nuclear weapons at heavily-guarded storage sites. Weapons and launchers in motion are also more susceptible to "insider" threats and accidents (Krepon 2008). Such a war, Krepon added, would also place stress on the army's unity of command. Krepon has also pointed out that Islamabad faces a dilemma, because less-dispersed nuclear weapons may be more vulnerable to a disarming military strike from India (Krepon 2009).

Conclusions

Although nuclear weapons may no longer be at the forefront of great power diplomacy with the familiar Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union

fading into history, nuclear weapons remain an important consideration for international policy makers. Even though Cold War-era deterrence strategies fall short when faced with non-state nuclear threats because of the underlying state-centric assumptions, the lack of rational motives exhibited by certain non-state groups and the problems of retaliating against an actor with no territorial base, the theoretical framework on which Cold War deterrence rests still offers much advice to policy makers today even when considering threats from non-state actors. The acquisition of nuclear capabilities has critically both enabled and emboldened Islamabad to pursue strategies such as support for insurgents and proxy warfare with increasing confidence. Pakistani security elites, therefore, appreciate that nuclearization is an important enabling condition for Pakistan's continued reliance on jihad throughout India. Seeking to deter terrorists, especially committed, jihadi groups such as Al Qaeda willing to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD), poses significant challenges. In this context, India and Pakistan must realise their strategic vulnerabilities in the emerging global security scenario. India should play a meaningful role in redefining the security structure in the subcontinent. It should accept the challenges facing Pakistan for its survival in the post-Iraq war scenario. A stable, democratic and prosperous Pakistan will certainly enhance stability and security of the subcontinent. Any attempt to destabilize Pakistan either by India or by external powers would certainly destabilize the region or jeopardize the security interests of India. Pakistan should also recognise and accept its strategic vulnerability in the emerging international order. Pakistan's immediate concerns will be to ensure the safety and security of its nuclear establishment along with containing terrorism in their soil. Any further attempt to collaborate with the Jihadi groups or proliferation efforts would certainly invites external intervention in to the country. A mature democratic leadership is needed to tackle the most volatile situation in the history of Pakistan and also in the history of the subcontinent. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the Pakistani leaders (Zardar/Gilani) now have a rare opportunity to engineer the shift from recurring crises to a nuclear safety. The immediate task is to ensure nuclear safety, stability and security in South Asia. This can be achieved through improved bi-lateral relations and the avoidance of another crisis. India and Pakistan should sincerely review the existing nuclear confidence and security building measures and stabilize the existing CBMs. And without nuclear CBMs the dangerous political tensions between the two countries, fuelled by feelings of mutual vulnerability, cannot be mitigated. The time may have come to develop a new balance between the needs of war risk reduction and those of non-proliferation. It is the responsibility of the Indian and Pakistani leadership to come out of their negative nationalistic perspective to a broad national, region and global approach to fulfill the long cherished aspirations of the millions of the people in the sub-continent for peace, prosperity and development.

Notes

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1. As a body of thought, nuclear optimism has passed through two distinct stages. Although its lineage can be traced to the classic deterrence theorists, its first robust articulation was Kenneth Waltz's iconoclastic "more may be better" argument. Waltz uses rational deterrence theory and structural realism to advance two interconnected propositions. First, "nuclear weapons, responsibly used, make wars hard to start. Nations that have nuclear weapons have strong incentives to use them responsibly", (Kenneth N. Waltz (1981): *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better*, Adelphi Papers 171 (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 30). Second, the first proposition holds true "for small as for big nuclear powers;" thus, "the measured spread of nuclear weapons is more to be welcomed than feared".(Waltz, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons,".30)
2. See for more discussion on the related issues Brahma Chellaney "Fighting Terrorism in Southern Asia: The Lessons of History", *International Security*, 23 (3) winter 2001/02, pp. 94-116. Thomas Fuller, "Stroking Southeast Asia Tensions," *International Herald Tribune*, October 31, 2001, p. 1.
3. For example, in late 2008, the British Prime Minister estimated that three-quarters of the most serious terrorism plots investigated in Britain had links to Al Qaeda in Pakistan ("Brown Offers Pakistan Anti-Terror Aid," *Washington Post*, December 15, 2008).
4. Pakistan Security Report (2010), PIPS, Islamabad. The report shows that there was also a decline in casualties among "militants" despite a 165-per-cent increase in drone attacks that are supposed to specifically target terrorists based on intelligence. "Militants' casualties" fell by 27 per cent since 2009.
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The India-China Trade Relations: Implications for India's Trade with South Asia

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Abstract

Integration is taking place under “current globalisation,” which consists of free trade, free capital movement and domestic labour market flexibility. Bilateral trade between China and India, the world's two most populous countries, has expanded substantially in recent years. Few studies have however focused on the understanding of India - China trade relationship with respect to India's trade with south Asian countries. This paper examines the changing pattern of India's international trade with the World's major economies. Specifically Its objective is to examine and compare international trade in and between the India and China and to draw implications for India's trade and economic cooperation among South Asian countries with respect to steady growing trade with China.

Introduction

India-China trade relations are the most important part of bilateral relations between India and China. China and India today represent Asia's two largest and most dynamic societies which are emerging as new trend setters in international relations. Especially, with their outstanding annual GDP growth rates, China and India have since come to be recognised as the fastest growing economies. According to World Bank estimates, and assessed on the basis of purchasing power parity, China and India have already become the second and fourth largest economies of the world respectively surpassing developed countries. From the global perspective, China and India today represent two unique new players—presenting an extraordinary combination of a very large GDP and still with significant poverty and pockets of unrest and a very low per capita income and living standards. This unique combination raises several questions about their becoming major drivers of international economic trends.

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However, in the politico-strategic sphere, their recent economic success has resulted in both seeking an expanded space in regional as well as international decision-making, something that is becoming a matter of worldwide concern. Thanks, however, to their colonial and cold war legacies, their economic success had, for a long time, remained a mutually exclusive exercise thus slowing down their pace of progress and its global impact. It is only rather recently that their political initiatives at confidence-building began to expand their areas of mutual co-operation, which now remains premised on their new mantra of mutual accommodation and mutual benefit. Their bilateral trade has since come to be recognised as the most reliable as also the most agreeable instrument of China-India rapprochement. Their long-term potential as trade partners, however, remains yet to be fully explored and exploited and their political equations remain yet vulnerable to their problematic legacies. It is in this context of their fast changing equations that this article makes an attempt to hypothesise how their bilateral trade promises to become the most potent instrument for resolving their political difficulties and facilitate progress in actualising their strategic partnership for the future. This China-India economic partnership remains an essential prerequisite for the success of the regional and global political initiatives.

Historical Background - An Overview

China and India established diplomatic relations on April 1, 1950. India was the second country to establish diplomatic relations with China among the non-socialist countries. In 1954, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and Indian Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru exchanged visits and jointly initiated the famous Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in December 1988, facilitated a warming trend in relations. The two sides issued a joint statement that stressed the need to restore friendly relations on the basis of the Panch Sheel and noted the importance of the first visit by an Indian Prime Minister to China since Nehru's 1954 visit. India and China Economy agreed to broaden bilateral ties in various areas, working to achieve a "fair and reasonable settlement while seeking a mutually acceptable solution" to the border dispute.

The Late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi signed bilateral agreements on science and technology cooperation, on civil aviation to establish direct air links, and on cultural exchanges. The two sides also agreed to hold annual diplomatic consultations between foreign ministers, and to set up a joint ministerial committee on economic and scientific cooperation and a joint working group on the boundary issue. The latter group was to be led by the Indian foreign secretary and the Chinese vice minister of foreign affairs. As the mid-1990s approached, slow but steady improvement in relations with China was visible. Top-level dialogue continued with the December 1991 visit of Chinese Premier Li Peng to India and the May 1992 visit to China of Indian President Ramaswami Venkataraman. Border trade resumed in July 1992 after a hiatus of more than thirty years Consulates reopened in Mumbai and Shanghai in December 1992, and, in June 1993, the two sides agreed to open an additional border trading post.

Though, Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in December 1988 is usually identified as a turning point and break-through in India-China relations, it should also be noted that many years of previous effort had a contribution to it. In 1976, the two countries decided to restore ambassadorial-level diplomatic ties after a gap of 15 years. The next major step was foreign minister Vajpayee's visit to China in February 1979. In 1984, India & China signed a Trade Agreement, providing for Most Favoured Nation Treatment. In 1994 the two countries signed agreements on avoiding double taxation. Agreements for cooperation on health and medical science, MOUs on simplifying the procedure for visa application and on banking cooperation between the two countries have also been signed.

The Chinese economy was decentralized in 1978 and major economic reforms were introduced which created conditions for rapid economic growth and structural changes in China. In 1980, China's share in world trade was less than one percent, and it started permitting foreign direct investment (FDI). In 1999, China had grown to become the world's second largest economy after US in terms of GDP. The high growth rate of China is attributed to high levels of trade and greater investment effort. Strong exports growth from China has helped push its economy to a growth rate of 9.1% in 2003-2004. China is the world's second largest recipient for FDI with total FDI inflows crossing US \$ 53 billion in 2003. Growth in Special Economic Zones (SEZ) has also helped China increase its productivity.

Recently Chinese premier Wen Jiabao visited India, where he said that India and China must take their trade to \$60 billion level. Seeing the whopping growth in Sino-Indian trade, China outlined a five-point agenda, including reducing trade barriers and enhancing multilateral cooperation to boost bilateral trade.

Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Between India and China

There is a much talk about the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between India and China, which may fail to materialize unless and until China addresses the near \$20 billion trade deficit that India has with China, for this China needs to lower non-tariff barriers to facilitate the increased movement of goods over the border in the other direction.

An Overview of China-India Trade in South Asia

The bilateral trade crossed US\$13.6 billion in 2004 from US\$ 4.8 billion in 2002, reaching \$18.7 billion in 2005. The India China trade relations have been further developed from 2006, with the initiation of the border trade between Tibet, an autonomous region of China, and India through Nathu La Pass, reopened after more than 40 years. The leaders of both the countries have decided to enhance the bilateral trade to US\$ 20 billion by 2008 and further to US\$ 30 billion by 2010, was also achieved.

India's Overall Trade with China in Recent Years

The principal items of Indian exports to China are ores, slag and ash, iron and steel, plastics, organic chemicals, and cotton. In order to increase the extent of exporting Indian goods to China, however, there should be a special emphasis on investments and trade in services and knowledge-based sectors. The other potential items of trade between India and China are marine products, oil seeds, salt, inorganic chemicals, plastic, rubber, optical and medical equipment, and dairy products. Great potential also exists in areas like biotechnology, IT and ITES, health, education, tourism, and financial sector.

Note: All the tables and diagram's are prepared by author by compiling the data taken from the ministry of commerce, data bank. (All the Values in Million \$).

Table 1: India's Overall Trade with China in Recent Years

S.No.	Year	2005-2006	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010
1	EXPORT	6,759.10	8,321.86	10,871.34	9,353.50	11,617.88
2	%Growth		23.12	30.64	-13.96	24.21
3	India's Total Export	103,090.53	126,414.05	163,132.18	185,295.36	178,751.43
4	%Growth		22.62	29.05	13.59	-3.53
5	%Share	6.56	6.58	6.66	5.05	6.5
6	IMPORT	10,868.05	17,475.03	27,146.41	32,497.02	30,824.02
7	%Growth		60.79	55.34	19.71	-5.15
8	India's Total Import	149,165.73	185,735.24	251,654.01	303,696.31	288,372.88
9	%Growth		24.52	35.49	20.68	-5.05
10	%Share	7.29	9.41	10.79	10.7	10.69
11	TOTAL TRADE	17,627.15	25,796.89	38,017.74	41,850.52	42,441.90
12	%Growth		46.35	47.37	10.08	1.41
13	India's Total Trade	252,256.26	312,149.29	414,786.19	488,991.67	467,124.31
14	%Growth		23.74	32.88	17.89	-4.47
15	%Share	6.99	8.26	9.17	8.56	9.09
16	INDIA'S TRADE BALANCE	-46,075.20	-59,321.19	-88,521.83	-118,400.95	-109,621.45

India's Five Major Trading Partners in 2009-10**Table 2: India's Five Major Trading Partners in 2009-10 (In Million \$)**

Rank	Country	Export	Import	Total Trade
1	U ARAB EMTS	23,970.40	19,499.10	43,469.50
2	CHINA P RP	11,617.88	30,824.02	42,441.90
3	U S A	19,535.49	16,973.68	36,509.17
4	SAUDI ARAB	3,907.00	17,097.57	21,004.57
5	GERMANY	5,412.89	10,318.18	15,731.07
	<i>Total of Top 5 countries</i>	64,443.66	94,712.54	159,156.21
	INDIA'S TOTAL	178,751.42	288,372.87	467,098.71

Major Trading Partners in 2002-03**Table 3: Major Trading Partners in 2002-03 (values in million \$)**

Rank	Country	Export	Import	Total Trade
1	UNSPECIFIED	206.05	17,783.3 8	17,989.43
2	U S A	10,895.76	4,443.58	15,339.34
3	BELGIUM	1,661.84	3,711.93	5,373.76
4	U K	2,496.41	2,777.01	5,273.42
5	CHINA P RP	1,975.48	2,792.04	4,767.52
	<i>Total of Top 5 countries</i>	17,235.54	31,507.93	48,743.47
	INDIA'S TOTAL	52,719.42	61,412.13	114,040.40

India's Exports Position in South Asia in 2009-10**Table 4: India's Trade Position in South Asia 2009-10 (Exports)**

S.No.	Country	2009-2010
1	AFGHANISTAN TIS	463.55
2	BANGLADESH PR	2,433.77
3	BHUTAN	118.86
4	MALDIVES	79.86
5	NEPAL	1,533.31
6	PAKISTAN IR	1,573.32
7	SRI LANKA DSR	2,188.01
8	CHINA P RP	11,617.88
	TOTAL	20,008.56

India's Imports in South Asia in 2009-10**Table 5: India's Export in South Asia in 2000-2001 (Value in million \$)**

S. No.	Country	2009-2010
1	AFGHANISTAN TIS	126.24
2	BANGLADESH PR	313.11
3	BHUTAN	151.79
4	MALDIVES	3.97
5	NEPAL	496.04
6	PAKISTAN IR	370.17
7	SRI LANKA DSR	356.57
8	CHINA P RP	32,497.02
	TOTAL	34314.91

India's Export in South Asia in 2000-2001**Table 6: India's Export in South Asia in 2000-2001 (Value in million \$)**

S.No.	Country	2000-2001
1	AFGHANISTAN TIS	25.86
2	BANGLADESH PR	935.04
3	MALDIVES	24.61
4	NEPAL	140.84
5	PAKISTAN IR	186.83
6	SRI LANKA DSR	640.14
7	CHINA P RP	831.3
	TOTAL	1,954.41

India's Import in South Asia in 2000-2001**Table 7: India's Import in South Asia in 2000-2001 (Value in million \$)**

S.No.	Country	2000-2001
1	AFGHANISTAN TIS	26.59
2	BANGLADESH PR	80.51
3	NEPAL	255.08
4	PAKISTAN IR	64.03
5	SRI LANKA DSR	45.01
6	CHINA P RP	1,502.20
	TOTAL	1973.42

India's Overall Trade Balances with China and South Asian Countries

**Table 8: India's Overall Trade Balances with China and South Asian Countries
(Values in Million \$)**

	YEAR	2005-2006	2006-2007	2007-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010
CHINA	Export	6,759.10	8,321.86	10,871.34	9,353.50	11,617.88
	Import	10,868.05	17,475.03	27,146.41	32,497.02	30,824.02
	Trade Balance	-4,108.95	-9,103.17	-16,275.03	-23,143.52	-19,206.14
PAKISTAN	Export	689.23	1,350.09	1,950.53	1,439.88	1,573.32
	Import	179.56	323.62	287.97	370.17	275.9
	Trade Balance	509.67	1,026.47	1,662.56	1,069.72	1,297.38
BANGLADESH	Export	1,664.36	1,629.57	2,923.72	2,497.87	2,433.77
	Import	127.03	228	257.02	313.11	254.66
	Trade Balance	1,537.34	1,401.57	2,666.70	2,184.76	2,179.11
NEPAL	Export	859.97	927.4	1,507.42	1,570.15	1,533.31
	Import	379.85	306.02	628.56	496.04	452.61
	Trade Balance	480.12	621.38	878.86	1,074.12	1,080.70
SRI LANKA	Export	2,024.67	2,258.30	2,830.43	2,425.92	2,188.01
	Import	577.7	470.33	634.96	356.57	392.19
	Trade Balance	1,446.97	1,787.96	2,195.47	2,069.35	1,795.81
BHUTAN	Export	99.17	57.66	86.74	111.15	118.8
	Import	88.77	142.05	194.72	151.79	153.1
	Trade Balance	10.4	-84.89	-107.98	-40.64	-34.3
AFGANISTAN	Export	142.67	182.11	249.21	394.23	463.55
	Import	58.42	34.37	109.97	126.24	125.19
	Trade Balance	84.24	147.73	139.24	268	338.36

Concluding Remarks

China's trade with India has witnessed an impressive rise defying all suspicions about China's special relationship with Pakistan or China's encirclement of India in south Asia. To

highlight some other strong fundamentals that promise to sustain their current trade boom, while China continues to enjoy a huge favourable balance of trade vis-a vis most other smaller states of the South Asian region, it is only the China-India trade that has remained to be steadily growing trade in South Asia, but the trade balance has been unfavourable to India with the ever increasing trade deficit. This clearly reflects the major cause of concern from the point of view of India, yet strong mutual stakes which promise to sustain this trade boom at least in the short term, and the two nations seem to be becoming increasingly relaxed about their bilateral ties. No-one today talks of a China-India clash in South Asia where both have a flourishing engagement with each other without any mutual friction or skepticism. Another aspect of the growing trade between the two countries is that it has severely affected India's Trade with other South Asian countries as is visible from the analysis above. The share of these countries has fallen substantially with India's international trade after the emergence of China as India's trading partner. The overall trade balance is continuously in negative figures with China and growing rapidly, whereas with the other South Asian countries it is in positive figures, it is increasing or almost constant as analysed above. So there is a great necessity for India to explore the new avenues of trade with these smaller countries and also to find substitutes of Chinese merchandise with the smaller partners in South Asian countries.

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Global War on Terror: Post-Bin Laden Dimensions

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Abstract

Global war on terror has been dominating international politics for the last one decade. The 9/11 attack on the Twin Towers of the New York instigated the Bush administration to declare a global war on terror. To kill Bin Laden, the USA was engaged in a long war in Afghanistan. Moreover, the propaganda of the Evangelical Christians and the global petrodollar politics pushed the USA to a wider conflict in Western Asia and South Asia. However, the death of Bin Laden has raised a number of questions about the future dimensions of the global war on terror. What would be the future of Islamic radicals? What are the policies the USA wants to promote in a post-Bin laden world? And what are the implications for the regions of South and West Asia after the death of Bin Laden? The paper tries to find answer such questions, and evaluates the possible dimensions of global war on terror in a post-Bin laden world.

Introduction

The term “global war on terror” has been dominating international politics for the last one decade. In the post Cold War world, the appearance of Al-Qaeda in the international domain has made terrorism¹ as a threat to most nations. The targeting of innocent people and suicide attacks by Bin Laden and his associates pushed the world towards uncertainty and conflict. Bin Laden and Islamic radicals organized a terror network and identified the West as ‘the enemy’ of Islam. They declared ‘Jihad’² against the West and targeted United States (US) embassies and important places all over the world. The US certainly responded towards such terrorist activities. The international community, including the United Nations (UN), came forward to face the menace of terrorism. However, the emergence of the neoconservatives in the US policy making bodies added a new debate to international terrorism.

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The Evangelical Christians and Messianic Jews identified the global war on terror as “The Clash of Civilizations”. They started defaming Islam and termed the Muslims as an “evil empire” (Phillips 2007:251). On the other hand, global petrodollar politics added a new dimension in international politics. The powerful oil companies of the US seized the “global war on terror” as a chance to expand their presence in Western Asia.

Al Qaeda’s attack on the Twin Tower of the US on September 11, 2001, widely known as 9/11, came as a shock to the world. The US came forward as the leading country to dismantle the terrorist networks.

The international community identified terrorism as a challenge to the development and stability of the world. Global and regional organizations felt an urgency to evolve security frameworks in this regard. The UN, European Union (EU) and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) formed new strategies to face the menace of terrorism.³ Bin Laden, the mastermind of 9/11, was identified as the prime target. The US military started a well equipped military attack on Afghanistan to kill Bin Laden. But, for one decade, the US intelligence forces failed to detain him. Finally, on May 1, 2011, the Obama administration orchestrated a well planned military attack on Abbottabad of Pakistan and the US Navy SEAL⁴ commandos killed Bin Laden. International media recognized the death of Bin Laden as a great achievement for the global war on terror and the US celebrated it as a memorable day for Americans (Sonmez 2001). However, the death of Bin Laden unlocked new debates about the future dimensions of global war on terror. Is the global war on terror going to an end? What would be the future of the Al Qaeda network? What is the future of terrorist organizations affiliated with Al Qaeda?

Is it going to change the US policy of war against terrorism? What would be the future policy of the US in Western Asia and South Asia? What are the implications for the Muslim World in a post-Bin Laden World? The paper tries to answer such questions.

Global War on Terror: Radical Islam, Neoconservatives and Obama

In the contemporary world, the global war on terror is mostly a response to the terrorist attacks on the US interests by the radical Islamist organizations. On March 3, 1973, the Black September Organization assaulted the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum and assassinated the US ambassador to Sudan, Cleo A. Noel and other diplomats of the Saudi Arabian Embassy. The day is considered as the beginning of terrorist attacks by the Islamic radicals on US

interests. Since then, the terrorists have been targeted the US and European establishments identifying them as the root cause for backwardness and underdevelopment of the Muslim World. They instigated Muslim youths by saying that Israel is not a natural state in Western Asia. The country serves the interests of the West. Hence, the destruction of Israel can make the Muslim World more secure and it can open up ways for establishing a Palestinian state. Moreover, they included the autocratic regimes of the Western Asia in their target list terming them as subservient to the West.

However, the politics of the Cold War pushed the US intelligence wing Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to forge a link with radical Islamic ideologies in Afghanistan. When the pro-Soviet regime came to power of Afghanistan, Islamic radicals declared *Jihad* against the communist regime. The US felt an urgency to help *Jihadis* to defeat its rival Soviet Union. General Zia-ul-Haq, the former president of Pakistan cultivated radical Islamic philosophies with the help of the CIA and established *Madrashas* in the Pak-Afghan border. The King of Saudi Arabia and CIA funded radical *Madrashas* against Soviet Union. They organized *Jihadi* groups. The master mind of 9/11, Bin Laden came to Afghanistan from Saudi Arabia and fought with *Jihadis* against the communist regimes of Afghanistan. Bin Laden emerged as an influential and charismatic leader among the *Jihadis*. But, the end of the Afghan war made the *Jihadis* irrelevant and jobless.

On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. The supply of oil from the Gulf region to the US came under threat. The US felt this as a challenge to its national interest. The autocratic and militarily weak Saudi Arabia also felt a threat of invasion from Iraq. The King of Saudi Arabia invited the US to save its land and the US also felt an urgency to ensure its presence in the region. The US attacked Iraq to free Kuwait. But the presence of the US in the Saudi Land, which is considered as sacred land for Muslims, was not accepted by Bin Laden and his followers. Bin Laden used the issue and declared *Jihad* against the US. He recruited well trained Muslim youths in his organization Al Qaeda for attacking the US establishments. He declared *Jihad* against the 'enemies of Islam' and started spreading radical ideologies among the Muslim youths.

It is not that the US presence in Saudi Arabia only raised the grievances of Al Qaeda. Rather, Al Qaeda is philosophically originated from the radical Islamic thoughts, those that propagated *Jihad* against non-Muslims. Such radical Islamists are mostly originated from the political philosophy of Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) (Ahmed 2011:213). He was confronted by one of the greatest tragedies of Muslim history, the destruction of the Abbasid Caliphate by the

Mongols. Hence, he declared '*Jihad*' against heretics and apostates. He divided the world into two absolute and mutually exclusive spheres: the land of Islam (*dar al-Islam*) and the land of unbelief (*dar al-Kufr*) (Delong-Bas 2004: 248). He asserted the relationship between the two to be necessarily to be hostile and the Islamic governments had to uphold Islamic laws and must defend Islamic land against '*Kafirs*'⁵. However, the radical philosophy of Ibn Taymiyya failed to secure the integrity of the Muslim World. Rather, the lack of innovation, stagnancy, hidden corruption and internal power clash led the Muslim World towards deviation and fall. From the West to the East, the Muslim emperors lost their crowns. From the Ottoman Empire to the Delhi Sultanate, all has easily surrendered to the Western colonials.

The colonial experiences divided Muslim intellectuals mostly in to two groups. The first group became very close to western culture and norms. They were influenced by western secular thoughts and they denied the relevance of religion in politics. Mustafa Kemal of Turkey, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and General Suharto of Indonesia were the leading personalities of such thought. They were also influenced by socialist ideologies. They wanted to make a clear separation of state and religion. But, the leaders of such belief did not succeed to solve the socio-economic problems of the post-colonial Muslim societies. Rather, they became autocratic and malicious to their people. The suppression of freedom of speech and freedom of thought prevented any development of democratic and liberal political ideology. Hence, the second group, radical Islamists obtained a gap and desired to acquire state power through revolution.

In the nineteenth century, at least three Islamic radical thinkers became influential. They are Indian political activist Abul Ala Maududi (1903-79), Egyptian political thinker Mohammad Qutb (1906-66) and Egyptian political activist Hasan Al-Banna (1906-1949).⁶ Maududi and Mohammad Qutb termed the modern civilizations as *Jahiliyah* (ignorance). Hence, they declared *Jihad* against all non-Islamic forces and gave a political philosophy to acquire state power thorough revolution for ensuring the superiority of Islam. They denied equal status for all the citizens in the so called 'Islamic State', and made *Jihad* compulsory for every Muslim against the *Jahiliyah*. Hasna Al Banna was associated with Sayyid Qutb and his main role was in organizing the first radical Islamic party in the Muslim World, *Ikhwanul Muslimeenn* (Muslim Brotherhood) in 1928. Maududi also established a radical Islamic party *Jammat Al Islami*. In the contemporary Muslim World, all the Muslim radical organizations are ideologically linked with *Ikhwanul Muslimeen and Jammat Al Islami*.

In the present world, radical Islamists are mostly divided into three groups. The first group became extreme radical and in a fight with the West. They became anarchist. Al Qaeda is the leading organization of the group. The second group remains stubborn and stagnant in the philosophies of Maududi and Qutb, like the Islamic Brotherhood in West Asia and *Jammat Al Islami* in South Asia. The third group became more liberal and believes in continuing strategic relations with the West. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Turkey are leading this force. However, Al Qaeda is the most extremist radical Islamic organization. They believe in the complete destruction of the West and Israel. Hence, their target is to attack Western establishments to 'free' Muslim World from the 'invasion' of the West.

On the other hand, the US global war on terror started after 9/11. The attack on Twin Towers created a compulsion for the US government, particularly for the Bush administration to declare war against Al-Qaeda. Within a few days after 9/11, on September 20, 2001, in a joint session of the US Congress, Bush declared, "Our war on terror begins with Al Qaida, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated." However, the US War against Terrorism came into the international debate, when the Evangelical Christians and neoconservatives tried to use terrorism as propaganda against Muslims. The Evangelical Christians and neoconservatives influenced US policy making bodies to attack Iraq in 2003 by claiming of the Iraqi ruler Saddam Hussain possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in the hand of Saddam Hussein. The American Evangelical movement allied first with the Zionist movement and termed Muslims as, "the modern day equivalent of the Evil Empire" (Phillips 2007). Such conservatives started investing in the US think tanks to ensure their influence in the US policy formulation. The John M. Olin Foundation is one such conservative institution. The foundation invested \$ 305.4 million dollar since 1985 to influence US think tanks (Bonney 2008: 35). Samuel P. Huntington is said to have received \$ 4.7 million over fifteen years from the John M. Olin Foundation. In 1993, he wrote an article in the *Foreign Policy* Journal. He developed a theory named, *The Clash of Civilizations*. In the theory, he remarked that the Islamic Civilization is going to be the next enemy of the West after the fall of the Soviet Union. The neoconservatives got the idea to implement their agenda in the international arena. They published a new project known as "Project for New American Century (PNAC)". The attack of Al Qaeda on 9/11 gave them an opportunity to implement their agenda. The Bush administration attacked Iraq and Afghanistan to implement the PNAC.

In this respect, the present US President Obama's election to power increased the global attention on how he responds to international terrorism. The policy analysts argue that

Obama made a significant change in the strategies of the US, but at the same time a substantial continuity with the policies and philosophies of the Bush administration is present (Lynch 2010: 3). Obama was determined to fight terrorist networks more effectively by moving away from the most visible symbols and rhetorical framework of Bush's global war on terror. The Obama administration seeks to rebuild relations with the Muslim mainstream, to marginalize violent extremists and to deprive them of popular support, to strike at terrorist networks and to undermine extremist narratives by restoring American adherence to the rule of law. It is built on those efforts, by a range of key policies: engagement, outreach and a rhetorical commitment to restoring the rule of law on the one hand; and on the other, escalated drone strike and counter terrorism partnership in the ungoverned spaces where Al- Qaeda and its affiliated movements thrived (Lynch 2010: 3). Obama's 2010 National Security Strategy declares that "this is not a global war against a tactic – terrorism or a religion Islam. We are at war with a specific network, al-Qaida and its terrorist affiliates".⁷ The administration defined its goal in the war on terror as, "to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda and its allies".⁸ Moreover, the Obama administration seems concerned about its relations with the Muslim World. In 2009 Obama declared, "The United States is not, and will never be, at war with Islam. In fact our partnership with the Muslim World is critical and not just as rolling back the violent ideologies that people of all faith rejects, but also to strengthen opportunity for all people".⁹

However, while Obama administration is facing criticism from the neocons for not doing enough against the 'Islamic terrorist', the killing of Bin Laden is helping Obama to rebuild his image that he is serious about the global war on terror. The timing of the killing of Bin Laden is significant. One year remains for the next presidential election in the US. The killing of Bin Laden enhances the image of Obama domestically. It would help him to escape the allegations of 'pro-Muslim policies'. He also can escape the criticism for his failures in the domestic levels of job creation and managing the financial crisis. At the same time, he would be able to justify that in any way he is not weak to secure the interests of the US; rather he is the frontline American, who killed Bin Laden. On the other hand, some analysts argue that there is nothing new in the policies of the Obama regarding the global war on terror and Muslim World; he is following only the Bush Doctrine. In this respect, Mark Lynch summarized Obama's policy against the global war on terror based on four principles, a. global Muslim engagement, b. countering violent extremism (CVE), c. kinetic counter terrorism and d. rule of law (Lynch 2010). In such a context, the policies of Obama get a new dimension that ensures continuity and changes with the policies of his predecessors. It can secure American interest in the global war on terror as well as is enhancing the image of the US in Western Asia.

Post-Bin Laden Dimensions

The Western media, particularly the US analysts identified the assassination of Bin Laden as a success for the Obama administration. The intelligence services of the US also expressed satisfaction by the completion of their operation against the most wanted terrorist of the modern world. The US has been looking to kill him for a decade. In the end they succeeded to fulfilling the demands of their people. In this respect, the present section would focus on the post- Bin Laden dimensions of global war on terror.

Al Qaeda and Global Jihad

Since the US attack on Afghanistan in 2003, the influence of Bin Laden was not clear to the intelligence forces of the US. Some argued that the influence and guidance of Bin Laden had increasingly degraded. Others argued that Bin Laden remained an active participant in both the strategic direction and operational activities of Al Qaeda (Lake 2011). If Bin Laden really remained an active policy maker, his death would affect the networks of Al Qaeda. If he did not remain in the policy formulation, then also the death of Bin Laden has a symbolic significance. He had a spiritual influence in the Al Qaeda network. But after his death the emergence of a leader acceptable to all Al Qaeda leaders would be a challenge for the organization. It is reported that Ayman Al Zawahari, the second influential leader of Al Qaeda, was elected as the chief. But he is considered less charismatic and less influential than Bin Laden.¹⁰ Since the Afghan war, he was close to Al Qaeda. Bin Laden was always more charismatic than any other leader. Moreover, an Al Qaeda leader without Saudi citizenship may lead to problem within the organization.¹¹

Al Qaeda ideologically helped many other organizations to continue and expand terrorist activities all over the world. After the crackdown against Al Qaeda networks in many countries, the affiliated organizations of Al Qaeda gained autonomy in their decision making and operational capability. Michael Leiter, Director of the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) of the US, states that, “affiliated has no longer simply relied upon their linkages to Al Qaeda senior’s in Pakistan but they have in fact emerged more as self sustaining, independent movements and organizations” (Leiter 2010). The death of Bin Laden may prompt the affiliated groups to be “self starter” for new terrorist activities.¹² Another argument is that though the affiliated organizations had attained autonomy, but there was a “periodic exchange of strategic planning...the exchange of financing or the deployment of technical experts” between the core

and regional affiliates of Al Qaeda (Rollins 2011). The death of Bin Laden may affect such exchange. The core¹³ was the financier of major operations. The assassination of Bin Laden may weaken the core. Hence, the core may be dependent on the regional affiliates for financing. It may create conflict and clash between the core and affiliates. At the same time, the affiliates may face challenges for technological upgrading and would be confined easily by the security forces. By examining 648 terrorist groups, Seth G. Jones concluded that most of the terrorist organizations end in one or two ways. Either they join the political process, or else small networks of clandestine intelligence and security forces arrest and kill the leadership (Jones 2008). Hence, the affiliated organizations have to face challenges to survive after the death of Bin Laden. In this respect, the death of Bin Laden is catastrophic for both the core and affiliates.

On the other hand, the ideological objectivity of Al Qaeda may yet be relevant to its followers and affiliated organizations. Al Qaeda and the Islamic radicals legitimize their *Jihad* to achieve mainly three objectives: (a) fight the US and its allies to free the Muslim World from the 'occupation' of the West; (b) overthrow regimes in Western Asia; and (c) to establish a pan-Islamic Caliphate (Jones 2011). Rohan Gunaratna termed the objectives of Al Qaeda as "opportunistic" (Gunaratna 2002:31), while conversely Olivier Roy thinks, "neo fundamentalism and radical violence are more linked with westernization than with the return of the Qur'an" (Roy 2006: 6). Moreover, Olivier Roy summarizes that, "International Islamic Terrorism is a pathological consequence of the globalization of the Muslim World rather than the spillover of the Middle Eastern conflicts" (Roy 2006: 337). In this respect, the death of Bin Laden is less relevant for the '*Jihadis*'. Bruce Hoffman argued, Al Qaeda is "in the main flatter, more linear, and more organizationally networked" than it has previously been (Hoffman 2006:285). He divides Al Qaeda into five tiers: Central Al Qaeda, affiliated groups, allied groups, allied networks and inspired individuals. Hence, it would be difficult to conclude that the death of Bin Laden is the end of terrorism. Bin Laden himself has been widely quoted by saying, "regardless of whether Osama is killed or survives, the awakening has started, praised be God" (Lawrence 2005: 22). A Pakistani journalist, Abdel Bari Atwan, who interviewed Bin Laden many years ago (1996) observed, "Bin Laden as a dead man would be even more potent than when he was alive" (Bergen 2006:385). However, after the death of Bin Laden, Peter Bergen writes, "Between the Arab Spring and the death of Bin Laden, it is hard to imagine greater blows to al Qaeda's ideology and organization...Bin Laden was on the wrong side of the history" (Bergen 2011). In this respect, if the Arabs and Muslim World win the ongoing revolutions of democracy, the terrorists' ideologies would lose relevance in the Arab World.

But, the failure of Arab spring may blow the fire of Al Qaeda and that would again invite the ideology of Bin Laden in the global scenario.

US Neoconservatives

Since Barack Obama's election to power, neoconservatives have been critical about his foreign policy principles of Obama. During the election campaign in 2008, the difference of opinions was clear. The republican candidate John McCain offered a continuation of the Bush Doctrine¹⁴ under the conditions of reduced US power and freedom of action - calling it "neoconservative in light."¹⁵ Conservative think tanks and the Christian Zionists were the supporters of McCain. After the election, neoconservatives remain critical about the policies of Obama. Obama rejected George W. Bush's policy of war on terror as the overarching foreign policy. He acknowledges the idea of international terrorism, "to defeat Al Qaeda...stay on the offense everywhere from Djibuti to Kandahar" (Keller 2008). He sees international terrorism neither as primarily a military challenge nor as the encompassing challenge of the day. Instead he lays emphasis on strengthening moderates in the Islamic world and on restoring America's moral leadership and supporting a multilateral approach in the international arena (Keller 2008).

However, neoconservatives criticise Obama for not securing the interests of the US. Former Vice President Dick Cheney criticized Obama's policy on global war on terror. He accused the Obama Administration of jeopardizing the security of the United States and running the risk of another attack like that of 9/11.¹⁶ He complained that Obama's policies amounted to returning to the law enforcement mode of fighting terrorism, which he saw as inadequate to meeting the threat posed by al Qaeda to America. Moreover, neoconservatives and Christian Zionists raised the point that Obama who not serious in detaining terrorists those are a security threat to the US. The assassination of Bin Laden made their arguments less important. Their propaganda against Islam and Muslim becomes also vain.

Neoconservatives have media influence in the US society. It is a challenge how they adapt to the post-Bin Laden world. After the death of Bin Laden, their propaganda would get less relevance. It needs to be stated that in the US as well as in Israel, the liberal forces are raising their voice against such conservative groups. For example, the influential US writer Francis Fukuyama, till the early years of the twenty first century, was one of the most prominent neoconservative ideologues. He moved away from the neocons from 2004 and wrote in *The National Interest* that the neocons were harming American and Israeli interests. At the

same time, during the Bush administration the conservatives were very close to the administration. At present, the influence of the conservatives is not so strong.

On the other hand, the Obama administration also cannot get rid of the influence of the conservative lobbies. It seems that in the upcoming US presidential election the conservatives wouldn't get as much chance to influence the policies as they did earlier. Hence, it can be expected that the war against terrorism would be more specific against terrorists and identifying all the Muslims as terrorists may get less authenticity.

The US Policy in West Asia and South Asia

The Obama administration as well as the policy making bodies of the US has reached in a conclusion that the end of Bin Laden does not mean the end of terrorism. Al Qaeda and other organizations are active and may target the interests of the US. Hence, the killing of Bin Laden may not change the US policy of global war on terror to a wider extent. Firstly, any fundamental change is not possible for the US considering its national interest and its threat perceptions from the terrorist organizations. Secondly, the Obama administration has to accommodate all the domestic opinions in its policy making and at the same time, the administration has to consider the impacts of its policies in the next presidential election. Thirdly, the petrodollar politics as well as the strategic and energy interests of the US would influence its policies in Western Asia, South Asia and Central Asia. In this respect, the death of Bin Laden is considered as a "prospect of rebalancing the US foreign policy" (Fick 2011).

The democratic movements in Western Asia and North Africa are enduring new compulsions to reformulate the US policies in the region. Obama's famous address in Cairo towards Muslim World as well as his opinion of "two state policy" between Palestine and Israel in respect of 1967 border has raised debate among the domestic political actors of the country. It seems that the Obama administration wants to limit the causes of grievances in the Muslim World against the US. But at the same time, the national interest may not offer Obama any chance to make substantive policy change regarding Western Asia. On the other hand, as it was perceived earlier that the fall of Arab regimes might increase the rise of extremism in the region, it seems now that the democratic and liberal forces are trying to shape the future of Arab Spring. It may add new thinking that supporting the undemocratic regimes denies the interests of the US in Western Asia. Therefore supporting democracy may help the US to forge good relations with Muslim World.

The realist thinkers of the US are in confusion that if the interests of the US and the people of the Arab World do not go in a convergent direction, then what will the future of anti-Americanism be (Oren 2011)? If democracy fails to serve the interests of the US in West Asia and makes the oil and energy interests insecure, what would be the policies of the US? But the death of Laden and the blow of Arab Spring give an opportunity for the US to make a constructive engagement with the region. Arab Spring “politically killed Al Qaeda” (Fisk 2011).¹⁷ It is an opportunity for the US to help democratic movements of the region. At the same time, it is a challenge to ensure uninterrupted oil supply from the democratically elected governments of the region. Because, democracy may elect more nationalist organizations that would increase bargaining with the US for oil supply.

It needs to be stated that all the countries may not go for democracy in the region. The US might support autocrats those are vital for US interest. Particularly, Saudi Arabian monarchy would remain more important for the US. Hence, the US can make a balance between democracy and autocracy in the region. That may limit the grievances of the Muslim World and at the same time it might secure the interests of the US without any interruption.

On the other hand, the US policy in South Asia gets a new momentum. In a post-Cold War World, the US changed its policies in South Asia. The country developed strategic partnership with India and after 9/11, increased pressure on Pakistan to fight against terrorist organizations. Strengthening Indo-US partnership was not appreciated in Pakistan. The denial to complete any nuclear agreement with Pakistan, as the US did with India, weakened the confidence of Pakistan to deal in its traditional manners with the US. It influences Pakistani military establishment to continue militancy as a ‘strategic instrument’ to ensure its relevance in the region. Pakistan’s military establishments are also not satisfied with its decreasing influence in Afghanistan.

However, Pakistan’s link with international terrorist organizations, the spreading terrorism networks in the Federally Administered Tribal Regions (FATA) regions and Pakistan’s double face in the war on terror have deteriorated Pak-US relations. Moreover, the killing of Bin Laden in Abbottabad has started a new debate about Pakistan’s sincerity with regard to the global war on terror. Robert Fisk and many other analysts think that the position of Laden was known earlier to Pakistani intelligence wing Inter Service Intelligence (ISI). In this respect, Pakistan has lost its credibility in the global war on terror. At the same time, Pakistan also thinks that the country is not getting sufficient recognition for their role in the war

against terrorism. Hence, when US questions the role of Pakistan in the global war on terror, it puts Pakistan into discomfort significantly.

The US invested twenty billion dollars to make Pakistan confident (Fair 2011). But, Pakistan's growing relations with China and its policy towards Afghanistan are not convergent with the interests of the US. At the same time, the US cannot end its relations with Pakistan considering the geo-strategic importance of the country. The US intends to guarantee its position in Afghanistan for ensuring its presence in the region. The US has rivalry with China and Russia to secure its presence in Central Asia. The conflict with Iran and the fear of reemergence of Taliban in Afghanistan are challenging the interests of the US. However, deterioration in Pak-Afghan relation may increase the influence of terrorist organizations in Pakistan and that can be more catastrophic for US interests. In this respect, it is strategically complex for the US to sever its relations with Pakistan.

Some analysts also argue that the US may be interested in the dismantlement of Pakistan (Marshall 2011). But the completion of such kinds of projects would not be easy and smooth. That may lead the region towards more vulnerability. The mistrust in Pakistan-US relations may increase the former's dependency on China, which might increase the influence of China in the region. Any such development would not be acceptable to the US and India. Hence, the USA has to continue a relation with Pakistan for its strategic and security interests. But, such relations may not be always comfortable for both the countries. Moreover, the death of Bin Laden in the land of Pakistan may change the "center of gravity" of the global war on terror from Afghanistan to Pakistan. Because, it seems that terrorist networks are more secure in Pakistan than in Afghanistan. In addition, it may affect the Afghan-Pak relations. Afghan authorities may try to get to put more pressure on Pakistan for ensuring its control on the Pak-Afghan border.

The importance of Indo-US relations has increased for both countries after the killing of Bin Laden. India's perceived threat from Pakistan sponsored terrorism and strategic partnership with the US made the country a reliable partner for the US in the region. Moreover, India and the US are both concerned about the involvement of China in South Asia. In addition, India wants its presence in Central Asian issues to confirm its uninterrupted energy supply. India would use the opportunity in accordance with the policies of the US to create more pressure on Pakistan. India's traditional relations is now a days changing more openly. Such changes indicate a new fold of Indo-US relations. Hence, India's *realpolitik* foreign policy may deteriorate Indo-Pak relations in South Asia.

Muslim World

The death of Bin Laden has multifaceted significance for the Muslim World. The West thought that the killing of Bin Laden would increase grievances in the Muslim World. However the scenario has been different. Bin Laden did not acquire sympathy from the mainstream Muslim societies. A Pew Global Attitudes Project found that the confidence among Muslims on Bin Laden to 'do the right thing in world affairs' has dropped significantly since 2003.¹⁸ An Arab opinion poll by Shibley Telhami and Zogby International found that in 2010 Bin Laden only received 6% of the respondents' support when asked which world leader they admire most (Khoury 2011). On the other hand, the ongoing Arab Spring signifies that the autocratic regimes are not supported by the Muslims. The theory that 'Muslims are not eligible for democracy' is losing relevance. However, the death of Bin Laden opens an opportunity for the Muslims to start a dialogue with the West and it would give an opportunity for Muslims to enjoy democracy and rule of law in their respective countries.

The response of the West to the democratic movements of Muslim World is important. If the West denies the emergence of the democratic movements in the Muslim World and try to establish undemocratic and subservient regimes in the region, the radical forces may get a new chance to enlarge their legitimacy. It would lead the region again towards a devastating scenario.

In a *realpolitik* world, the Palestine issue is not attracting emotions of the Muslim youths as it had done earlier. But, a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israel conflict is a prerequisite for the permanent security and development of the region. If the international community fails to solve the problem, the radicals might use the issue again for the revival of the ideology of Bin Laden. Moreover, if the oil interest leads the West to a policy of creating more instability in the region, the desire for peace would remain a dream for the Muslim World, particularly for Western Asia. In the upcoming meeting of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), September, 2011, the Palestinian Authority is going to present a proposal for an independent Palestine state.¹⁹

How the West and the other countries of the world respond to the proposal would be a determinant for future relations between the West and the Muslim World. The death of Bin Laden, gives a new opportunity for the Muslim World. How the liberal and democratic forces of Muslim World can use such an opportunity after the death of Bin Laden is an important

question for the next decade. A large number of liberal Israelis also want to reach in a solution in the matter of Palestine refugees. But the conservative and radical groups of both sides are impeding any development in such a process. The death of Bin Laden is an opportunity for the liberal forces to come forward to solve existing conflicts.

Conclusion

The end of Bin Laden is not the end of terrorism. Bin Laden might be the last man who had influenced thousands of terrorists for his '*global Jihad*'. His followers may fight in the future, but the networks he developed and affiliation to the organization Al Qaeda certainly have to face debacle. The Arab spring denies any future sympathy for Bin Laden. The core and affiliated organizations of Al Qaeda would lose relevance in the coming days. The affiliated terrorist organizations may create a new threat for humanity. In this respect, the continuity of the global war on terror would remain important. A global framework for ensuring surveillance over affiliated organizations of Al Qaeda remains essential. The leadership of the US in countering terrorism remains important for its superiority and technological upgrading. But the policy of the US needs a global legitimacy. A framework within the UN mechanism is essential, and it would make the global war on terror more legitimate. Furthermore, the global war on terror should not be limited to the military framework. In a post- Bin Laden world, the necessity of preventive measures is increasing for containing terrorism.

However, the US policies towards '*global Jihadis*' are important. If the US continues its battle against the terrorist networks, the scope of survival for Al Qaeda would be very limited. In addition, the US has to use its soft power to address the remaining grievances in the Muslim World. The support for democracy in the Arab World would be the test case for the US in this regard. If the US can make a convergence in its national interest and democratization of the Arab World, it would certainly help the country to enhance its legitimacy in the internal arena. It seems that Obama's policy of engaging liberal forces and countering violent extremism is mounting his rationality and authenticity in the domestic levels as well as in the international arena. Neoconservatives are finding it difficult to challenge Obama. But how far Obama can go with such policies is not clear yet.

Moreover, the US policy in Western Asia and South Asia is in transition. The death of Bin Laden gave a new message for the Obama administration that Bin Laden was not a popular person in the Arab World. Arabs also have shown a desire for democracy. Hence, supporting the democratization process in the Muslim World and ensuring uninterrupted oil supply for the

US is a challenge for Obama. On the other end, the importance of India is increasing to the US interest in South Asia. The uncertainty and confusion between Pak-US relations are increasing. In addition, the US is also aware about the increasing Chinese influence in the region. Therefore, the success of the future of global war on terror depends on a balanced relation among the regional and global players of South Asia.

The death of Bin Laden unlocks new dimensions in international politics. It is not the end of the global war on terror, but how the West responds to the death of Bin Laden would determine the intensity and necessity of that war. The positive response to the democratic movements would help to counter terrorism in an easy way, but the denial of democracy can raise the threats of terrorism in the world. At the same time, how the Muslim World can adapt with the changing realities is also important. If the Muslim World can implement democracy, the extremists will lose their relevance. But the failure of the democratic transition might increase the deviation of Muslim societies. The promotion of democracy and liberalism might help to contain terrorism. On the other hand, the denial of democracy would enhance the threats of terrorism in the coming days.

Notes

1. The definition of terrorism is facing huge international debate. The present paper accepts the definition of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In 2004, the UNSC defined terrorism in its resolution no. 1566 as, "criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature".
2. What Islam really means by *Jihad* is a long debate among the Muslim scholars. However, the radical Islamists define it as an ideology to fight against non-Muslims to ensure the superiority of Islam. But the Liberal Muslims use the word as a metaphor to fight against all injustice and they also define it as of a vow by a Muslim not to do any sin. However, the Western analysts made the word as an ideology of Muslims to attack the West.
3. The UN recognized at least 19 global and regional conventions to fight against terrorism.
4. The Navy SEALs are considered the elitist of the US Special Operation Forces. SEAL is an acronym which stands for Sea, Air and Land. This is because the Navy SEALs operate on all the three, under any given conditions. The Navy SEALs work in small units or teams.
5. Arabic word *Kafir* means non-believers. In Islamic belief those people do not believe in god as described in Quran, they are *Kafir*.
6. In their understanding all non-Muslim Islamic are ignorant societies.
7. National Security Strategy of the USA, May 2010. p. 20.

8. Barak Obama's speech, "On a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan", The White House, 27 March 2009.
9. Remarks by President Obama to the Turkish Parliament, 6 April 2009.
10. Ayman Al Zawahari is considered less charismatic than Bin Laden. But he has very influential role in the formation of the philosophical framework of Al Qaeda. He is considered as the main ideologue of the organization.
11. In the Muslim belief, Makkah and Madina are the holy places for them and the prophet of Islam born in Makkah. Both the places are in Saudi Arabia. Hence, Laden had accepted an authenticity to be the leader of Al-Qaeda to his followers for being a citizen of Saudi.
12. "The End of Bin Laden: Implications for Global Business, Politics and Security", *Oxford Analytica*, May 3, 2011, available at: <http://www.oxan.com/Events/OCC/Calls/2011-05-03EndOfOsama.aspx>, accessed on: June 13, 2011.
13. The central organization of Al Qaeda.
14. The main features of the Bush Doctrine are pre-emptive action, regime change, maintain unipolar world, control global energy, engaging Arab and Islamic world, intervene actively for securing the superiority of the USA in the world.
15. In the post Cold War, the theoretical interpretation of the US foreign policy is multifaceted. Bush Sr.'s foreign policy was known as realist, Bill Clinton's policy was known as liberal internationalist, Bush Jr. followed neo-conservatism and Obama's policy is known as liberal internationalism with the elements of classical liberalism.
16. Huma Khan and Rachel Martin, "Vice Presidents Face Off: Dick Cheney and Joe Biden Go on the Offensive", *ABC News*, 15 February 2010, available at: <http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Politics/dick-cheney-vice-president-joe-biden-square-off/story?id=9839602>, accessed on: 14 June 2011.
17. Robert Fisk with an interview in *Al Jazeera*, May 2, 2011.
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Folk Culture and Environmental Sustainability

Somenath Bhattacharjee

Abstract

In the multi-ethnicity of India the tribal population has its own identity and cultural heritage. The tribal's modes of occupational pursuit and cultural norms, values, customs, practices as well as cultural heritages are very much interrelated to their ecological habitat. Their folk tradition deals with our traditional heritage, continuing generation after generation. These are the treasury of our past handed down from generation to generation, but many folkloric traditions have already disappeared due to various reasons. Particularly due to the gradual influence of urban culture as well as modernization and globalization the dialect and the traditional cultural practices as well as the folk traditions of the tribals are not getting adequate importance and thus it is very common among the younger generation. This paper is an attempt to discuss the society, culture, environment and folk traditions of the tribals and also the folk concepts regarding environmental sustainability- these issues have been observed among a few sub-Himalayan tribes of North Bengal.

Key Words: Society, Culture, Environment, Folk culture, Environmental, Sustainability, Globalization.

[I]

Society, Culture, Environment and Folk Traditions of the Tribals

Society and culture are interdependent and interrelated to each other. Society can be looked upon as a process, a series of interaction between human beings where each person responds to the stimuli of another person. No social life is possible except such interaction and this communication is the basic to all social life. The whole human society and each group in the society can be viewed as the manifestation of the social processes between the interacting members. These interactions ultimately form the social structure and the norms and the values and customs related with these social relationships determine the cultural aspects of human beings. Actually a culture is the way of life of people; while a society is an organized, interacting aggregate of individuals who follow a given way of life, thus society is composed of people and the way they behave is their culture (Herskovits 1955:316).

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Culture consists of the abstract values, beliefs and perceptions of the world that lie behind the people's behavior and that are reflected by their behavior. These are shared by members of a society, and when they are acted upon, these elements produce behaviour that is intelligible to the other members of that society. Cultures are learned, rather than inherited biologically, and they are learned largely through the medium of language. The parts of a culture function as an integrated whole (Havilland 1999:35). The unique capacity for culture in the human species depends on learning. Culture is obtained through the process called enculturation, that is, the process of social interaction by which people learn and acquire their culture. Human beings acquire their culture both consciously through formal learning and unconsciously through informal interactions. Culture includes all the elements in man's mature endowment that he has acquired from his group by conscious learning or by a conditioning process- technique of various kinds, social and other instructions, beliefs and patterned modes of conduct (Herskovits 1955:305-6).

The relation between life and environment is extremely intimate. Every change in a living creature involves some change in its relation to environment and every change in the environment creates some change in the response of the organic being. Our environment is our habitation in the complete sense. The daily livelihood activities and the cultural aspects of human beings are closely related to the surrounding environment. In the context of society culture has its own application to the ways of life or designs for living common at any one time to all mankind; to the ways of living peculiar to a group of societies between which there is greater or lesser degree of interaction to the patterns of behaviour peculiar to a given society. The tendency for all aspects of a culture is to function as an interrelated whole which is called as integration. This integration is prevailed through its economic, political and social aspects. The fundamental components of every culture are its material and non material aspects. Material culture consists of the physical products of human society whereas the nonmaterial products are intangible goods like values, beliefs, norms, morals, and customs.

India is a multiethnic, multireligious country. Along with its multiethnicity the cultural variabilities are diversified in nature. Simultaneously, with the variation of geographical landscape, culture has become different from one region to another. In the context of multiculturalism in India, the tribal culture has its own importance. Most of the Indian tribes live in the forests, hills and naturally isolated regions and they are known by their distinguishing names meaning either the people of forest and hill or the original inhabitants and so on. The socio-cultural lives of the tribals are intimately connected with the forest ecology and forest is an inseparable part of their daily life. Roy Burman opined in 1982 that " directly or indirectly in the tribal mind forest symbolizes life in its manifold manifestations i.e. home, worship, food, employment, income and entire gamut. Tribals can in fact be regarded as the children of forests.

The daily lives of the tribal people are closely related with their surrounding environment. The tribal culture has its own heritage and it is nourished in the lap of nature. The cultural heritages of the tribals are informal, oral, illiterate and unreflected many i.e. folk based traditions. Their cultural heritage and their cultural traits and elements are not merely for the individuals rather it is for the entire community as a whole. Folk traditions of the tribals are a composite whole which is one of the dominant characteristic of their culture. In folk songs, verse and music go together and the musical aspect is much more reflected in practice. The simple catchy folk tunes conveying the feelings and sentiments of their ancestors, their lives and thoughts, their activities and achievements, their morals and discipline are of great value (Vidyarthi and Rai 1976:330). The term 'folk culture' includes unity, tradition, community dependence and collective awareness and consciousness of the concerned people. This term was first coined by W.J. Thoms in 1846 and it is recognized universally. C.F. Potter has defined folk culture as "a lively fossil which refuses to die". The tribal folk culture mainly includes folklore that is a collective combination of myths, legends, tales, proverbs, riddles, ballads, folk song, folk dance, folk music, folk carvings etc. It comprises the least tangible expression of the aesthetic aspects of culture (Herskovits 1955:267). S.C. Roy in 1930 first made a strong plea for the study of folklore by the anthropologists in his presidential address to the Anthropological Section of the Sixth Oriental Congress, held in Patna. The term folklore is not get restricted to traditional customs, rites and beliefs of the past lingering among backward people in complex civilizations, but is now extended to include folk arts, folk abuse, folk proverbs, riddles, idioms etc. both among people of civilization and among primitive civilizations. He believed that folklore throws a flood of light on the early intellectual evolution of human society and for this reason he regarded folklore as "pre- history of human mind". He emphasized upon the need to collect and preserve folkloric traditions, because they are the treasury of our past handed down from generation to generation. He told that the study of folklore should include folksongs, ballad, folkrites, folktraditions, folkbeliefs associated with dreams, superstition, omen, folktales, folkproverbs, folkrididdles, folkmagic and *Totaka*, folkabuse, folkrecreations etc.

This folk tradition is mainly based on dance and song with the tunes of music which are based on various natural tunes, notes and cords those come across the nature. The sounds of the birds, the flow of the river and the wave of the winds are the sources of their music. Ultimately the folk cultures of the tribal people are the reflection of their interactions with the environment and the nature plays here the keen role to create collective consciousness and unanimous celebration of folk cultural performances among the tribal societies. But with the passage of time, in the present decade of 21st century, the forces and factors related with globalization, urbanization, industrialization, land alienation and tribal migration modernization as well as globalization, the peaceful isolation of the tribals is left no more and people from outside frequently has started to inhabit in their territory. The authority and control over the natural resources automatically have got shifted over from the tribals to the non tribals. The relationship between the environment and inhabitation of the tribals has to suffer a major

setback and simultaneously their folk cultural heritages has also started to get abolish. These issues have been observed among a few tribal communities of North Bengal.

[II]

Folk Culture of the Tribes in North Bengal

Folklore in tribal communities has a very important significance. It continues to be a vital part of their life. There is hardly any social, economic, religious or festive occasion without a folksong. The numerous customs and beliefs have their own traditional background and they provide ample material to reconstruct the history and ways of life of the community. Their dance and music are related to the spirit of the people, while their musical compositions express the inner feeling and pattern of their lives. In this context North Bengal is very important because a number of ethnic groups have inhabited here from time immemorial. North Bengal is situated in the northern region of West Bengal which consists of six districts namely Cooch Behar, Jalpaiguri, Darjeeling, North Dinajpur, South Dinajpur and Maldah. The geographical landscape of North Bengal can broadly be divided into Hills, Sub Himalayan foothills and Barindh plains. Mainly the *terai* or the marshy forest area between the Himalayan foot hills and the plains of Cooch Behar district is located in North Bengal (Bhattacharya, 1978:1). Throughout the entire territory a number of tribal groups have been dwelling from a prolonged period. The traditional culture as well as folk culture of those concerned people has its own importance. But the situation gradually altered with the changing dimensions of time. In this regard, a few case studies are mentioned below in brief-

[1] Folk Culture of the Totos: The Totos are one of the primitive tribes of West Bengal. They live in the Totopara village under Madarihat police station of Jalpaiguri district. The entire Totopara village is bounded by natural environment and the Totos have a very close affinity with it. Their life and culture are very much interrelated with environment. In this regard their folk culture is predominated with the rhythm to show their obedience to nature and natural resources. Their songs are not only composed for leisure but there are some social, religious as well as economic needs and values behind their composition. Any song performed during particular religious festival have some parts of its own. The first part is known as *dhire* which gives a description of materials gathered for worship, arrangement of functions and dedication to the deity. The second part is called as *tashi tawa* where prayers are offered to the deities like sun, moon, river, stream and other terrance elements. These are performed for the peace and welfare of the entire Toto society and the main theme of their songs are very much related to the gathering of forest produce. Those songs and concerned musical performances are mainly observed during their several religious festivals where the community members participate altogether. A few of their religious festivals are mentioned below:

Table 1: Religious Festivals of Totos

Name of the worship	Season and time	Purpose	Participation
<i>Mayu and Ongchu</i>	August-September. 3pm-7pm	For safety and protection of the entire Toto community	Except child all members of the Toto community
<i>Shakra</i>	July- August and December-January, in the morning	For better crop production and welcome note for a new bride	Whole Toto community
<i>Sadingpa</i>	Any day in the morning	House hold peace and cattle Wealth	Toto Family members
<i>Satring</i>	Any season in day	For better crop production	Whole Toto community
<i>Mut- devi</i>	Any season and any time	To avoid destructive effect of Torsa river	Except the unmarried girls and elderly women the other members of the Toto community
<i>Gorea</i>	Next day after Janmastami, From morning to noon	For safety and protection of the entire community	Whole Toto community
<i>Choisung</i>	Performed in any season in the morning	For household peace	Toto Family members
<i>Pudua</i>	Performed in any season and in between 1 pm-7p.m	To avoid physical illness as well as good health	Whole Toto Community

Their several religious festivals mainly highlight the issues that the concerned people are primarily dependent upon environment for their daily livelihood and all sort of well being. Further, the musical performances are related to rituals which denote their feature of collective consensus to worship the nature as their mother and the protection and utilization of the natural resources as a whole.

[2] Folk Culture of the Meches: Adjacent to Totopara village in the same jurisdiction of Totopara Ballalguri Gram Panchayat, the Mongoloid originated another tribe; the Meches have their own settlement named as Mechpara. Their settlement is closely related to nature. Adjacent

to their village Torsa River and Titi forest bit are located. Their daily livelihood is very much dependent upon the surrounding environment. The folk culture of the Meches is quite interrelated with nature. The themes of the folk songs are based on natural beauties and their daily livelihood activities. They have a water fetching song. Earlier the women and the young girls went to fetch water from the stream in the afternoon and they sang this song with great merriment. It is to be mentioned here that the Meches have two very important songs named as *rongjali* and *gadan bathor*. *Rongjali* is their inaugural song where an appeal is noted to celebrate altogether and to keep the social solidarity within the community. *Gadan bathor* is performed at the beginning of the first day of Bengali New Year. It emphasizes the scenic beauty of nature with a note for a prosperous and happy new year. It also offers a prayer for better production of the crops, peace and prosperity for the whole community. In these festivals both males and females participate irrespective of any age and sex. They have a number of dance festivals. The concerned people mostly adults perform songs and dances before the transplantation of the saplings. Among them a concept is prevailed that the setting of first monsoon is compared with the case of menarche of woman because it makes the soil cultivable and fertile. They correlate the fertility of nature with the fertility of a woman (Field Study, 2006). They perform *mosanai* dance in the form of a group performance which resembles the delight of a peacock by observing the dark cloud and onset of rainy season. The folk cultural heritage of the Meches denotes their close affinity with nature and nature based products. Not only that, the lyrics of their songs and the dances emphasize how nature and natural products should adequately be utilized and how they should be preserved for the future to live happily.

[3] Folk Culture of the Rabhas: The Rabhas are mongoloid in origin and they fall under the larger Bodo group. One such section is living in the plain land of Bochamari village in the Cooch Behar district. Among them most of the people are settled agriculturists. Besides this they are also engaged in official jobs and some peoples have businesses. In this context they have a greater opportunity to come in close contact with adjacent urban centers.

Considering the folk culture, earlier in the traditional Rabha society they performed several folk songs and dances with music, on different occasions and religious festivals. Even all of their labour, rejoice, sorrows were expressed through songs and dances. During transplantation as well as cultivation they performed a community dance called *hangai-sani*. This was performed by all community members irrespective of their age and sex. At the time of catching fishes in the river they performed *nakchung-reni* dance. Further, they have a number of religious festivals like *maihana* which were performed during December for harvesting paddy.

All of their religious festivals were celebrated with music, songs and dances. Their folk cultural practices were very much related to the utilization of natural resources and its equal sharing among the community members. Their performances expounded the tune about how

the natural resources could be preserved for the sake of safety and protection of the entire community.

[III]

Environmental Sustainability in Folk Traditions

The folk cultures of the tribals are closely associated with nature. Basically the tribal songs contain various human sentiments which may include amorous love and affection, affection for child, neighbours and society, brother-sister affection, bravery, humour, teasing etc. Nature is one of the main inspirations and also a subject matter of many tribal songs and it is also well observed among all the above mentioned tribal people. Sun and moon, earth, cloud, rain, trees, animals and birds are described or referred to in many songs, some of which are the songs of their totem. Such animals and trees get priority as subjects for the songs, thus environment has great importance in tribal life. Environment though literally mean surroundings, has a wide connotation including within its purview physical, biotic and human aspects of the earth. Environment is an inseparable whole and is constituted by the interacting system of physical, biological and cultural elements which are inter-linked individually as well as collectively in myriad ways (Katiyar, 1997:5). Globally, there has been increased focus on traditional natural resource management and conservation systems in the recent times. The extent of beliefs, myths and cultural practices for relationship of life forms with society and individual well being is perhaps most developed in Indian culture. The cultural traditions in India are full of such instances, traditions and cultural practices which have helped to maintain rich biodiversity that nature has bestowed us over thousands of years. In this present decade, we are quite interested about the protection of environment and sustainable development. Sustainable development is a developmental process where the exploitation of resources, the direction of the investments, the orientation of technological development and institutional change are all in harmony and enhance both current and future potential to meet human needs and aspirations. Accordingly sustainable development is defined as a production system in which the technological and management inputs do not adversely affect the bio-physical system which has a basal productivity i.e. output, which can be harvested with little or no input [Katiyar, 1997:88-89]. Meanwhile, the tribal people have a close affinity with the nature as well as cultural norms and values related to the preservation of natural products. In this concern, the folk traditions as well as folk songs of the tribals bear special significance; for example a folk song of the Drukpas is mentioned below to understand the relevance of their affection, emotion, sentiment and knowledge to preserve and sustain the environment. The Drukpas are of Tibeto-Mongoloid in origin and inhabit the almost naturally isolated region of dooars in Kalchini block under Alipurduar subdivision in Jalpaiguri districts of extreme north- east corner of West Bengal. Their settlement is totally surrounded by nature. Their livelihood and cultural practices have a very close affinity with the environment. Their society is a folk based one. They have many traditional occasions and religious festivals. *Losar* is their important festival. They have

many folk games, dances and music. On different occasions and religious festivals they perform folk songs and folk dances with music. Their lyrics and songs are very much related with the beauty of nature and its importance in their daily life. One among the many is given below as an example-

- i) *geau gosa gi lebe minto*
thidu guolo saein
(We need bright sunshine for our earth.)
- ii) *kate lebe minto*
taese guola saein
(God has bestowed this place our place of mountain with bright sunshine and rain.)
- iii) *nate lebe minto*
taese guolo saein
(The nature is protecting the animals, plants and human being with the bright sunshine and rain.)
- iv) *paso lebe minto*
souge guolo saein
(Not only this place but all the places in our earth unknown to us, may kindly be protected by you.)
- v) *chuote lebe gi minto*
sime guolo saien
(With your kind blessings the streams are filled up with water and the fishes can be alive there.)
- vi) *gaesa lebe minto*
chende guolo saein
(Oh God may we all get your kind blessings.)
- vii) *choma lebegi minto*
eyapche guolo saein
(Oh God give us your kind blessings that our streams may keep filled up with water, our agricultural fields may get filled up with flowers and crops.)
- viii) *esa lebegi minto*
eyapche guolo saein
(May all the flowers of our village get fully blossomed which will make us rejoiceful, may we get enchanted with pleasure and joy as like the flowers get blossomed.)

The above lyrics of the folk song clearly signify that the Drukpas are very much related with the environment and they have a close affinity with it. Moreover they have a deep sense to preserve the natural resources and they pray for the good nature and environment as well as production of crops and ultimate well being for the entire community. In this context, the folk culture makes the involvement and common participation of the concerned people. These cultural practices show their obedience to the nature for survival and to protect the source of concerned products that can be obtained from the surrounding environment.

General Observation

Society is a complex network of social relationships. The series of interactions between person to person lead towards a cumulative approach for the achievement of better ways of livelihood as well as development. The human society is keenly interwoven with the cultural aspects. Culture helps to accumulate the daily livelihood requirements and means of survival in fashioned aggregate. The norms, values and customs related with cultural aspects control human life and its social behaviour. Every society is exposed to an environmental milieu and it is the main resource from where the concerned individuals can accumulate their requirements. Culture controls the social behaviour of human beings and it is keenly related with the environment. The ample production of environment control the economic backbone, material needs of the society in diversified ways and it is also related to their rituals and customs. It is well observed among the tribals in various ways. The tribal society worships nature as their mother and the impact of environment on their social, economic and cultural life can be noticed from several dimensions. Being in the lap of nature, the tribals' cultural performances like songs, dances, proverbs, riddles are reflections of their interaction with the environment. Folk cultural traditions are the note of their social solidarity and community consensus. The folk tunes reflect the beauty of nature and simultaneously it is the prayer for the prosperity and welfare of the entire society. Being closely related with nature and environment, their folk cultural practices are not only for recreation, but also for devotion and obedience to the nature. In this way they offer their prayer to nature for protecting their property and wealth as well as to provide the continuous resource of natural products to them. Folk culture does not imply only the artistic activities and musical performances of the tribals; rather it bears a much wider aspect. The folk lyrics denote the collection and accumulation of the natural products to provide the requirements for the entire community members. The folk cultural heritages are keenly related with the knowledge and practices of how the environment can protect the daily livelihood of the tribals and how they should utilize the natural resources in this concern. It prevents them from the wastage of raw materials and to redress environmental degradation as a whole. At present the environmental degradation and sustainable development has become a global emerging issue. In this concern we can apply the knowledge of the tribals for environmental preservation as well as to protect the environment from its gradual degradation and sustain it for our improvement. The tribal concept of environmental preservation may have

some regional variation but the key concept lies in the issues of safety and security of the environment all together.

In this regard, the folk cultural heritages among the tribes of North Bengal have their own importance. Their lyrics and musical performances have a connection with every social aspect; along with that it denotes a key concept about their dependence and affection to the nature. Earlier they were almost dependent on nature and nearly isolated from the rest of the people. The folk cultural aspects had a great value in their livelihood activities, economic pursuits and social ceremonies concerning their daily livelihood. But in the present circumstances the survival of cultural aspects is threatened by the gradual changes in belief systems due to the forces of deforestation, encroachments, political interference, industrialization, urbanization, modernization and globalization. Similarly economic development, population pressure, changing value systems and global cultural forces have undermined the status of their sacred groves. On the other hand due to continuous environmental degradation and rapid deforestation their scope to worship nature, several deities and numerous totemic objects was affected. Among the studied people the environmental degradation and continuous influx of outsiders forced them to go outside in search of jobs and in this regard gradually they came in close contact with other languages. In this regard their dialect is gradually losing its importance particularly among the young generation. Language is treated as the vehicle of culture but if language gets changed then the folk culture has faces serious challenges for existence. It is to be mentioned here that, for the enculturation of folk based traits, the importance of dialect cannot be ignored. Ultimately it has seriously affected the folk music, folk dance, legends, myths and lyrics of the concerned people. Further it can be stated that, when environmental degradation occurs it may tell upon the language and ultimately the folk cultural traditions of the simple societies have to suffer the worst setback as a whole. The influence of urban based culture and global cultural trends are gradually engulfing the unwritten oral tradition as well as documents and folk based cultural heritages. The folk traditional aspects are gradually getting merged into a global nexus. Though development has occurred in a number of aspects the traditional cultural heritage of the tribals has paid the price for it. Meanwhile their development is quite disproportionate against their actual requirement. For the survival as well as for the future existence of the concerned people and their folk culture, the prime need is to protect their environment and ethno-cultural heritages. It can be possible if the indigenous knowledge in this regard is applied adequately. Their cultural beliefs and customs related with environmental protection are enculturated through generation after generation. Thus if we want to protect the environment and simultaneously try to make it sustain for our betterment then we may apply the folk based knowledge of the ethnic people.

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India's Approach to Conflict Resolution in South Asia: Re-reading Gujral Doctrine

Pratip Chattopadhyay

Abstract

Most of the South Asian states are engulfed among themselves with varying degrees of conflicts and disputes that remains unresolved despite pronouncements and joint declarations. South Asia being an Indo-centric region, most conflicts are between India and her neighbours that emanates from the different perceptions of India's policies. The present paper deals with one of the seminal approaches to resolve inter-state disputes in South Asia emanating from India, viz. the Gujral Doctrine. Section I provides the theoretical framework of conflict resolution studies while section II depicts the conflictual geo-history of the region. Section III highlights the main strands of Gujral Doctrine and section IV reevaluates the approach in the light of present relational dynamics of the South Asian countries and concludes that a re-reading of this approach is required for a fruitful foreign policy strategy of India towards the regional neighbouring countries.

I

In the political arena, conflict as well cooperation is part of the interaction among actors. Terms like 'amity' and 'enmity' – even more, terms like 'friendship' and 'hostility' – must be used with caution in discussing interstate relationships. These terms are taken from the universe of interpersonal relations and they convey a sense of emotional involvement. In contrast, diplomatic postures of amity and enmity do not depend on emotional conditions and may in fact contradict them. Thus, some Americans may feel enmity towards the coloured races, but this does not prevent 'cordial' or 'friendly' diplomatic relations between the United States and many African and Asian nations. There is a type of relationship that at first does not seem to fit into the amity-enmity spectrum. It could be described as a state of 'minimal relations'. One novelty of our age is that no longer do the countries shun political ties altogether; most of them, in fact, cooperate within the framework of the United Nations. The cool, non-entangling relations of the kind sought by the non-aligned countries can be pictured in the amity-enmity spectrum as relations of minimal amity.

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Moving out toward the extremity one approaches the more intense types of amity which can be described as active cooperation or a relationship of 'going it with others'. Such cooperation can spring from two incentives which are distinct in motivation and effects. Cooperation may arise from a desire to improve relations within the cooperating group, in which case the interest is turned inward and is independent of threat outside the group. The second incentive - which, to the disappointment of idealists, proves much more potent - is the desire to meet a common external threat by cooperative effort (Wolfers 1962:25).

Enmity reflects the existence of a conflict of interest. Peace is threatened at that stage of the conflict when physical coercion, by one side or both, becomes a practical possibility. Relations between inimical but non-warring nations are often described as competition or rivalry that pertains only to their struggle to equip themselves with arms and alliances as the means of attaining their objectives. The transition from war to peace does not come spontaneously or easily, years of strife inevitably leave deep scars, bitter memories and rancour. Peace is won only by effort and resolve. There must therefore be a change in attitudes, a change in mentalities. Reconciliation must be the new challenge; social justice and the struggle against poverty, the new goals.

The argument of security as peace is premised on conflicts and it is true that conflict studies in the form of conflict-management and conflict-resolution studies have contributed to security studies that are assumed to be peace studies as well. One of the notable phenomena in peace studies has been the rapid development of conflict resolution studies. The theory, practice and skills of conflict resolution have taken off from behavioural and anthropological studies, system building programmes in the wake of managerial development in the field of arbitration, mediation, adjudication, and the practice of evaluation research. Starting as a managerial tool in the field of social conflicts, it became a matter of academic pursuit. Conflict resolution could not keep itself distinct from conflict management and conflict moderation. The liberal arts and sociological dimensions of the theory and skills of conflict resolution were to be subsumed in the behaviouralism of statecraft (Samaddar 2001:25-26).

Because governments concerned with peace are interested in going beyond the mere prevention of open hostilities, much of their foreign policy or peace strategy is aimed at consolidating and stabilizing the peace. Since as in the case of the restoration of peace, deterrence is not, or not by itself, sufficient, consolidation calls for accommodation in its broadest sense. Deterrence, to preserve the peace, and accommodation, to consolidate it, then, are the chief peace strategies of nations and they usually can be pursued simultaneously. Many men of sensitive conscience are disturbed to see their country either entertaining cordial relations with nations, regimes and individual rulers whom they condemn for unethical behaviour or engaging in war with a people for whom they feel no hatred. Yet if the nations interest dispassionately perceived shall guide statesmen, it is necessary that they be able to

dissociate themselves from their own private feelings and from those of the public when as statesmen they shape the relationships of their country with other nations (Wolfers 1962:35).

Conflict resolution is an ideal term but it is now being frequently used because it gives a sense of hope to those people who are under the shadow of endless sense of insecurity and fear. When the human mind tends to be violent, aggressive, egocentric and chauvinistic, the outcome has been the frequent outbreak of wars and other forms of hostility. Mark Hoffman defines conflict resolution as follows: “the attainment of a non- hierarchical, non-coercive integrative solution that is derived from the parties themselves through a process of analytic problem-solving” (Hoffman 1992:265).

There is an extended debate in the international relations literature on balancing versus bandwagoning when new poles of power emerge. This basically concludes that weaker states’ decisions to balance or bandwagon depends upon the threat perception from the emerging pole, whether there are shared interests or not, and by implication, the kind of accommodation or side payments – implicit or explicit – offered as inducements by the emerging pole to potential allies. On regional cooperation and alliances, states are sensitive to not just absolute gains but relative gains since relative economic gains, particularly if cumulative over time, can convert into military advantage. Hence, it is not enough to point to the absolute gains from trade but to reassure potential partners that relative gains, if any, will not convert into anything threatening. When India was a closed economy, the smaller neighboring states found no advantage in bandwagoning with it, but India’s liberalization and high economic growth of 7 to 9 percent has changed the picture. (Sridharan 2011) Backed by the double changes, viz. new policy orientation of Gujral Doctrine and high economic growth, India can possibly induce bandwagoning by offering economic incentives combined with political and security reassurances among her regional neighbours.

II

In this backdrop it would be interesting to envisage the situation in the South Asian region where nature has provided a complex character. There is a vast country at the centre of the region around which there are smaller countries. The partition syndrome has resulted in the artificial division of states, people and resources, thereby leaving behind bickering, disharmony, mistrust and communal feelings. The socio-cultural and religio-linguistic spectrum overlaps national boundaries and creates ethno-religious complexities in the region. It has given rise to identity crisis among them. As a result, the smaller countries tend to look towards extra-regional powers to play a role in regional affairs so as to balance India’s regional pre-eminence. This naturally has security risks for India. These cross currents are intensified by the new forces of mass media and democracy, which help to create new ethnic and religious consciousness or reawaken old rivalries. South Asian states have opted for different strategies for nation-building and are at different stages of political development. What is more important is that these

strategies are not only mutually complementary they are actually conflicting- one's strategy tends to thrive on another's failure. For socio-historic reasons India is not only the virtual fountainhead of all the cultures of South Asia but it is also the base of all cultural conflicts, some of which were accentuated during the Indian nationalist movement. The incongruity among national elites of South Asia resulting from such causes as different stages of political development, conflicting nation-building strategies, different attitudes and responses to cross national ethnic and religious problems, etc. present a complex situation for inter-state relations in the region. It is further complicated by conflicting strategic and diplomatic positions held by different South Asian states with regard to both the regional and global systems. Any effort towards building regional consciousness therefore must address both internal and external forces that come in the way. The socio-historic and geographic factors taken together draw India into the region's ethnic and religious conflicts often as unwilling party.

Inter-state conflicts in South Asia probably are highest compared to any other regional blocs. Bilateral relations are defined by antagonism and mistrust. The differences between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, between Sri Lanka and India over the nationality of Tamilians, where Sri Lanka accused India, especially state government of Tamil Nadu for supplying arms and providing trainings to the Tamil terrorists in its Southern areas are only two of the most outstanding examples in this regard. The problem between India and Nepal on open border and the Indo-Nepal treaty of peace and Friendship of July 1950, dispute between India and Bangladesh over illegal migration from the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) and the demarcation of boundaries involving fertile islands and enclaves and also in sharing the water of river Ganges are examples of conflicts in the region. Most countries of the region are Indo-centric and their elites adopt policies either deliberately for their own survival or for valid national interests. Both seem to impact bilateral and regional relations that, in turn, also generate conflicts. This occasionally happens in Indo-Nepal, Indo-Bangladesh, Indo-Pakistan and Indo-Sri Lankan relations. While minorities are also a source of conflicts in the region, global political impacts also contribute to creating conflicts.

It has been fashionable for Western leaders, political commentators and strategic analysts to define South Asia's conflicts through the narrow prism of what they term as Indo-Pak rivalries over Kashmir. Obviously, when it comes to South Asia and the Indo-Pak conflict which predominate the region, intellectual integrity has to take a backseat when fig-leaves have to be found to screen strategic interests of the United States and the West. Kashmir and specifically the Kashmir Valley (a fraction of the entire Jammu & Kashmir state) is the Western fig-leaf. South Asia minus Pakistan has been devoid of any inter-state conflicts. Therefore, in terms of viewing South Asia in terms of conflict resolution, the reference point for the impediments have to perforce focus on Pakistan, as that is where inter-state conflicts in South Asia get generated and proxy war and terrorism engineered (Kapila 2002).

Politics arises when there is conflict. At the same time one of the essential functions of politics is the resolution of conflict. Promotion of cooperation, development and associated values are also political functions. The most familiar idea of politics in South Asia is that of engaging in a zero sum game at all levels of interaction. The new trend after the cold war that witnessed conflict resolution and conflict management efforts led some people in the Indian Foreign Policy establishment to believe that peace cannot be far behind in South Asia. In the changed world perhaps the most significant achievement of the Gujral doctrine was a conscious decision to make the nation's foreign office less Pakistan centric.

III

India witnessed the emergence of I.K.Gujral as a diplomat, especially as the External Affairs Minister only with the coming to power of the United Front government and India during the regime launched an initiative of peace through the 'Gujral Doctrine'. I.K. Gujral became the Indian Prime Minister after Deve Gowda, and continued to pursue the doctrine that understood the need to adopt a liberal attitude towards the problems of the neighbouring countries, and stressed that India should take initiatives in resolving long standing problems without expecting reciprocity. (Upreti 2005:214.) The 'Gujral Doctrine' revolved around five principles, which were first enunciated in a September 1996 speech by Gujral at Chatham House, London, and then amplified in a mid-January 1997 speech in Colombo, Sri Lanka. The basic idea was that India as the region's great power, would act magnanimously in resolving hitherto contentious issues with the smaller states and create a regional norm and practice of noninterference in other's affairs. In the words of I.K.Gujral, "The 'Gujral Doctrine', if I may call it so, states that, first, with its neighbours like Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka, India does not ask for reciprocity, but gives and accommodates what it can in good faith and trust. Second, we believe that no South Asian country should allow its territory to be used against the interests of another country of the region. Third, that none should interfere in the internal affairs of another. Fourth, all South Asian countries must respect each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty. And finally, they should settle all their disputes through peaceful bilateral negotiations."¹

Gujral applied these principles in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal, without obstruction from the Indian polity. Perhaps, most dramatically, India and Bangladesh on December 12, 1996, signed an agreement on Ganges River water sharing. The ratification of the Mahakali Treaty in June 1997 added a new dimension to the bilateral relations, as did the acceptance of Nepal's request for an additional transit route to Bangladesh through India. During Gujral's visit, Nepal's long standing demand for an alternative trade route to Bangladesh through Indian territory in Phulbari, was accepted. The agreements showed how determined diplomacy could solve what has been regarded as an intractable problem. The issue which was creating a misunderstanding between India and Sri Lanka was the ethnic crisis in the

island. Sri Lankans were apprehensive of India's attitude and role in the crisis. The Indian government made it clear that Sri Lanka and Sri Lankans alone must sort out this issue.

The Gujral Doctrine, which encapsulated the United Front's neighbourhood policy, brought rich dividends to India as well as to countries in the neighbourhood. Its objective was to promote all round economic and social development with justice and equity. The accelerated development of every country in the subcontinent was a key goal of the Gujral Doctrine. The first thing to note about it was that it had given a good deal of thought, rooted in concrete experience. This meant there is continuity -in the sense of returning Indian foreign policy to an independent and upstanding orientation- as well as a significant measure of new thinking. The exercise seemed reasonably well aligned with the then political and coalition government realities in India and also with the emerging realities in the neighbourhood and the world at large.

There was already a favourable atmosphere created by the time the Gujral Doctrine was spelt out. Democracy in Nepal and Bangladesh facilitated a new beginning, putting behind the past. Similarly, in Sri Lanka, the withdrawal of the IPKF and later the coming to power of Chandrika Kumaratunga provided a fresh start to the establishment of mutually beneficial relations. This process continued with added vigour and vision during the tenure of Gujral, and he built on this crucial base, first, as foreign minister and, later, as prime minister during 1996-97. His own personality had a lot to do with the positive response that his doctrine evoked. By putting his words into action in the manner he conducted relations with the neighbours, Gujral was able to prove beyond doubt India's sincerity. He clearly understood the importance of maintaining friendly relations with the neighbours and clearly stated the five principles necessary to do so. The result was the creation of a positive constructive atmosphere in South Asia and especially in the relations between India and its neighbours.

India succeeded in resolving certain long-standing problems with Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Its encouragement of sub-regional cooperation was a welcome development. However, suspicion and confusion still persist among the neighbours. Nepal and Bangladesh lack a national consensus over the issue of sharing river waters. Sri Lanka still appears suspicious about India's attitude towards the Tamil problem because of the influence of regional parties in the central government. Bhutan also seems to be worried about Bodo and United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) activities in its territory. Regarding Pakistan, Gujral's approach was more guarded. He did not include Pakistan in the list of states to which his doctrine applied, and several of its principles pointedly were not being applied by Pakistan and India's intelligence services in their activities against each other. India did not mind if Pakistan was disturbed by its omission. Gujral sought to show that Pakistan would not bog India down in the region. Yet Gujral made it clear that he wanted to improve relations. He volunteered that India would ignore 'needless provocations' from Pakistan and would not respond to Pakistan's rhetoric on issues like Kashmir. The I.K.Gujral regime took measures to

facilitate better people to people contacts, in particular the unilateral liberalisation of the visa regime. With Pakistan, India's attempts under the Gujral regime towards economic and cultural cooperation have not been very successful. Pakistan's insistence upon taking up the 'core issues' first has repeatedly thwarted the process of normalization of relations. (Upreti 2005:220)

The unusual decisiveness and tone of these overtures owed much to Gujral's intellect and character. Born in Jhelum, a city between Rawalpindi and Lahore in what is now the Pakistani part of Punjab, Gujral retained an affinity for the region and its culture. Near the end of his career, the soft-spoken Gujral pursued a policy to win India its desired place in the global order by first winning the confidence of its neighbours. Some of the initiatives he completed had been set in motion by Narasimha Rao and his foreign minister, Pranab Mukherjee, but Gujral had the courage and decisiveness actually to make the moves when others might have feared political backlash. Indeed, the widespread public support for Gujral's diplomacy, including among some BJP leaders in private, suggested that the Indian polity was more amenable to visionary leadership than many politicians assumed in justifying their inaction. Gujral's policy also had the potential to reduce the external pressures and threats that Indian and Pakistani hawks cited to justify their ongoing desires for nuclear weapon and ballistic missile testing and development. All of this contributed to clear American respect for Gujral's efforts. Inder Gujral, for all his diplomatic efforts to raise India's regional and global stature, could not afford to neglect the strategic weaponers. When the defence minister in October 1997 requested authorization to conduct nuclear weapon tests, Gujral paused, as he had other strategic priorities. Beyond the primacy of politico-economic progress, Gujral's concentration on raising India's regional and global standing through diplomacy militated against conducting tests. Gujral was fitfully pursuing a strategy that could alleviate the causes of insecurity. If dialogue with Pakistan could normalize relations, as it had begun to do with China, India's regional security and global status would improve. The nation then would focus on internal development that ultimately would determine its strength. (Perkovich 2002:399)

Gujral doctrine was considered to mark a serious policy change in India's relations with its smaller neighbors. At first sight it might seem that India was forgoing its readiness to project its regional power and impose conditions on its neighbors if necessary. Yet on reflection, it is also possible to state that the doctrine had (two) strategic aims; first, to isolate any outside powers, including Pakistan, from interfering in the regional affairs, especially in the smaller states; second, to make these countries accept Indian ownership of the region by voluntarily accepting self-responsibility to respect that ownership and, eventually contributing to positively to safe guard it; becoming 'unilateral' economic and security partners with India without signing any documents. In this respect, one can also say the doctrine is subtly more aggressive in the Indian assertion of the region. The third and important point here is Gujral doctrine is a basis for Indian conduct between government-to-government relationships. And even though it says one should not interfere in each other's internal affairs, it does not specify

how the security concern of each other due to internal turmoil should be interpreted and acted upon.

Even for these successes, scholars note a basic weakness in the doctrine that is founded in its axioms. It is the definition of the region as a geographic space with 'separate countries' than "nation-states with common goals". One might dispute and say such loaded terminologies are good in principle and on sheet. As India is surrounded by failed states, the phony definition of sovereignty of these nation- states degrades the doctrine and will allow for the eventual erosion of sovereignty of the region, and the adjoining regions. However it is believed the doctrine has the internal structural mechanisms to readjust and address this vital discrepancy. Otherwise there will be contradiction between the principle positions of publicly upholding the doctrine, while contriving to retrieve certain situations by underhand tactics contrary to the doctrine, which will only work against the main objective of the doctrine. The Gujral Doctrine, India's policy of providing unilateral concession to South Asian neighbours without seeking reciprocity, proved to be too mild in the face of the impregnable perceptual framework of India's neighbours. Altaf Gauhar, leading Pakistani columnist commented that, "The Gujral Doctrine is not a doctrine of good neighborly relations but a Bharti Plan to seize the neighbour peacefully" (Bhasin 2011).

The Gujral Doctrine, it should be noted, is not the act of a weak idealistic power. Rather, it is the sign of a regional hegemon. The doctrine is not a statement of unilateral concessions. It articulates a set of responsibilities for India's neighbours as much as for India. For example, it insists on non-interference in India's internal affairs even as it promises not to interfere in the domestic politics of smaller states. The affirmation of bilateralism has long been the cornerstone of India's approach to the region, and there is no derogation of that approach. The doctrine lays down a set of norms and practices for South Asia. It undertakes to abide by some norms and practices and in turn suggests that the rest of the region do so too- with the implicit 'threat' that India could always abide by some less palatable norms and practices. Here is a classic hegemonic order – reward and the withdrawal of the reward. Only a hegemon has the power to promise, and do, both. The Gujral doctrine is a show of power, not the opposite (Bajpai 2004:54).

Despite its political weakness, the Gujral government backed up the doctrine with some tangible moves, but ultimately failed to achieve its grand vision. The Gujral Doctrine was visibly incongruous, as Pakistan used its territory, diplomatic resources and much else to pursue a proxy war against India. Moreover, freeing intra-regional trade—it could have created powerful incentives for bilateral and regional cooperation—did not register high on Gujral's priorities. In any event, the Gujral government did not last long enough to be able to sustain his policy.

Inter-state conflict and disputes emerges due to different perceptions of policies and meanings accrued from it. It is axiomatic that India's size and level of development enjoins on it the responsibility of being the natural fulcrum in the process of South Asian development. In dealing with regional concerns India claims to perform its leadership role by pursuing policies to further the common interest of regional states. But the hesitant and cautious policies pursued by India contradict the qualities of dynamic leadership. On the pretext of countering regional apprehensions, India has on many occasions abandoned the leadership mantle. Ironically such policies have fuelled allegations of lack of interest on India's part for regional concerns. Hence India's policies of avoiding leadership have led to perceptions of abandonment of regional responsibilities. An examination of India's policies and regional perceptions demonstrate that India's role in South Asia neither confirms to the indices of traditional leadership nor genuine hegemony. The mismanagement of the power variables and complexity of perceptual constructs has resulted in a situation where India fears to exercise its leadership and neighbours strive to counter its hegemony. Consequently, India in South Asia is "powerful enough to be feared but not powerful enough to be respected". Though India's role in South Asia cannot be likened to a hegemonic power, India has also fallen short of the traditional leadership role in the region. India's policies reflect supervisory postures rather than a more favourable participatory leadership character. India has failed to provide political advice and economic guidance to neighbours without appearing to be domineering. Rather than pursuing a consistent policy aimed at addressing the perceptual fears of the regional states, India tends to abdicate its proactive role. India's policy in the region is not consistent in terms of what it avoids and what it pursues and hence it fails to qualify as pure hegemony or positive leadership (Bhasin: *ibid*).

IV

The politics in South Asia lies in the conflict/conflictual issues and the management of conflict/conflictual issues with the neighbours and in this count the entire post cold war Indian policy makers failed to achieve anything substantial. The critical problematic inter-state issues at stake for India in the South Asian neighbourhood for the last sixty long years that are yet to be resolved are- the Ganga water sharing, Kashmir problem, problem of illegal migration and problem of tracking the terrorist training camps. Essentially through a number of composite dialogue process the Indian leaders under the illumination of a new policy approach tried to bring down the inter-state tension and mistrust. The question is why despite the best efforts of Indian leaders have the disputed areas remained unresolved? Or is it that the Indian leaders like their counterparts were superficial in their approach?

India since the time of Gujral era has done everything right in order to have a long term peaceful and strong bond with her South Asian neighbours within an institutional framework with the long term aim of a political union and common currency for the region that got reflected in the various policy pronouncements over the past one decade. During the Atal Bihari Vajpayee regime there was also a declared set of rules guiding the relations with the

neighbouring countries. The NDA Government not only remained committed to the Gujral Doctrine but prepared to move even further ahead in the direction of peace, friendship and prosperity with her neighbours. India was not merely returning to the Gujral Doctrine, this government wants to inject significant economic content into it. As far as the immediate neighbourhood was concerned, it did not turn away from the Gujral Doctrine, and even floated the idea of a South Asian Union following the European model. During the Manmohan Singh regime there were attempts to get linked with the neighbouring countries. However both these two regimes after Gujral government extended their friendliness to distant countries bringing them in the fold of an extended neighbourhood. India's inclination towards these countries coupled with the absence of the nomenclature 'neighbourhood policy' in any of the foreign policy reports and policy pronouncements brings the commitment of these governments in 'mending fences' with the South Asian neighbours under critical prisms. Insightfully enough, Dhruva Jaishankar suggests that Indian foreign policy over the last decade has been guided by a Vajpayee-Manmohan Doctrine, the essential elements of which are "a prioritisation of the country's economic development, an emphasis on diplomacy, a strict maintenance of Indian sovereignty, a distrust of alliances, a consideration of balances of power, an abstention from direct interference in the internal affairs of other states, and a willingness to bilaterally engage all states, including those with competing interests" (Jaishankar 2008:10).

Such a direction is not a new facet of Indian foreign policy as its resonance can be seen in Gujral's speeches and statements. In one instance Gujral commented that

"We aim to achieve this goal both through bilateral interaction with our neighbours, as well as through the framework of SAARC. A peaceful, stable and constructive environment in our neighbourhood is vital for us as we pursue the goals of accelerated development for ourselves and the region. You might well know of the offer of a dialogue we made to Pakistan soon after our Government took office. Even while we are awaiting Pakistan's response, we are taking unilateral steps to improve the relationship at the people-to-people level. We are also trying to preserve a positive atmosphere, by avoiding polemic, and ignoring the occasional hostile rhetoric from across the border."²

The Gujral Doctrine is a unique attempt by India to fashion a new order in South Asia which elaborated a vision of a South Asian economy in the new century with the free movement of capital goods and service within the region. The new turn in Indian diplomacy has contributed to a more peaceful South Asia in four ways. First, in promoting agreements with the smaller states, the doctrine has reduced the resentment and suspicion they harbour towards India. It has also reduced their incentive or desire for external reassurance and balance in their relationship with their giant neighbour. This will further reduce the friction in India's relations with the smaller states. Second, if the new diplomacy reassures Bangladesh and Nepal in particular, it invests in the political stability of the entire Northeast. The doctrine is intended

to be a reassurance, at the same time, that India will not support dissidents from the smaller countries. Third, to the extent that the doctrine leads to the making and implementation of agreements such as Mahakali and Ganges water sharing, it is an investment also in the economic development of the most difficult corner of South Asia. Agreements with India's neighbours and the new accommodating style will have a more direct economic benefit and helps in pacifying regional trouble-spots and conflict. Lastly, the various bilateral agreements with the smaller states have threatened to isolate Pakistan. India's success on the Mahakali with Nepal and the Ganges with Bangladesh suggest that it is Pakistan, not India, which is being obdurate. This enables New Delhi to increase the pressure on Islamabad to come to terms on key issues.

V

Such an overall peace-building diplomatic approach for the entire region marked a paradigm shift in the annals of India's neighbourhood policy. Unilateral concessions and the effort for constant dialogue with neighbouring countries create the route for conflict resolution and through the process of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). *A minute re-reading of the statements of I. K. Gujral and a reading of the speeches and statements of top foreign officials of the present Indian government engaged in External Affairs indicate the eagerness and earnestness to resolve conflicts in inter-state relations in South Asian region.*

The present External Affairs Minister of India, S.M. Krishna commented on the situation of Sri Lanka in this manner- "While the Government of India is of the view that the end of conflict in Sri Lanka provides an opportunity to pursue a lasting political settlement in Sri Lanka within the framework of a united Sri Lanka, acceptable to all the communities in Sri Lanka including the Tamils, it has to be kept in mind that this is a long standing issue and Sri Lanka is going through its internal processes.....We will do whatever we can to support this process."³

On the issue of Pakistan, S.M. Krishna mentioned "As an outcome of the talks, it was decided to continue the dialogue process on all issues....The visit of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan was aimed at resolving peacefully all outstanding issues through a constructive and forward looking dialogue and to establish cooperative and good neighbourly relations between the two countries, in an environment free from terrorism and violence. In this regard, we are committed to see an end to terrorism and violence and to realise their aspirations for peace and development."⁴

Most promising of all outcome of the present UPA II government is its near solved achievement of the issues of border conflict. The EAM remark testifies this approach in this manner "...we have expanded our understanding on water issues. We have a very good agreement on the sharing of the Ganga Waters which is being implemented sincerely by both

sides. I am optimistic that we shall reach similar conclusion on the sharing of the Teesta and Feni waters. Between neighbours, it is necessary to deal with each other in a spirit of transparency and sincerity.....we shall find mutually acceptable and pragmatic solutions that meet the needs of our people while recognizing the need for mutual sacrifice in view of declining of flows due to climate change.”⁵

Summing up the attitude of India towards her neighbours in South Asia in the new millennium erstwhile Foreign Minister Nirupama Rao commented “We have articulated a policy in our neighbourhood that emphasises the advantages of building networks of inter-connectivity, trade, and investment so that prosperity can be shared and so that the region can benefit from India’s rapid economic growth and rising prosperity. We want to create an environment with our neighbours that enables us to work together to fulfill our common objectives of economic development.”⁶

Thus C. Raja Mohan is apt when he mentions that the “Gujral Doctrine’ was controversial when it was first unveiled but became the basis for neighbourhood policies of those who followed him – Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Dr Manmohan Singh. Realists in the Foreign Office did not take long to recognise the many good uses that the Gujral Doctrine could be put to. That New Delhi must act non-reciprocally towards its neighbours and create stakes for its neighbours in the success of India, in the name of promoting a ‘peaceful periphery’ has now become the reigning doctrine in the South Block (Mohan 2009).

Conflict resolution in South Asia is a painful process requiring time, flexibility, some degree of relaxation in the communication of the conflict, ability to think beyond the logic of the state, and creation of an enabling environment in which people-to-people relationships are made possible. Conflict resolution in South Asia is also a long drawn out process requiring multi track efforts. It is high time that a purposeful discourse in South Asia on the importance of research for the management and resolution of conflict takes place. The Gujral doctrine has indeed given a fresh dimension to the management of issues of conflict in South Asia. The geo-historical factors that have resulted in the continuation of a number of inter-border disputes in the South Asian neighbourhood must be tackled not through the prism of political realism but through attitudes of concern and responsibility. Though in the Indian policy domain, not to speak of other countries in South Asia, the Gujral doctrine have been sidelined, no other major settlement and management oriented approach or policy has evolved. The need of the hour is to create a soft power based approach and in that light the Gujral doctrine must be resurfaced with new vigour and vision. While the ideal way towards regional integration would be the adoption of a regime of common norms and policies, this is not feasible given that SAARC bars the discussion of domestic issues. Hence, the best way forward for Indian policy would probably be the bilateral route of improving relations with its neighbors with non-reciprocal openness in parallel with other efforts, including aid – India being an emerging donor – but tying such cooperation to reciprocity on basic Indian security concerns such as terrorism and insurgency.

The Gujral Doctrine that prioritised neighbourhood politics in Indian policy domain should be re-read and perceived in this way for creating a peaceful neighbourhood, at least in the Indian policy perspective.

Notes

1. Excerpts from 'Aspects of Indian Foreign Policy'- A Speech by I.K.Gujral at the Bandarnaike Centre For International Studies in Colombo; January 20th 1997. www.stimson.org/southasia/?sn=sa20020116302-33K
2. *Ibid.*
3. Suo Motu Statement in Lok Sabha by EAM on "The Situation in Sri Lanka", August 4, 2011 <http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=530117907>
4. Suo Motu Statement in Parliament by EAM on "Visit of Foreign Minister of Pakistan to India" August 03, 2011 <http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=530117897>
5. Address by EAM at Bangladesh Institute of International & Strategic Studies July 08, 2011 <http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=530117817>
6. Address by FS on 'Key Priorities for India's Foreign Policy' at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, June 27, 2011 <http://meaindia.nic.in/mystart.php?id=530117787>

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Environmental Challenges in South Asia: The Case of Maldives

T C Karthikheyan

Abstract

This paper looks into the environmental challenges faced by Maldives, an atoll island state in the South Asian region. It explores all possible sources of environmental challenges with inherent vulnerabilities of the country in terms of its geographic and environmental conditions and analyse important contributing factors such as global warming, sea-level rise, impact of tourism and environmental degradation, and the 2004 Tsunami. The paper particularly examines the effects of global warming on Maldives on the basis of the IPCC Report on Climate Change. The impact of tsunami and its repercussions on the Maldives' ecological fragility are also discussed. Towards the concluding part, the paper focuses on the need for the Maldivian government to formulate appropriate policies and also, at the same time, the difficulties in realising those policies, considering the cooperation and aid from the international donor community and the outcomes of the global climate change negotiations.

Key Words: Maldives, Environmental Challenges, Tourism, Tsunami, Climate Change, Sea-level rise, Ecosystem.

Introduction

Maldives is one of the atoll¹ island states facing severe environmental problems with regard to global warming and the ill effects of sea level rise. It also has the problem of environmental degradation due to its huge tourism industry. Being so vulnerable to Nature's course of action, Maldives faces the imminent threat of being inundated in the next 50 years because of global warming and the resulting sea level rise. Its vulnerability has been witnessed glaringly in the wake of the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004, which has caused severe damage to its ecology and economy. This paper deals with the nature of Maldivian geographic features and its vulnerability; the problems of global warming, sea level rise, the impact of tsunami and the tourism industry all of which are discussed by emphasizing on the nation's environmental security. It also discusses the Maldivian demographic features and its fragile ecology to highlight their impact on the livelihood of the people and its environment. In general, this paper exposes the environmental insecurity of Maldives with regard to the imminent threats it faces in the near future.

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Vulnerability, in the context of atoll island states, is widely believed to be associated with exposure to external economic forces and environmental hazards due to peculiar geographic conditions. In the Commonwealth Secretariat's 1997 report, *A Future for Small States: Overcoming Vulnerability*, it has been argued that vulnerability is the consequence of two sets of factors: (1) "the incidence and intensity of risk and threat" and (2) "the ability to withstand risks and threats (resistance) and to bounce back from their consequences (resilience)". Such threats were perceived to emanate from three main sources: economic exposure; remoteness and insularity; and proneness to natural disasters. Maldives is an ideal example of such a scenario.

The Maldivian archipelago, which is composed of live coral reefs and sand bars, consists of 1192 coral islands grouped in a chain of twenty six atolls in the Indian Ocean. These 1192 islands of Maldives make up less than 2 per cent of the total area of the country that is 90,000 sq km. The exclusive economic zone of Maldives extends over an area of 8,59,000 sq km. Islands vary in size from 0.5 to several square kilometers (Phadnis and Luithvi 1982:9). The islands are low-lying, with an average height of 1.6 meters above mean sea level. Maximum height above sea level within the Maldives is around 3 meters and in excess of 80 per cent of the land area is less than 1 meter above the mean high tide level. Few of the islands have a land area in excess of 1 sq. km. and only 199 are inhabited. Only 33 inhabited islands have a land area of more than 1 sq. km. and no fewer than 67 islands - one third of the total - have less than 500 inhabitants, while 144 islands - 70 per cent of the total - have less than 1000 inhabitants (Ministry of Planning and National Development 2006).

Maldives has neither hills nor rivers and is also without land based building materials. Land is scarce in Maldives and only around ten per cent of the land is suitable for agriculture. The tropical vegetation of Maldives comprises groves of breadfruit trees and coconut palms towering above dense scrub, shrubs and flowers (Bell 1883; Bell and De silva 1940:18).² Ten per cent of the land, or about 2,600 hectares, is cultivated with taro, anabas, coconuts and other fruits. Only the lush island of *Fua Mulaka* produces fruits such as oranges and pineapples, partly because the terrain of *Fua Mulaka* is higher than most other islands, leaving the groundwater less vulnerable to sea water intrusion (Maloney 1980: 7). This has been the condition for more than a century now. Most of the atolls depend on groundwater or rainwater for drinking purposes. Maldives has unique geography, and is a relatively homogeneous country with respect to religion (Islam) and language (*Dhivehi*) (Suryanarayan 2001:93). Concerns over global warming and a possible long term rise in sea level as a result of the melting of polar ice are important issues to the fragile balance between people and environment of Maldives. Even today, Maldivians are very efficient sea farers, taking into consideration, the average ratio of land to sea being 1:300³, indicating a total pervasiveness of the ocean in the life of the Maldivians (Sahadevan 1999:250). Though the Maldivians have taken the advantages and disadvantages of living in an island state in their own stride for centuries without the fear of

the ocean, they have now started to feel the “insecurity of islandness” in their mind because of global warming and the sea level rise.

The total population of Maldives at present (according to 2006 census) is 298,968, a considerable increase (2.78 per cent) over the number reported in the last census of 2000. The population of Maldives is large in relation to the land area and the population growth rate is among the highest in the world (Shaljan 2004: 1836). The overcrowding in Male, the capital, has been the root cause of many of the pressing environmental problems there. More than a quarter of the country’s population lives on an area of less than two square kilometers. This has also put severe burden on the infrastructure and resources of the island (Khan 1997:472). Many problems arise from congested conditions in Male, from a combination of increased pollution, urbanisation, and infrastructure development, changes in technology, increased consumption and pollution. Poorly planned land use and sewage and waste disposal have had serious environmental, economic and social consequences for Male.

Another aspect of vulnerability to which much attention has to be given in Maldives is its ecological fragility. Maldives possesses one of the best corals of the world, which is now endangered. The general ecology and the coral reefs of the islands, lack enough resilience to withstand the natural environmental damages caused by global warming and sea level rise. Maldives has also introduced long-ling fishing from last year as against their traditional pole-and-line fishing which is environment friendly. This is an unwanted move because, long line fishery is criticized worldwide for the merciless death of species such as sharks, turtles and seabirds, all caught unwanted as by-catch (Bluepeace 2010). Adding to these is the development of numerous resort islands, which forms the base of its tourism economy, and the coastal structures affecting the reef system. The ecological formation of Maldives makes resource management extremely difficult and the lack of trained personnel adds to the problem.

Sources of Environmental Problems in Maldives

Environmental challenges for Maldives arise mainly from three aspects: a) in the form of tourism and its impact on its environment, b) in the form of global warming and the associated problem of sea-level rise, and c) the possibility of tsunami, as witnessed in 2004. The internal risks in Maldives arise from the higher flow of tourists, the waste generated and the pollution caused by them, scarce natural resource of the state and the demand made on those resources, the limited availability of human resources, lack of technical expertise and the small size of the market. Maldives hugely suffers from the very limited land area accompanied by limited resources and skills. But its major strength when it comes to its economy is its geographic location that helps the tourism industry and forms the back bone of its economy.

Tourism and its Impact on the Environment

Tourism has been the highest source of revenue for Maldives. Much of Maldives' economic boom was due to its resorts and tourism development. Maldives has one of the best corals and diving sites in the world. But much of its problems arise because of the development of tourism itself, like the problem of waste management and disposal, generated by the tourists and the resorts. Tourism has expanded by leaps and bounds and contributes more than 28 per cent of GDP. It all started in a humble way in 1972 with the establishment of a semi-government institution called Crescent Tourist Agency with two resorts situated in uninhabited islands (Suryanarayan 2001:94). While tourism provides considerable economic benefits to Maldives, its rapid expansion is also responsible for adverse environmental and socio-cultural impacts, like dumping of more and more waste in the sea and conflict of interest in resource sharing between the Maldivian citizens and the tourists (United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development 1999: 5). Natural resource depletion and environmental degradation associated with tourism activities are sometimes serious problems in tourism rich countries like Maldives. Many tourism activities in Maldives such as speed boating, motorised water-sports like jet skis, sea diving and snorkeling represent stress for fragile ecosystems.

The management of natural resources to reverse this trend is thus one of the most difficult challenges for governments at different levels (Webb 1998:70). Tourists tend to consume more and generate more wastes in tourist destinations (Pandey 2004:163) and this causes serious problems for Maldives, combined with the lack of appropriate means of technologies for protecting their natural resources and local ecosystems from the pressures of tourism. The main environmental impacts of tourism which are typical to Maldives are the pressure on very limited natural resources, pollution and waste generation, and damage to marine ecosystems. Furthermore, it is widely recognised that it is not just uncontrolled tourism expansion that is likely to lead to environmental degradation. Environmental degradation, in turn, poses a serious threat to tourism. In Maldives, the main natural resources at risk from tourism development are land, freshwater, and the marine resources which form the basis of the livelihood of the citizens.

Climate Change and Sea-Level Rise

Climate change has important economic, environmental and social effects (Maslin 2004:29). The most dramatic declines are seen in South Asia and South-East Asia, where economic development is vibrant and fast. Maldives is the most important country of this region in this regard. The external factors which affect the environment of Maldives are mainly related to global warming. There is growing scientific evidence that human activity has begun to change the average temperature of the earth's surface.⁴ Global warming aggravates rapidly because carbon dioxide is accumulating in the atmosphere much faster than scientists expected (CO₂ concentration in the atmosphere is measured in parts per million (ppm)), raising fears that

humankind may have less time to tackle climate change than previously thought (*Frontline* 2007:60). At its most far-reaching findings, the 2007 Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) indicates that global temperatures are making forests, soils, and oceans less able to absorb CO₂ - a shift that would make it harder to tackle global warming (IPCC 2007). Rising sea levels caused by thermal expansion of the oceans⁵ and the melting of glaciers due to global warming are threatening the population that lives close to the oceans.

It is also pertinent to note here, that the anthropogenic warming and sea level rise would continue for a considerable period of time due to the timescales associated with climate processes, even if the greenhouse gas concentrations are to be stabilized today (Pew Center on Global Climate Change 2007:5; Houghton 2004:155). This makes the coastal communities, particularly in the low lying small islands more vulnerable. Studies on coastal human settlement have made it possible to identify vulnerable human settlements and estimated the number of people in the "low elevation coastal zone (LECZ)", which scientists define as the contiguous area along the coast that is less than 10 metres above sea level. Almost three-quarters of the people currently living in the low elevation coastal zone are Asians (Mc Granahan *et al.* 2007:17).

Problems facing the Maldives

Sea-level rise is of particular concern to small states as over half the countries classified as small states are islands, like Maldives. Maldives is more vulnerable to the projected sea-level rise as most of the population and the infrastructure exist in the coastal zone. It will also affect the marine environment with possible damage to coral reefs and fisheries. There is also the danger of inundation of outlying islands and damage to vegetation and freshwater resources through saline intrusion, as predicted by the IPCC. In Maldives, a far greater proportion of the population suffers from the potential effects of mere one metre sea-level rise than in larger South Asian countries like India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

Maldives, with its low flat topography faces the perennial possibility of submergence due to the sea-level rise. In addition, lack of enough land to accommodate the people and to build necessary infrastructure is another problem in Maldives (Khan 1997:471). Adding to all these problems, the people of Maldives are also alarmed because of their past experience, where the long distant swells generated by storms originating in the far south have resulted in flooding in Maldives resulting in coastal erosion and alteration of beaches. The 1987 and 1991 floods are all of these types where the islands were flooded about a height of 1.5 metres. This has been aggravated over the years by a normal practice followed till very recently in Maldives, where the people use corals as a building material for their houses, and thus depleting the corals which also act as natural barriers at the sea (UNDP 2008:11; Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources 2010). The Maldives, usually enjoys a warm and humid tropical climate, with the weather mainly being dominated by two monsoon periods: the southwest monsoon (the wet

period, from May to November); and the northeast monsoon (the dry period, from January to March) (Ministry of Home Affairs, Housing and Environment 2001:2). This traditional wisdom is becoming redundant on account of global warming and there is a clear change in the monsoon patterns in the last three to four years. This has also severely affected the fishing industry.

Maldives with its inherent problem of lack of land area and the livelihood nature of dependency on fishing had largely resulted in the coastal settlements of all the inhabited islands. More than sixty per cent of its population lives along the coastline. From an environmental perspective there is a double disadvantage to excessive (and potentially rapid) coastal settlement which is more commonly seen in Maldives. First, uncontrolled coastal development is likely to damage sensitive and important ecosystems and other resources. Second, the coastal settlement, particularly in the lowlands, is likely to expose residents to seaward hazards such as sea-level rise and tropical storms (UNEP 2006). Unfortunately, such environmental considerations do not have the influence on settlement patterns that they deserve, because of the inherent problem of livelihood issues. Dr. Gordon McGranahan of the International Institute for Environment and Development says, “the 10 metre figure (LE CZ) identifies a zone where issues of sea level rise and storm surges need to be taken seriously, not where flooding is expected” (*The Hindu* 10 March 2007:11), thus emphasising the long term implications for the vulnerable communities.

Some of the important findings of the 2007 IPCC report and its consequence for Maldives are;

- a) “most of the observed increase in globally averaged temperatures since the mid-twentieth century is very likely due to the increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations. As a result, since 1961, the oceans have warmed to a depth of at least 3000 metres and have been absorbing more than 80 per cent of the heat added to the climate system. Such warming causes water to expand, resulting in a rise in sea level” (IPCC 2007).
- b) It also states that “steady sea-level rises reaching as much as a meter by 2100 would affect 360000 km. coastline and render some island countries uninhabitable”. These findings are of greater significance in case of Maldives, where the mean height of the land is just one meter above the sea level. Rising sea level could drastically affect the existence of Maldives, a formidable threat that made President Nasheed to say that he will set up a sovereign fund to buy lands in other countries. IPCC has also said that an increase in precipitation in higher latitudes and the increased retreat of mountain glaciers and snow cover in both hemispheres since the 1990’s, could also fasten the process of sea level rise.

Maldives could also be a victim of scarce water resource by the decrease in precipitation in the lower latitudes, as predicted by the IPCC report. The report adds that, “while mid- and high-latitude ocean waters have freshened, low-latitude waters have become more saline, leading to changes in evaporation and precipitation, and a decrease in fresh water availability”.

- c) “Cold days, cold nights and frost have become less frequent, while hot days, hot nights and heat waves have become more frequent”. This could affect the corals and the biodiversity of Maldives and thus its tourism industry. The report also predicts “intense tropical cyclones”, which could be devastating for the Maldives with its vulnerable coastal structures (IPCC 2007).

The 2004 Tsunami Disaster

Another major threat facing Maldives is the possibility of tsunami disasters, like the one that hit Maldives in December 2004. On that fateful day, an earthquake measuring 8.9 on the Richter scale took place northwest of Sumatra in the Indian Ocean and the resulting tsunami waves reached the shores of more than 12 countries with devastating effect. Maldives was one among the affected countries. It was the nightmare that the country long feared and it came far more rapidly. While explaining the level of preparedness that his country had at that time, Maldives’ UN ambassador Mohammed Latheef said, “the country was in the midst of conducting their own study on how global warming was affecting the national economy and coordinating the coastline when the tsunami hit” (Latheef 2005). There was a dramatic change in sea level and weather patterns in Maldives thereafter.

Maldives, being a small island state has its own problems associated with the behaviour of the sea. But the same geography of Maldives has helped it in saving more life where, the death toll in the Maldives stands at just 80 in a disaster that claimed more than 150,000 lives from Indonesia to Somalia. Ironically the very factor that made the islands so vulnerable to the ocean had saved them from more loss of human life. The atoll islands in Maldives are so flat, small and low that the tsunami just passed over the islands from one side through the other side. The absence of a big landmass on which to top meant the waves hitting the Maldives did not have the same effect that so devastated Indonesia’s Aceh province, close to epicentre of the magnitude 9.0 earthquake that triggered the tsunami, as well as the south-eastern coast of neighbouring Sri Lanka (Simpson 2006:5).

That does not mean that the country’s beautiful and precious corals, flora and fauna and sandy beaches which attracts a lot of tourists, was spared from any devastation. In fact, the worst affected country in terms of environmental degradation and biodiversity loss was the Maldives. Ali Rilwan, a prominent environmentalist in Maldives, says that the marine protected areas, infrastructure and management systems had been destroyed or severely damaged that

these systems are likely to have been almost completely lost, putting back by years the conservation efforts for these areas⁶. The effect on coral reefs have been disastrous, not only from the initial waves but by the settling of mud, silt and other sediment on the corals after the waves. "Some of the places I've visited look like they've been hit by a nuclear bomb," said Tom Bergmann-Harris, assistant representative UNICEF Maldives (Candappa 2005). More than 15,000 of the 300,000 population were homeless at that time and the economy is still reeling from the impact on tourism and fishing, aggravated by the 2008 global economic meltdown.

A report issued by the UN Environment Programme on 17 June 2005 found that the Indian Ocean Tsunami caused a number of significant impacts on the Maldives' environment. It also stated that the country's inhabited islands are confronting several environmental challenges and highlighting the environmental pollution. The report concluded that the tsunami generated approximately 290,000 cubic meters of waste on the country's sixty nine inhabited islands and took a severe toll on the ecosystem. In some islands, the tsunami hit at one side of the island and left on the other side wiping everything on its way. Coastal zones were eroded and vegetation, including food crops were destroyed (Latheef 2005).

Repercussions on the Ecosystem

Maldives harbours many key marine and coastal ecosystems like coral reefs, mangroves, sea-grass beds, coastal dunes, mudflats, salt marshes, backwaters and lagoons, all of which play a vital role in sustaining the living natural resources on which so many people depend (Roy and Connell 1991:1059; Connell 1999). The effect of the tsunami on these ecosystems was very severe ecologically as well as economically. Many coral reefs had lost both their structure and biota, and are now reduced to rubble due to mechanical damage. Further, there is significant contamination by run-off from land, with large quantities of wastes and pollutants, debris, soil, and organic matter. This further increased the damage and hampered recovery process. Many coral reefs that did not sustain a direct or hard hit by the tsunami suffered from the exposure caused by the receding water as it approached, as aerial exposure can kill corals that are not adapted to it (Ministry of Environment 2006). Also, increased turbidity in the wake of the tsunami had suffocated large areas and killed many organisms that survived the wave itself, like the reefs and sea-grass beds.

There are a number of long-term implications including changed shorelines, loss of breeding fish populations, habitat and nursery grounds and loss of key attractions such as pristine beaches and reefs which will affect the tourism industry, a vital source of income in Maldives. Moreover, the salination on the island is deep and widespread due to the tsunami, that it potentially makes the soil on the island unfit for any kind of vegetation, which in turn substantially increases the vulnerability of the island and its inhabitants to further land erosion, extreme weather events and to the impacts of climate change (Rilwan 2011). Observations show that the ecological damage caused to the country's mangrove and other coastal forest

ecosystems has been extensive, though varied from coast to coast. Many coastal wetlands have been affected by the large inflow of salt-water and wreckage during the tsunami, with longer-term effects including changes in their hydrology caused by changes to coastlines and damage to sea-defenses.

In many cases, the Tsunami worsened pre-existing environmental management problems on the inhabited islands. Water supplies were also contaminated with high level of nitrates, which causes health hazards. At the peak of all these problems, there is a strong assumption and threat for its survival that Maldives would be flooded within fifty to hundred years and thus no trace of its existence would ever be found. This though was contested by some independent researchers and organisations (Morner 2004:149; Nunn 2004:55). These threats could not be brushed aside and it is evident from the statement of the Maldivian president in 2009, soon after his election that if the need arises they will look for acquiring land in other “friendly nations” for the purpose of resettlement of Maldivians. Further, massive flooding in the intervening period due to tsunami and cyclones, combined with the absence of high ground for evacuation would justify the authorities treating the risk seriously.

At last, in the area of marine activities, Maldives rely a great extent on food from the sea both for their local consumption and also for its huge fishery products export industry and to provide livelihood for its workforce. Marine climatic information gathering and dissemination is needed in supporting the management and exploitation of expanded coastal and deep-sea fisheries. The safety of all types of craft at sea also requires accurate weather forecasts and warnings. All these need appropriate planning and implementation by the Maldivian government, keeping in mind, the peculiarity of its problems and solutions.

Conclusion

The present environmental issues for Maldives are beach erosion, coral bleaching, coral mining, dredging, biodiversity loss, population growth and its impact on distribution and lifestyles, fresh water availability, soil degradation, the effects of tsunami and most importantly, the rising sea-level due to global warming. Sea level rise is of great concern for Maldives and a lot of measures have to be taken for adaptation and mitigation, with the help of the international community. This is not only a livelihood issue for the nation more than that it is a problem of its sovereignty, as has been highlighted by the Maldivian President’s call for finding land for the citizens in other territories. Finally, it should be noted that tourism and leisure industries are the major source of income for Maldives and most of these activities intrinsically depend on clean environment, favourable climatic conditions and weather patterns. Clearly, changes in the climate which upset current weather patterns, or produce greater extreme environmental conditions, would impact adversely on these activities and thereby affecting the livelihood of the majority of the people which relies on them.

On the background of the 2008 global financial crisis and the problems surrounding the weak US dollar recently, the Maldivian government is in a deep crisis in terms of resource generation to fund effective policy implementation and technology adaptation to save its environment, thereby securing its economy and sovereignty. Nevertheless, knowing its limitations and vulnerabilities, Maldives has been championing its environmental concerns at the regional and international fora including United Nations, in its personal capacity as one severely threatened by serious environmental problems and also by forming alliances with the likeminded developing countries who are concerned about their security and had organized the Small Island Developing States (SIDS), Association of Small Island States (AOSIS)⁷, etc., long before it was affected by the 2004 tsunami and the emergence of definite evidence on global warming. But a concerted effort from the international community has not been initiated till now and there has only been a stop gap knee jerk reaction towards the environmental problems.

The protection of Maldives' fragile environment should be considered important because of its flourishing tourism and the money it brings in. This understanding stems from the fact that the "life cycle" - right from discovering, developing and eventual declining of a tourist destination, happens because of the negative impact on the environment due to mis-use and overuse of the facilities at the tourist destinations, thus leading to deterioration of key attractions and loss of revenues (Pandey 2004:177). Though Maldives had succeeded in sensitising the international community about the environmental problems surrounding them⁸, it is finding it difficult to alleviate its existential threat by extracting actionable commitments on changing the lifestyle behaviour and cutting down the green house gas emissions from the developed world.

Maldives also faces the challenge of successfully integrating its environmental concerns into their national policies and programmes. The successful implementation of a viable environmental policy resides in the ability of Maldives to garner international support both in terms of financial and technical assistance. Sustainable development of Maldives is possible only through the transfer of environmentally sound technologies and provision of new and additional financial assistance by the developed countries. Interestingly, one of the positive outcomes of the November 2010 Cancun conference of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was a much needed one for Maldives, where in order to scale up the provision of long-term financing for developing countries, it was decided to establish a "Green Climate Fund" rising to US dollar 100 billion per year by 2020, that "will function under the guidance of, and be accountable to the Conference of the Parties (COP)." With the Kyoto protocol coming to an end in 2012 without any global agreement to be carried forward, Maldives is pinning its hope on the forth coming Seventeenth South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit to be held in its capital Male in November 2011, to convince its regional partners to push for a viable comprehensive global agreement on global warming and climate change in the Seventeenth UNFCCC conference to be held in Durban in Nov-Dec 2011. If concrete developments are achieved on the

implementation and functioning of the Green Climate Fund, and finding an alternative solution for Kyoto protocol becomes certain, that could well be a strong impetus for the developing world in getting technological assistance from the developed world for their commitment towards their climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts. Maldives in particular, will hugely benefit if that becomes a reality this year.

Notes

1. An atoll is a coral island (or islands) that encircle a lagoon partially or completely. The word atoll comes from the word “*atholhu*” in *Dhivehi* - an Indo-Aryan language spoken in Maldives. Some of the other atoll island states are Kiribati, Tuvalu, etc.
2. This Book written by H.C.P. Bell, a civil servant from British Ceylon, is the first authoritative and comprehensive work on Maldives. He made a brief stay in Maldives in 1879, when his shipwrecked, and visited again in 1920 and 1922, deputed by the Government of Ceylon to study and explore the Maldives. His book was prepared in the 1920s, but published posthumously in 1940.
3. Maldives is spread over an area of 90,000 square kilometers – of which, the total land area is barely 300 square kilometers.
4. The United Nations Inter-governmental Panel on climate Change, citing various scientific studies has said in its 2002 report that human activities (anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations) are inducing climate change. Nevertheless, there are some set of academics and scientists who believe that this global warming is a natural cyclic phenomenon.
5. A large component of sea level rise is due to thermal expansion of the oceans. If the top 100 metre of the ocean was at twenty five degree Celsius, a rise to twenty six degree Celsius (that is mere one degree Celsius) would increase its depth by about three centimeters. But the change in the amount of expansion differs according to the water temperature. For the cold water the expansion for a given change of temperature is small.
6. Interview with Ali Rilwan, the Executive Director of Bluepeace - an environmental NGO in Madives, is working on environmental issues, marine ecology and sustainable development. Interaction with him in March 2011 was so insightful for this writer on the local ecological conditions and the negative effects of tsunami and global warming.
7. Maldives was instrumental in the formation of the Small Island Action Group in 1989 that eventually, at the Second World Climate Conference in Geneva in 1990, became the AOSIS. It is a coalition of small islands and low-lying coastal countries that share similar development challenges and concerns about the environment, especially their vulnerability to adverse effects of global climate change.
8. Maldives had always vociferously advocated their concerns to organizations like SAARC, Commonwealth, UN, etc. Besides, it has organized the Small States Conference on Sea Level Rise in 1989 and the Thirteenth Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 1997. It has also been an important player in producing the Barbados Programme of Action (BPoA) for Sustainable Development of SIDS, which formed the basis of negotiations at the UN.

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Citizenship and the Minorities in Pakistan

Jabir T K

Abstract

The political question of majority versus minority becomes prominent and troublesome even in a society with one dominant religion. This subject is a greater divisive force in states where religion is the source of political legitimacy or the basis of a state's identity. Religion turns out to be a dangerous political weapon when the majority religious community attempts to characterise the state's culture, social institutions and the state itself according to a specific belief system.

Introduction

History has shown that religion in a multi-cultural and multi ethnic-society has polarised the societies than integrating them. Even within a single religious denomination one may find numerous strands that never consolidate. The differences in policies, political contestation for power, material achievements and territorial space can make the religion and the question of authenticity problematic. The political question of majority versus minority becomes prominent and troublesome even in a society with one dominant religion. This subject is a greater divisive force in states where religion is the source of political legitimacy or the basis of a state's identity. Religion turns out to be a dangerous political weapon when the majority religious community attempts to characterise the state's culture, social institutions and the state itself according to a specific belief system. Such political means may terminate modern norms or political ideals like, democracy, human rights and citizenship. After the creation of the state of Pakistan in 1947, the issue of separate electorates had been enshrined in the character of the Pakistani state. When the Muslims became a majority, Pakistan had a formidable task of reassuring its religious and ethnic minorities and integrating them into mainstream national politics. In the 1956 Constitution, and later in the amended 1973 Constitution under the Zia ul-Haq regime, Pakistan practiced separate electorates against the will of minorities. In the following section, I will try to problematic, the citizenship, multiculturalism, marginalisation and exclusions that various minority communities have been undergoing and what should be the solutions to be employed for this stigma in Pakistan.

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Citizenship and Multiculturalism: Theoretical Interpretations

The challenge of multiculturalism and nationalism has provoked a re-examination of a great number of issues in political theory, from the role of the state, the limits of toleration and the rights of minorities, to the proper scope of public education and the nature of citizenship. It has brought about a reconsideration of the basis of political order. Multiculturalism is a term that depicts one meticulous way of responding to ethnic diversity and is a way of espousal of diversity (Gaus and Kukathas 2004:251). 'It is a position that rejects assimilation and the "melting pot" image as an imposition of the dominant culture, and instead prefers such metaphors as the "salad bowl" or the "glorious mosaic", in which each ethnic and racial element in the population maintains its distinctiveness' (Glacer 1997:10). Multiculturalism requires much greater social transformation of social and political institutions to enable cultural minorities to preserve their languages and their distinctive customs or practices and to turn modern society into one in which racism has been eliminated and the diversity is nurtured rather than repudiated, or simply tolerated (Lopez 2000:2-3).

Multiculturalism was first theorised and systematically developed by Will Kymlicka in his two major works: *Liberalism, Community and Culture* (1989) and *Multicultural Citizenship* (1995). In Kymlicka's view, the political theory of post-war liberalism had wrongly assumed that, the problem of national minorities could be resolved by ensuring the provision of basic individual rights. The religious minorities were protected by the separation of church from state, and the establishing of freedom of religion, so ethnic identity would be protected by freedom to express in private life those cultural attachments that should not have the business of the state. Kymlicka argues that the minority rights could not simply be considered under human rights hence human rights standards are simply unable to resolve some of the most important and controversial questions relating to cultural minorities (Kymlicka 1995:4). These included questions about which languages should be recognized in the parliaments, bureaucracies and courts; whether any ethnic or national groups should have publicly funded education in their mother tongue; whether internal boundaries should be drawn so that cultural minorities form majorities in local regions; whether traditional homelands of indigenous peoples should be reserved for their benefit; and what degree of cultural integration might be required of immigrants seeking citizenship (*Ibid* 4-5). Kymlicka says, traditional concepts of human rights, simply give us no guidance on these questions, and unless they are supplemented by a theory of minority rights, human rights theory will not enable us to address some of the most pressing issues confronting us in places like Eastern Europe, where disputes over local autonomy, language, and naturalization threaten to leave these regions mired in violent conflict. So Kymlicka has been ambitious to develop a liberal theory of minority rights that explains 'how minority rights coexist with human rights and how minority rights are limited by principles of individual liberty, democracy, and social justice' (*Ibid* :6).

In his theory, Kymlicka differentiated three kinds of minority rights that were to be accorded to ethnic and national groups: self-government rights, poly ethnic rights, and special representation rights. Self government rights require the delegation of powers to national minorities, such as indigenous peoples. These rights have not been entitled to other cultural minorities who had immigrated into the country. The latter would be entitled for poly ethnic rights, which guarantee financial support and legal protection for practices peculiar to some ethnic or religious groups. Both indigenous peoples and immigrant minorities might also be eligible for special representation rights which guarantee places for minority representatives on state bodies or institutions. The principal argument of Kymlicka's theory of differentiated rights is a distinction between two kinds of minorities: national minorities and ethnic minorities. National minorities are peoples whose previously self-governing, territorially concentrated cultures have been incorporated into a larger state. In Kymlicka's theory, the minorities have very different legitimate claims to make, and understanding this should make clear that national minorities need not fear that policies of multiculturalism would reduce them to the status of migrants, just as other citizens need not fear that multiculturalism implied that immigrants had a legitimate claim to self-government. His arguments based on the modern liberal tradition, has a history of recognizing group differentiated rights. According to him it is, 'the orthodox liberal view about the right of states to determine who has citizenship rests on the same principles which justify group differentiated citizenship within states, and that accepting the former leads logically to the latter' (*Ibid* :124). So citizenship is itself a group differentiated notion, and liberalism is a view that recognizes the rights of individuals as members of states. It therefore makes perfect sense for liberals to be willing to recognize groups within states, for groups, like states, exist to protect people's cultural membership. (Gerald F Gaus and Chandran Kukathas 2004:252). In the modern world, cultures which are not societal cultures are not likely to prosper, given the pressures toward the creation of a single common culture in each country. Kymlicka's theory of group differentiated rights accordingly focuses on enabling national minorities to sustain their societal cultures, while protecting immigrants with poly ethnic rights that would 'help ethnic groups and religious minorities express their cultural particularity and pride without it hampering their success in the economic and political institutions of the dominant society' (Kymlicka 1995:31).

Citizenship has been one of the central themes of republican political tradition. From ancient time onwards, political thinkers have engaged in the discussion towards the exact relationship between the individual and the state. In ancient Greece, this relationship had embodied in the notion of the 'citizen', which literally means a member of the state. However, the modern concept of citizenship is founded upon the principle of universal rights and obligations. Its roots lie in the modernity which was obviously constituted in the West, and in the natural rights. In the twentieth century, this got enhanced as the doctrine of the human rights. Citizens are not just bearers of rights. They have been capable to assert against their state, and they also do have duties and obligations towards the state, that has protected, nurtured and cared for them. A citizen is a member of a political community who is endowed

with a set of rights and a set of obligations. So, citizenship symbolized to a relationship between individual and the state, in which the two are bound together by reciprocal rights and obligations. It may be interpreted in two ways, that as a legal status which can be defined objectively one the one hand, and citizenship as an identity, a sense of loyalty or belonging on the other. According to Andrew Heywood, citizenship relates to the precise nature of citizens rights and obligations, and the balance between the two. Citizenship often appears to be 'above politics' in the sense that, most of the theorists are prepared to endorse it. In practice though there are competing concepts of citizenship. The most important of these have been social citizenship and active citizenship (Heywood 2004 a: 204)

Thus, the fundamental right of a citizen is the right to live and work in a country. Citizens may be entitled for the suffrage, and stand for contest in the elections and enter into certain occupations either military or in state service, which may not be entitled to the non citizens. Legal citizenship only designates a formal status, without in anyway indicating that the citizen feels that she/he is a member of a political community. So, citizenship always must have a subjective or psychological component. In the case of legal rights, mere possession of that would not ensure that individuals will feel themselves to be the citizens of that country. It can be epitomising the predicament of multiculturalism and citizenship, that minorities in Pakistan, have undergone alienation from their state. Hence the social disadvantage and religious and ethnic discrimination is directly from the people of that country and indirectly from the government. In such situations, individuals cannot be exactly considered as 'full citizens' or as having active citizenship, even though they may enjoy certain formal entitlements. Not uncommonly, such people regard themselves as 'second class' citizens, if not as third class citizens (*Ibid*: 207).

The significance of citizenship and the recurrent interest in it reflects an enduring concern for and commitment to the public face of human life. The controversies about citizenship centre upon the rights it implies and its value as a political principle. The political right tends to endorse a narrow view of citizenship that stresses only civil and political rights, the rights that exercised within civil society and rights of participation. The political left, by contrast, tend to endorse 'social citizenship', the idea that citizens are entitled to a social minimum, expressed in terms of social and welfare rights (Heywood 2000 b:119).

So, when we discuss about the normative principles or the political ideals formed unquestionably with modernity, citizenship and multiculturalism in the state of Pakistan have been precarious in the case of religious and ethnic minorities. Article 33 of the Constitution of Pakistan, states that the state has been responsible for safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of minorities, including their representation in the national and provincial civil services; nonetheless, the procedures are ambiguous. Article 36 further promises the protection of minorities. However, the highest office of the land being constitutionally closed to minorities suggests a second class citizenship for them. Before going to the minorities' dilemma in

Pakistan, it is indispensable to examine here what Islam educates about minorities and what the so called Islamic state of Pakistan has practiced.

The Islamic State and Minorities

The concept of *dhimmi* or protected communities has been the traditional concept used to address non Muslims in Islamic state, with fewer rights than Muslims. The traditional political Islamists have defended it, however, by quoting writers on the far right and like classically Abul Aala Mawdudi and others, who do not feature it in their centre-right version of an Islamic State. A reformed Islam can fully accommodate minority and human rights. The Muslim state that rests on progressive Islam can treat all its citizens fairly, Muslims and non-Muslims who share the same human values and commitment to justice and equity (Bennet 2005:160).

Muqtedar Khan argues that Islamic states inevitably treat non-Muslim citizens as less than equal. He cites blasphemy and apostasy laws as well known for the problems they cause minorities and says that narrow interpretation of the role of women in Islamic societies has also restricted the scope of possibilities for non Muslim women (Khan 2003:1). In his view, in seeking to impose Islamic Law and create an Islamic state, Islamists are in direct opposition to the spirit and letter of the Quran', which explicitly states 'there is no compulsion in religion (Quran 2:256) and exhorts peoples of the book to live by the laws revealed to them (Quran 2; 5:43; 5:47). In these verses it has been unambiguous that an Islamic State must advocate religious pluralism and inclusive citizenship. According to Khan, the ideal model is represented by the federal state of Madinah, which was based on a real and actual social contract agreed upon by Muslims, Jews and others that treated them as equal citizens. Divine law was applied but only after consultation and with consent of all citizens regardless of their faith. The difference between this and contemporary Islamic states is that the latter apply Islamic Law without consent or consultation and often through coercion (Khan 2003:2).

The State of Pakistan and Composition of Society

The partition of India and Pakistan in 1947 forced to millions of people to leave their homes on either side of an arbitrarily drawn border. Muslims moved from India either to West or East Pakistan (later Bangladesh), and a large proportion of Hindu and Sikh population left the newly founded Pakistan for India. It is often argued, in fact, that the tension exposed and played out during this period set in place a template for communal strife based on religion. After Independence, while some leaders of the Pakistan movement continued to press for continuation of separate electorates, others pushed for ideological consistency, while still others aimed to ensure adequate representation of minorities in the elected bodies of the country. The question of separate electorates was posed in a plan, which would help to form a consistent state. On the issue of separate electorates, the views of leaders of East Pakistan, where there

was a sizeable Hindu minority, were different from those of the leaders of West Pakistan. While the West Pakistanis stressed the need for separate electorates, the East Pakistanis insisted on joint electorates. Members of the minority communities were also of the view that separate electorates would cast them off from the mainstream national politics. They demanded equal political, civic and legal rights that could be guaranteed only under the joint electorate system.

Subsequently, the civil war between East and West Pakistan, and India's intervention in 1971, caused East Pakistan to become a new state, Bangladesh, which led to more trans-regional migration. While East Bengalis left West Pakistan for Bangladesh, Pakistan accepted the repatriation of several thousand Urdu-speaking East Pakistanis, also called *Biharis*. Most of these new immigrants settled in Karachi, increasing the number of Urdu-speakers in urban Sindh. Following friction over the question of language between Sindhis and Urdu-speakers in 1972, Pakistan became reluctant to accept any more migrants from Bangladesh (Kapur 1991:8). The Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, made millions of refugees from these two neighbouring countries adding to Pakistan's population, and increasing ethnic and linguistic diversity. So, Pakistan has had radical demographic changes over the few decades of its formation and their ramifications have fed into the already highly competitive and volatile inter-community relationships. Pakistan remains a populous country covering a substantial terrain and it is currently the sixth most populous state in the world and, after Indonesia, the most populous Muslim state. It had not been a coherent structure, although some consciousness about common social institutions had evolved in the course of the struggle for independence. The provincial societies have been fully organized historical formations. They constituted the building blocks of the emerging Pakistani society. Integration of the provincial communities has been one of the abiding themes of national development and a crucial process of Pakistan's social history (Qadeer 2006:2). Pakistan has striven from its independence onwards at least in the political rhetoric provided by both civilian and military leaders, for democracy, liberalism, freedom of expression, inclusiveness of minorities, and secularism. It is noteworthy to bring up here the famous and oft-quoted statement of the founder of Pakistan:

You are free now; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in the State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business of the State ... We are starting with this fundamental principle: that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State. Now, I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not so in the religious sense because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state.

However, the state of Pakistan has continued to drift toward increasingly weak authoritarianism, religious extremism, and intolerance of minorities, both Muslim and non-Muslim. This rift between animated political rhetoric and grim political reality has confused the

world as much as the Pakistanis themselves (Kalia 2011:1). Complex historical and social factors, anti-colonial movements, religion and language, have shaped the interaction between religion and politics in Pakistan. Islam was at the heart of the political struggle for the creation of Pakistan and has remained the central theme of post-Independence political discourse. Still, the debate on the role of Islam in national politics influences the complex political scenario of the country. Even after 64 years, the relationship between religion and state is still as ambiguous as the nature and direction of the democratic enterprise. The question of what type of polity Pakistan should be, liberal democratic or Islamic, evokes different responses from different social sectors and political interests. Military leaders, mainstream political parties, and Islamists have all attempted to define this relationship according to their vision of democratic development and the role of religion in society and state affairs (Sayed 1984:74-100).

After ten years of military rule, in 2008, democratic rule was restored in Pakistan, through elections that international observers considered as competitive and reflective of the people's will. Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan People's Party (PPP) became president and head of state in September 2008. Then Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani was elected as the prime minister and head of government. The PPP and its federal coalition partners control the executive and legislative branches of the national government and three of the four provincial assemblies.

Islamisation of the Society

On 25 January 1948 just months before Mohammed Ali Jinna's final exit from politics, he publicly retracted his earlier commitment to democratic citizenship by declaring that Pakistan's constitution would be based on Islamic law (*Sharia*) 'to make Pakistan a truly great Islamic State' (Shaikh 2009:45). Pakistan has had four constitutions since its independence. The first 1956 constitution declared Pakistan to be an Islamic republic. The Pakistan government granted equal citizenship rights to all men, when it became an Islamic republic in 1956; it refused to offer the same treatment to women by an internal exclusion by an Islamist group. However, by and large, the document did not formally commit itself to religion related exclusions of minorities. Indeed, in 1962, General Ayub Khan who introduced his own Constitution dropped the word 'Islamic' from the country's title and sought to make it more liberal in character. For example, progressive Islamic laws in the sphere of marriage and divorce were adopted in the Constitution. Ayub Khan encountered religiously inclined Islamic parties and institutions. To challenge the hegemony of Islam, his government nationalized religious endowments and assumed guardianship of religious shrines. He also sought to regulate religious education. (Bhargava 2004:23) In 1962, the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII), Pakistan's top constitutional advisory body established for Islamic order to the state under his regime. The council's current functions include recommending laws to the Parliament and Provincial Assemblies that conform to the *Quran* and *Sunnah*, (Prophet's Tradition) making recommendations to bring current laws to conform to Islamic injunctions and advising the Parliament, provincial assemblies, or other government functionaries on proposed laws and

whether they are in accordance with Islamic injunctions or not. The 1973 Constitution under Articles 228-31 focussed on identifying laws repugnant to Islam, and then recommending ways to bring them in conformity with Islamic principles to this Council.

President General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988) amplified the magnitude of the Council and used it to legitimise and promulgate controversial legislation like the Hudood Ordinance.¹ He began to give an altogether different orientation to Pakistan's social and political system by making this Islamic in its most conservative tradition. His ordinances, laws, actions, and acts of omission and commission were passed through the Eighth Amendment into the Constitution when the national assembly convened after the 1985 non-party elections. By this he consolidated separate electorates for minorities. The wave of religious intolerance and extremism began with Zia courting religious constituency for political support and legitimacy (Ahmad 1998: 118). The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and the *Mujahideen* resistance based in Pakistan were also factors that influenced the growth of religious militancy. The flow of arms and money from oil rich West Asian countries to the Islamic *Madrassas* (religious school) network further contributed to the power and influence of religious organisations and militant groups.

Religious oriented parties like Jamaat-i-Islami and Majlis- i-Ahrar, advocated the Islamisation of the country. They were not the only ones, who sought a systemic change; even the ruling political and civil elite soon began to seek out legitimacy and national cohesion through a selective use of Islamic ethos (Malik 2008:134). They sought to eliminate vestiges of the British derived civil and criminal laws and create a state based upon *Shariat*. Most liberal Pakistanis tried to reject the imposition of *Shariat* law, despite the fact that the demand was pressed incessantly by all Islamist parties. They stalwartly demanded Islamic provisions to be included in the yet to be adopted constitution. In response to the Islamists in Pakistan, the Muslim League leaders gradually viewed Islam as an acceptable vehicle for nation building of Pakistan. By this time several Western social practices have been altered or abandoned in the name of Islam, notably the public consumption of alcohol, gambling, and co-educational classrooms, except in some of Pakistan's westernised cities, such as Islamabad, Lahore, and Karachi (Cohen 2004:168).

After the 1971 war, Bangladesh evolved as a secular democracy focused on economic development but Pakistan continued to be ruled by a civil military oligarchy that saw itself as defining and also protecting the state's identity, mainly through a mix of religious and militarist nationalism. Islamists have occupied a significant role in Pakistan since the 1970s, providing the framework through which the country has defined its national interests and provided modulation between its domestic and international politics (Nasr 2001:112). Islamism has also enlarged Pakistan's regional power by opening new foreign policy possibilities in Islamabad, most notably in using Islamist activism to deal with developments in Afghanistan and Kashmir (Nasr 2005:184).

Minorities in Pakistan

Christians

The largest religious minority in Pakistan are Christians, which dates back to centuries. This includes Anglicans, Protestants, Catholics, Armenian Orthodox, Assyrian or Chaldean, smaller numbers of Nestorians and the more recent Evangelical sects. They are represented in many fields of Pakistani society and have to some degree, achieved higher positions in the government, bureaucracy and businesses. The events of 11 September 2001 led to many atrocities being committed against the Christian communities. The issue of land disputes which have led to the robbing and torching residences of Christians are very common.

Hindus

The second largest religious minority in Pakistan is the Hindu community. They live mostly in Sindh, Peshawar and Baluchistan. Since the atrocities and abduction for ransom have been rising, hundreds of Hindu families from Balochistan have migrated to India recently. The Minority Affairs Ministry too conceals with this Act. The Indo-Pak tension and Babari Masjid disputes in India have had adverse reactions against Hindus and triggered the demolishing of many temples in Pakistan. The recent Allahabad court verdict in India was highly intimidating to Hindus in Pakistan.

Sikhs

Sikhism itself originated in the Punjab province. Sikhs collectively are estimated to be 13,640. The holy sites of the Sikh community have been frequently targeted and many Sikh families forced to flee their regions. From Orakzai, the place near Afghanistan, where Sikhs have been living for generations they were forced to flee the area after Taliban militants asked them to pay *Jizya* or leave the area.

Ahmedis

Ahmedis are a minor sect of Muslims in the Punjab province of Pakistan. The hate speech, intimidation and violence against the Ahmedis, has been a norm in Pakistan. Since the promulgation of the 1984 Prohibition of Qadiyanat Ordinance until the end of the year 2010, hundreds of Ahmedis have been killed in faith-based attacks. 2010 was the worst year in terms of the number of killings since 1984; as many as 99 Ahmedis were killed in 2010 itself. The religious political parties frequently threatening the Ahmedi community, to launch a movement if they 'did not accept their minority status'. The government is silent about such blasphemous and unconstitutional activities.

Shi'is

Shi'is is a minority Muslim sect, who makes up an estimated 5-20% of the total Muslim population. The majority of Pakistani Shii Muslims belong to the *Ithna Ashariyyah* Islamic law school, with significant minority groups who practice Ismailism, which is composed of Nizari (Aga Khanis), Mustaali, Dawoodi Bohra, and others. The Sunni militant groups have assaulted various holy places and rituals of shii sect.

Zikris

Zikris are predominantly in south-western Balochistan where their spiritual centre, *Koh-i-Murad*, is located. They are a Baloch ethnic group in Makran and the adjoining areas, and fear that they will suffer the fate of the Ahmedis, as there are demands from certain Sunni groups for their designation as a non-Muslim minority (Qasrqandi 1978). The Zikris have generally subscribed to the idea of a revealed imam, *Mahdi* (promised Messiah) and, while believing in all the basic tenets of Islam, they consider Syed Muhammad Jaunpuri, a contemporary of the Mughal Emperor Akbar in the 16th century, to be their *Mahdi*. According to them, the imam appeared on *Koh-i-Murad*, an arid hilltop near Turbat in Balochistan, where he performed religious and spiritual rites before disappearing in Afghanistan. They remember and constantly recite the names and attributes of God, either on an individual basis or collectively (Baloch 1996: 51). Most Zikris are poor peasants or nomads who enjoy coming to *Koh-i-Murad* as others. There are some other minority religious communities like Budhists, Jains and Makranis who represent are very minimal in number.

The Blasphemy Laws

No other laws in a modernised world have had as grave social and psychological implications for religious minorities as the blasphemy laws in Pakistan. These laws have the shield coverage of acts that may fall within the offences of blasphemy, the violation of which carries extended prison sentences and death by hanging. The prevention of blasphemy, or irreverence towards holy persons, religious beliefs, customs and artefacts as currently articulated in Pakistan's Penal Code (PPC), find roots in colonial legislation drafted in 1860. This Indian Penal Code of 1860, prepared by the First Law Commission chaired by Lord Macaulay, criminalised the act of damaging or defiling a place of worship or a sacred object under section 295. Section 295A was added to provide for the offence of "outraging religious feelings". Penalties for such offences, included imprisonment for a term extending up to two years, a fine, or both. Pakistan inherited this code at independence and amendments made over the years transformed the legislation in to the Offences Relating to Religion as set out in the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) (Jinnah Institute Report 2011:12).

The Pakistan government under Zia ul Haq introduced the relentless penalties including life imprisonment and the death penalties were drafted in to the legislation. The PPC Ordinance 1982 amended section 295-B to include life imprisonment, providing that, "Whoever wilfully defiles, damages or desecrates a copy of the Holy Quran or any extract thereof or uses it in any derogatory manner or for any unlawful purpose shall be punishable with imprisonment for life." Ordinance XX, which added sections 298 B and C to the PPC, sealed the expulsion of Ahmadis from the Pakistani state in 1984. Any Ahmedi Muslim community member, preaching or propagating his faith, or outraging the religious feelings of Muslims, or referring to herself or himself as a Muslim is now liable to three years imprisonment. In 1986, the Criminal Law Act III provided a further amendment to section 295 C, by criminalising defamation against the Prophet and providing that, "Whoever by words, either spoke or written, or by visible representation, or by any other imputation, insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Prophet Muhammad shall be punished with death or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to a fine." It is under this section that Aasia Bibi became the first Christian woman to be sentenced to death for blasphemy, in November 2010. Nawaz Sharif's government in 1992 removed the option of a life sentence from section 295-C and imposed a mandatory death sentence, thereby giving more power to those who wished to use this law. One of the first fatal assaults against Pakistan's Christian minority community triggered by the blasphemy laws took place soon after the enactment of the 1992 amendment.

The indistinct terminology of the current legislation enables the misuse of Sections 295-298 PPC, and has allowed the persecution of minorities and the poor by providing unscrupulous complainants with a mechanism for settling personal vendettas through the justice system. The law has manifested in society as a tool for promoting intolerance. Even though a majority of those charged under this law are Muslims, the law has made non-Muslims even more susceptible. In addition, the manner in which the law is propagated by the religious groups in Pakistan has led to vigilantism and mob violence. The state has consistently failed to intervene and protect anyone against violence by maliciously motivated elements and the certainty of impunity has encouraged them to commit lawlessness. Reported incidents reveal that those accused of blasphemy are killed in jail often even before they are sentenced. As recently as November 14, 2010, the accused in a blasphemy case was shot dead near his house in Lahore after being granted bail. Other examples include incidents on July 30th and August 1, 2009, when seven Christians were burnt alive in Gojra, Punjab and dozens injured after riots broke out over allegations of blasphemy against the Holy Quran (*Ibid* :40). Since 1986, nearly a thousand cases of blasphemy have been registered in Pakistan. Of these, 476 have been registered against Muslims, 479 against Ahmadis and 180 against Christians. In 2010, over 32 people were killed extra judicially by angry mobs or individuals on the basis of allegations of blasphemy and 64 people were charged under the blasphemy law (State Human Rights in 2010-2011:7).

Misusing or misinterpretations of blasphemy laws are large in number and any fresh case which lacks any solid evidence is also brought under these laws. For example, in December 2010, Dr Naushad Ali Valliani, a physician from Hyderabad was accused of blasphemy. He was arrested for throwing a visiting card belonging to a Muhammad Faizan in the dust bin. The guilty act was throwing a card bearing the name 'Muhammad'. Dr Valliani apologized for throwing the card in the dust bin, insisting that he had no intention of insulting the Prophet, but local religious leaders insisted on further action and an FIR under Section 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code was registered against him. This blatant abuse of the law against innocent people only highlights the necessity for reform and increased scrutiny (Jinnah Institute Report 2011:40).

Personal Laws

There have been numerous personal laws for the minority communities. For Hindu community, these are Hindu Disposition of Property Act 1916, Hindu Gains of Learning Act 1930, Hindu Inheritance (Removal Of Disabilities) Act 1928, Hindu Law Of Inheritance (Amendment) Act 1929 etc. Christians have the, Christian Marriage Act 1832, and Christian Marriage Act 1872. There have been only minor changes since partition to the personal laws relating to Christians, Hindus and other minorities.² Particularly, the Hindu community does not have any specific codified laws relating to family matters, which are governed by customs and traditional laws. Members of minority communities can approach the country's regular family courts since the Family Courts Act 1964 does not restrict its jurisdiction to Muslims alone. One of the central concerns for religious minorities such as Hindus, Sikhs and Baha'is was the lack of a mechanism for registration of marriages. Married couples did not have any official certificate, showing that they were married, which proved a hurdle for married women in acquiring passports or any other such certificates. The couples have to make individual petitions in courts and although the courts issued such orders they applied only to the petitioners and were not the ideal solution to the absence of a marriage registration mechanism. Lack of registration of marriages also had implications for legal recourse for spouses in case of matrimonial disputes. The religiously stirred milieu of the Pakistani judicial system pushes them to adopt their own customs or traditional laws. Most of the issues are settled through different community forums (Jinnah Institute Report 2011:40).

Hate speech is another problematic issue for minorities and vulnerable communities in Pakistan. The hate speeches by the clerics at religious congregations and Friday prayer sermons are extremely condemnable. Some of the mainstream newspapers have not been an exception for the hate campaigning against members of minority faiths that often branded members of entire minority communities as agents of other countries (Annual Report 2010).

The minority communities have been victimised through these sorts of discriminations-admission in school, attaining public sector jobs, getting senior level jobs in the private sector

etc. They are politically disadvantaged, economically pitiable and socially segregated are restricted to menial jobs, bonded labour, low wages. Kidnapping of young minority women and forced conversions are widespread phenomena. The curriculum in educational institutions promotes intolerance towards minorities and diversity of state's culture. The minorities have been frightened everywhere in Pakistan, and a complete social insecurity made them to undertake forced exodus. However this is limited to the economically sound people among the minority. More or less, only a passive citizenship has been enjoyed by the minority communities in Pakistan.

The Efforts to Protect Minorities

The former president General Parvez Musharraf took a few efforts to give a progressive twist in amending the blasphemy laws. In April 2000, he announced a proposal to make an administrative change in the procedure for registration of cases under the blasphemy law. It aimed at reducing the misuse of this law to settle personal scores. However, he retreated in the face of opposition from some religious groups, as he did in March 2005 after Islamist groups had raised their voice against the deletion of the column on religion in new Pakistani passports (Kalia 2011:178).

It can be acknowledged that, in April 2010, the federal ministry of minorities announced that 10 religious festivals of the minorities would be celebrated officially in Pakistan. The festivals included Besakhi, Dewali, Holi, Eid-e-Rizwan, Chelumjust, Nauroz, Christmas and Easter. To recognise the contribution, services and sacrifices by the minorities in the creation of Pakistan and to highlight the vision of Jinna on religious freedom and tolerance, elaborated in his address to the Constituent Assembly on August 11, 1947, it was decided to observe August 11 as 'Minorities' Day' (Annual Report 2010). The minority communities have been demanding separate marriage laws for long. It was started by the federal minister for minorities in 2010 that this matter would be addressed in a Minority Protection Bill. But this IS yet to tabled in the National Assembly. In 2010 April, government decided to reserve four seats for minorities in the Senate. This was a decisive step from the government.

In 2011, Member of Parliament, Sherry Rehman, who had proposed the amendments in a private member's bill, announced that she will not pursue the legislative process. Due to this effort, Mrs Rehman received many death threats from militants. She is reported to have taken the decision after Pakistan's Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani said there was no scope for discussion on changing the law. As long as the blasphemy provisions remain on the statute books, they provide legitimacy to groups who use violent means to oppress minorities. The government's position provides a green light to vigilantism, which was proposed by Minority Rights Group International to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). There have been several protests by some Islamic groups against attempts to change or repeal the various provisions of section 295. In January 2011, the governor of Punjab province,

Salman Taseer, and in March, Minority Affairs minister Shahbas Bhatti were shot dead by terrorists. Both had long standing initiatives to amend the draconian laws of Blasphemy. This made a huge negative impact and halted the already lagging Commission for minority affairs and its Ministry.

Conclusion

The declining power of the state due to the merging of the religious factors had been employed for political legitimacy of various governments by either military rulers or civilian rulers', right from the formation of the state. Pakistan society's reluctance to engage with modernity has been a key impasse in the waning of civilian politics. In case of Pakistan, there is a significant contrast between its rulers and the ruled. The former have been highly educated elite of any institutions from the West, and the latter have always been either from various seminaries (Madrassas) or nothing. So, the dearth of modern education stepped back the society on the one hand and the government's appeasements to pursue the religious education of the masses on the other, catalysed the declining of state power.

Muslim theologians in states in South Asia in general and Pakistan in particular, until today not only reject modernity but also reject any idea about the plurality of Islam. For them Islam is a monolithic phenomenon and any intellectual inquiry of plurality is on the path of error, and anyone who accepting plurality may even be denounced as *kafir* (unbeliever). In their views, Islam is a static religion than a dynamic one. Modernity uses the dialect of rights whereas theological discourse is entirely built around the language of duties. Thus traditional Islam imposes duties and rejects the idea of rights, and the Islamists never recollect the ideas of the prophet's real traditions and that is a society of consensus and negotiations with all religious communities. In Muslim societies, the transformation from feudal to democratic society is far from complete and hence the empowerment of people, particularly its minorities and women remain incomplete. Participatory politics and civic culture with a focus on citizenship rights have suffered gravely due to the bureaucratic military nexus. This was exposed by the frequent military takeovers of the civilian government, which caused the breakdown of the democratisation process in Pakistan. In a reaction to this the religious and linguistic minorities have enjoyed only passive citizenship than an active one. In the vacuum of democracy, this was paving ways for various militant Islamism, like its latest version as Tehrik-e-Taliban. In Pakistan the minority communities, have only some (degree) opportunities to sensitise their woes to the outside world like, active involvement of some civil society groups, press, conferences, publication of reports etc, which have questioned the legitimacy of the governments, and all sorts of inter-religious and intra-religious social and political exclusions. Every minority community firmly identifies their national identity as Pakistani, but their religious or ethnic identity is being questioned by the dominant community.

The nation building process in Pakistan is an awfully sluggish development. It is not as simple as, just replacing the civilian government and conducting elections. The strengthening of civil society and building of secular political parties as a countervailing force in Pakistan can contain the demands for Islamisation constituted by the religious parties and radical Islamist groups. For a democratic society, it is very indispensable to construct the multiculturalism and constitute the democratic institutions like, active citizenship, equality, rights and individual freedom etc. Whenever an elected political leader has rejected the demands of Islamists, there has been a backlash. As for the instantaneous solution there should have been constitutional amendments to get rid of religious advisory bodies to the state affairs, and to the facilitation on the process of a modern nation state, than a static and undemocratic state. For the security of all minority groups, state cohesion and the democratisation of the state, the government of Pakistan should have the political determination to contain the growth of religious militancy and terrorism. It is essential for the Pakistani ruling elite to revisit Jinnah's vision of a tolerant, plural and democratic Pakistan, anchored on the principles of equal citizenship and other rights, irrespective of caste, creed or gender. The authorities should undertake efforts to promote the attentiveness of the value of diversity, minority rights, and the contribution of various communities to the culture and history of Pakistan and hearten the effective participation of representatives of minority groups and, constituting of local inter-faith committees. The blasphemy laws, the laws designating certain groups as minorities, and the constitutional provisions regarding the conformity of law with Islamic injunctions, should be adapted or revoked to ensure social justice and equality for a socially, politically, and culturally modernised state of Pakistan .

Notes

1. The *Hudood* Ordinances of 1979 by Zia regime were a collection of criminal laws intended to bring Pakistan's criminal legal system, inherited from the British, in conformity with Islamic law, including such punishments as amputation for theft.
2. Family Laws and Minority Women in Pakistan, www.hisoft.us/sites/mrcpak/publications/minority_women/

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India and Israel: Changing Equations and Emerging Trends

Priya Ranjan Kumar

Abstract

The foreign policy of any country cannot be aloof to the unfolding dynamics of international system. It seeks to reorient itself in accordance with the changing international scenario, adopts new techniques of diplomacy and tries equally to influence other nations. The foreign policy of a country therefore is a real reflection of a threefold process: reorientation, adoption and persuasion. The prime objective of this process, however, is the promotion and protection of the vital national interest. Internal factors and external realities often influence the judgements of national interest. India's foreign policy and national interests in the 21st century are in no way an exception to this natural principle. It is in this specific context that the present article proposes to examine the fluidity of Indian foreign policy with special reference to the country's relations with Israel. While examining the nature of India's relations with Israel in multidimensional aspects, it argues that as an emerging player in world politics, Indian foreign policy orientation must be seen as one- to- one relation on the equal footing. Improving relations with one (Israel) should not be viewed as compromising with other (countries) in the region.

India and Israel Relations: From Genesis to Development

Historically, both India and Israel represent ancient civilizations and share similar colonial past. These were among the first states to gain independent status (in 1947 and 1948, respectively) in the post-World War II wave of decolonization. Ironically, India achieved independence from the British colony through a long freedom struggle whereas Israel was established under the United Nation General Assembly's Resolution 181 on 29 November 1947 (which sought to divide the country into two states-one the Arab and one Jewish), after the announcement of the British government's withdrawal from the Mandate of Palestine, stating it was unable to arrive at a solution acceptable to both the Arabs and Jews.¹ Both were born out of messy partitions and have maintained democratic regimes ever since, even under adverse conditions (Inbar 2004:89). Since the creation of Israel in 1948, India's policy has been, and remains till today, basically different from that of the Arab States.

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After the inauguration of the state of Israel on 14 May 1948, a communication was addressed by her Provisional Government to the foreign governments expressing the hope that they “will recognize and will welcome Israel into the community of nations”.² The reaction of most of the countries, including India, except for a few Muslim countries, was almost identical. From the very beginning, Israel was keen on securing acceptance by Asian countries, particularly India and so intensified its efforts towards influencing Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Since many countries including the US, the UK and the USSR, had given recognition to Israel³ it was expected of India to come out with a definite policy with regard to Israel.

Invariably, like most other governments, the Government of India was also approached by Israel for recognition. It was officially made known that a telegram had been received from the Foreign Minister of Israel, Mr. M. Moshe Shertok, containing a request for his country's recognition in the middle of June, 1948. About two months after the receipt of this telegram, the Government of India was asked to make its views known on the question in the Legislature by a leading and active member, Mr. H. V. Kamath. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru replied that his government had “decided to defer consideration of this question.”⁴ When pressed further he said “the obvious reasons were that a new State was formed and we had to wait. Normally we should have to be satisfied and know exactly what the international position is before taking any step (India: Constituent Assembly: Legislative Debates 1948: 381)”. Further on the issue of recognition of Israel, Nehru said:

Any action that we may take must be guided not only by idealistic considerations but also a realistic appraisal of the situation. Our general policy in the past has been favourable to the Arabs, at the same time not hostile to the Jews. That policy continues. For the present, we have said that we are not recognising Israel. But this is not an irrevocable decision and the matter will no doubt be considered afresh in view of subsequent developments, including the final decision of the United Nations.⁵

Interestingly, India's little delayed recognition and non-establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel has been a matter of criticism. However, a close study of the situation would reveal that India's reluctant response, in the delay in recognition of Israel, can be explained primarily with two reasons. The first was that the Muslims constituted the main minority community in India (Misra 1961:406). The other significant factor in the delay in recognition of Israel was the attitude of the Arab states toward Israel. India was not only looking forward to friendly relations with these states, but was also interested to coordinate her foreign policy orientation with them in order to strengthen her influence on Afro-Asian nations. In other words, India which had vehemently opposed the partition of Palestine wished to have the continued friendship and confidence of the Arab states.⁶ The attitude of Arab states toward Israel was uncompromising and they were pressing the Government of India to withhold recognition.⁷ Nevertheless, on the question of recognition, the Government of India never said

that the delay in recognizing Israel was due either to the Jerusalem question or to her disputed frontiers. It was also not due to India's opposition to partition, as a result of which Israel had come into being. In this connection a very important point should not be ignored that because of its general policy of considering the facts on the ground, the Indian government never adopted a policy, which can really be characterized as non-recognition policy towards the state of Israel.

In a subsequent development, on 4 May 1949, the United Nations (UN) Security Council accepted Israel's application for admission to the UN. A week later on 11 May 1949, the General Assembly passed Resolution 273 (III), granting membership to Israel in the UN (General Assembly, A/RES/273 (III), 11 May 1949). In response to the recognition of Israel by the UN, Prime Minister Nehru stated that:

Israel is now a member of United Nations and its recognition by other Member States cannot obviously be indefinitely deferred. The Government of India would like to act in this matter which has been the subject of this controversy among nations with whom we have friendly relations, that would avoid misunderstanding or ill-feeling and a hope that a satisfactory decision will be possible in the near future.⁸

Although India recognised the State of Israel in 1950, two years after its establishment on 14 May 1948, it was only in 1953 that allowed the opening of a consulate in Bombay (Misra 1961; Kumaraswamy 1995). It's worth observing the statement of the Indian Prime Minister Nehru on the recognition of Israel. While, announcing the recognition of Israel, Prime Minister Nehru stated in Parliament that "of course, the fact of Israel being there as a state is recognized by us"⁹ in September 1950. No doubt both India and Israel were following the foreign policy according to their complex internal as well as external situation, but they had not denied their existence.

Moreover, the reasons for not having full diplomatic relations between both countries for long are still a matter of debate. Some of significant speculations are often being put forth in the literatures of India's relations with Israel. There is an argument that the reason of non-existence of full diplomatic relations between the two was India's supportive and sympathetic policy towards the Palestinian cause. India, being a founder member of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which was principled with anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, peaceful co-existence, national independence, self-determination and democracy in international relations¹⁰ was in the forefront in supporting the struggle for the national liberation movements in the world which touched all corners of every continent. Consequently, this led to the strong support for the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) by India. Moreover, India became the first non-Arab state to recognise the PLO on 10 January 1975 and it also allowed an embassy of the PLO in its Capital on 26 March 1980 (Pant 2004:61). During the controversial and secret visit of the Israeli Foreign Minister, Moshe Dayan, nothing substantial took place which would have

suggested that India had abandoned the PLO and its cause (Mohammed 1969). It is also argued that Indira Gandhi followed a pro-Soviet line towards the Israel-Palestine conflict in view of the fact that India had gradually moved closer to the former Soviet Union subsequent to the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. That was probably the reason why even during the Janata government, India's pro-PLO stance remained on track despite the apprehensions that it might undergo a total revision. India's keen interest in the Palestinian cause during the 7th NAM Summit in New Delhi in March 1983 can be observed in the decision which was taken for the setting up of a NAM Committee on Palestine (Pradhan 2004:10). India took a historical step during the Rajiv Gandhi period while recognizing the Palestine State-in-exile which was established in November 1988 under the provisions of the Algerian's Palestine National Council (PNC) Declaration (*Ibid* :11).

Ironically, India had to weigh so many pros and cons when dealing with the states of the West Asian region. Domestically, multicultural and racial composition of domestic constituency, safeguarding the continuous flow of the energy supplies from the West Asia, and substantial flow of foreign currency from the Muslim World in terms of remittances (particularly from Gulf) had its impact on the Indian foreign policy. The most important of all the above was the Pakistan factor. Regionally, in order to counter Pakistan's growing influence in the Islamic world, India had to comprehend all the options available to it. Internationally, the United States (US) strong support to Israel and India's tilted policy towards the Union of Socialist Soviet Union (USSR) during the Cold War¹¹ were some of the major factors behind the non-existence of diplomatic relations between India and Israel as mentioned earlier. Nevertheless, the similarities of both India and Israel in terms of democratic political structure and pluralistic nature of society with large domestic Muslim minorities, surrounded by non-democratic neighbouring states provided a space for informal interactions away from the public domain on the basis of mutual interests. Consequently, India and Israel didn't break the informal interaction in significant areas. For instance, there was a close collaboration between the Indian intelligence agency, RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) and Israel's intelligence agency, Mossad through which India got tacit cooperation (limited quantities of small arms and ammunition) from Israel during its 1962 war with China and 1965 and 1971 wars with Pakistan (Kumaraswamy 1998: 43). However, the Six Days war (1967) between Arab-Israel led to the weakening of India's interaction with Israel. From 1982 to 1988, India did not even allow full consular relations.

Surprisingly, the end of the Cold War and subsequent consequences brought considerable optimism to the nascent relationship. The demise of one pole (the USSR) in the bipolar structure of international system, resulted in the emergence of a unipolar world order-sometime characterised as Uni-multipolar¹² and Unipolar Movement¹³- led by the only superpower, the US. At the same time, globalisation led to a greater quest for cosmopolitan opportunities in foreign policy (Itzhak 2010:29). Moreover, the Indian experiences during the Cold War period with the Arab states were also having a bearing on the Indian foreign policy.

For instance, reluctant Arab support for India in its quarrel with Pakistan in the Indo-Pakistan war in 1965 reinforced the feeling that India was not pursuing a quid pro quo policy in West Asia. Egypt maintained a neutral position in this war which was unexpected by many Indians because India had sided with Egypt during the Suez Crisis.¹⁴ The Casablanca Conference that followed the outbreak of the second Indo-Pakistani war in 1965, saw Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Iraq attempting to have the Arab states collectively endorse the Pakistani position (Kumar 2007). When hostilities between India and Pakistan erupted into war in November 1971, Kuwait, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia strongly condemned India. Saudi Arabia and Jordan provided Pakistan with American-built combat aircraft. However, Egypt, Algeria, and Syria took pains to stay neutral (*Ibid*).

The significant role of domestic politics must also be highlighted in this regard, for they have given greater fillip to the thrust to forge close relations with Israel. The electoral defeat of the Congress Party in 1989 and its inability to form a coalition government until the June 1991 national elections, and the ascendance of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the Indian political system have given the much needed leeway to improve relationship with Israel. With the Hindu outlook and nationalists characteristics, BJP was in favour of establishing diplomatic relationship with Israel. Economic liberalisation which was adopted in the early 1990s depended heavily on economic and technological interactions with the West. In this context, India saw Israel (a modern technology-oriented state), as a significant player in the new globalized economy and wished to have good relations with it (Kumaraswamy 2002:198).

Subsequently, India on its part reoriented its foreign policy to accommodate the changing realities of international milieu for the sake of promotion of national interests.¹⁵ Internal factors and external realities often influence the judgements of national interest. India replaced its idealistic bent by a new hard-headed, bottom line pragmatism. The traditional Indo-pessimism has yielded ground for Indo-optimism (Mohan 2005:38). Socio-culturally, India, Israel and the US discovered a natural affinity, their economic cooperation provided mutual benefits and a partnership in the defence and security spheres were uniformly explored. Consequently, politico-strategically this triad moved towards each other. Moreover, the emerging non-compartmentalised and pacific nature of the relationship between countries was also one of the major factors, at a broader level, that impelled India to establish diplomatic relations with Israel (Dixit 1997). Finally, considering all these factors, India emerged bold and made public the announcement for the establishment of full diplomatic relation with Israel on 29 January 1992. In February 1992, Israel opened an embassy in New Delhi, and in May of the same year India opened an embassy in Tel Aviv.¹⁶ Significantly, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, during a press conference on the second day of his stay in New Delhi hoped that such a change would not affect India-Palestinian relationship which was so strong.¹⁷

Since the 1990s, India and Israel have expanded the horizon of relationship and this is being woven across multi-dimensional aspects. Both have improved the trade relation in various fields including agricultural products, health and medicine, science and technology, combating illicit trafficking and abuse of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances etc. Israel has satisfied some of India's thirst for newer items, especially electronic warfare technology and precision-guided munitions. The India-Israeli arms trade amounts to more than \$2 billion annually and Israel has become India's number two military supplier (Dasgupta 2011:24). Like Russia, it offers India access to military equipment without imposing political conditions, and Israeli firms have also been able to woo the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) with offers of joint development of high-tech weaponry. Both established a joint commission on trade. Both have joint mechanisms in the field of combating terrorism as well. The cooperation in the field of defence is predominantly and vital in the relationship between both the countries.

Combating Terrorism as a Common Security Concern

Like India, Israel also faces the same security challenges from \state sponsored terrorism by their non-democratic neighbours. There are structural similarities in the kind of threat perception both the countries face from across the border of their respective countries. Both are democratic, pluralistic states with large domestic Muslim minorities, and both share threats from their neighbours, India from Pakistan and Israel from Lebanon (particularly from the terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah) and terrorist organisations operating in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Both countries shared a strategic perception of threat of fundamentalism (Itzhak 2010:13). These shared security threats have led to a better understanding of each other's concerns (Ilan 2002).¹⁸ India sees Israel as a source providing training for its personnel and material in its fight against terrorism, and Israel is more than willing to offer India, both material and moral support in this regard (Shukla 2003). Stephen P. Cohen argues that the main reason for the change in Indian policy vis-à-vis Israel was Tel Aviv's long counter-terror experience. Further he states that "the dangers from Islamic extremism were so great that it was worth risking domestic Muslim opposition" (Cohen 2001). There is also a realization in India that India's largely pro-Arab stance in West Asia has not been adequately rewarded by the Arab world. India has received no worthwhile backing from the Arab countries in the resolution of problems it faces in its neighbourhood, especially Kashmir. There have been no serious attempts by the Arab world to put pressure on Pakistan to reign in cross-border insurgency in Kashmir. On the contrary, the Arab world has firmly stood by Pakistan, using the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) to build support for Islamabad and the Jihadi groups in Kashmir (Madani 2003). Thus, the search for strength in each other's inner reserves is natural for India and Israel in their quest for security and the fight against terror (Pant 2009:262).

This mutual understanding and concern has drawn the two states even closer, with India becoming the first close friend to Israel in the east and Israel being the first close friend to

India in the west. Israel, which has faced relative isolation across the globe since its independence, viewed India as its strategic anchor in Asia (Chaudhari 2003). In addition, Israel also sees major benefits in coming closer to a country with a big Muslim population, expecting that it might help dilute the importance of the religious component in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Both states are also islands of stability in an otherwise largely chaotic region stretching from North Africa to the Himalayas, which some have argued should be seen as a single strategic region (Hoagland 2001).

In a high level talk, the Prime Minister of Israel Yitzhak Rabin and the Foreign Minister Shimon Peres sought for the urgent need for India and Israel to cooperate to combat fundamentalism and terrorism (Kutty 2000). The Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres visit to India in January 2002 reflected a growing Israeli acknowledgment of this enhanced opportunity for cooperation. While talking to Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh, and Defense Minister George Fernandes, Peres publicly acknowledged that India-Israeli relations were now closer than ever. Equating the struggle in Palestine with the militancy in Kashmir, he stated that India and Israel were joint victims of the global scourge of terrorism. Further Peres advocated that India could look up to Israel as a friend in the war against terrorism (Cherian 2002). Moreover, he stated Indo-Israeli cooperation as “a coalition without a choice because no country democratic or otherwise can forgive or be indifferent to the dangers of terrorism” (Ilan 2002).

Invariably, combating terrorism has always been the core area of cooperation in India's relationship with Israel. Globalisation of terrorism became a common security concerns for both India and Israel after the 11 September 2001 episode in the US and the terror attack on Mumbai, on 26 November 2008. International collaboration in the counter-terrorism provided another factor in order to strengthen the relationship between India and Israel in this direction. This post-September 11 strategic environment has added an important variable to the India-Israeli equation. Consequently, Israel has even dispatched security specialists to train and advise Indian forces in the region of Kashmir. India and Israel established joint mechanism for the exchanging of crucial intelligence information on terrorists groups. The range of issues have been diversified and expanded at the Joint Working Counter-Terrorism Group, while incorporating combating international terror. At the same time, India got logistical support such as specialized surveillance equipment, cooperation in intelligence gathering, joint exercises, and cooperation to prevent money laundering and terror funding, to fight terrorism in Kashmir. Several seminars and conferences were organized on issues like border security, suicide bombers, aviation security and terror funding as well as information security encompassing digital and cyber warfare, have been held in India by Israeli experts. Israel's long experience (tactics used by the Israeli Defence Forces-IDF-security technology, equipment and methods) in guerrilla and urban warfare waged against Palestinian terrorists in the West Bank and Gaza Strip had been fruitful to the Indian security forces in countering insurgency in Kashmir and

north-east states (Kumar 2001). Even US forces benefited from the IDF strategy of urban warfare to tackle growing insurgency in Iraq (Dudkevitch 2003).

Moreover, it would be worth mentioning here that the gruesome terror attacks on India's financial capital, Mumbai on 26 November 2008, further positively impacted on India's relations with Israel. This terror attack carried out by the Pakistan-based terrorist groups was a tragedy for both the nations. The targets of this attack were not only members of Indian communities but also Jews, Christians and Muslims from Israel and other foreign countries (more than 170 people killed and 300 people wounded) (Friedman 2009). By targeting both Indians as well as foreigners (*The Hindu* 28 November 2008) (Australian, British and Japanese, Italian and others), the terrorists attacked several sites, including two luxury hotels (Oberoi Trident and Taj Mahal Hotel), frequented by foreigners, a train station (Chatrapati Shivaji Terminus) and a café (Leopold café). In addition, the terrorists launched a siege against the city's Chabad Jewish Center, killing six people, including four Israelis. The only surviving perpetrator, Ajmal Kasab, told police that the terrorists purposely targeted Israelis in Mumbai to "avenge the atrocities on Palestinians" (Ahmed 2008).

This was the first time when Jews or their religious places have been targeted because of their particular identity (Jew) in India. Historically, India is one of the few countries where Jews never faced discrimination and persecution and the absence of anti-Semitism which has been a source of pride for the country (Kehan 2008). The experience of this incident had tremendous impact on the India's relations with Israel. Soon after the attack, Israel reacted strongly and advocated for joint collaboration against the terror attack. Israel's then Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, stated "Dealing with terrorism must be done jointly and we must improve cooperation on this front. Israel will assist India as much as it wants (*Haaretz* 6 December 2008)." Similarly, while describing India's relationship with Israel, Indian Minister of State for Commerce and Industry Jyotiradithya Scindia called the India-Israel alliance a "relationship between two souls" based on shared morals and principles. Further, he stated the need for cooperation to the fullest extent to combat the menace of terror while emphasizing on strategic partnership based on sound fundamental principles between both the countries. Moreover, Israeli President Shimon Peres said "India's security is as important to Israel as its own" (*The Hindu* 19 February 2010). Both countries believe that fighting the menace of terrorism and fundamentalism will enhance peace and security in the West and South Asia.

Mutual Strategic Interest and Defence Cooperation

Significantly, new circumstances accompanied with constraints as well as opportunities after the end of the Cold War. These new constraints made it necessary for India to rethink its foreign policy and favor rapprochement with Israel. First and foremost, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR greatly affected India's interests. India and the USSR had been close allies for several decades. In fact, the USSR was meeting nearly 80 percent of India's

military needs in 1991 (Arielle 2010). Thus it became essential for India to search new partners and most importantly, new military suppliers. Improving relations with Israel was therefore an attractive alternative especially in the field of defense. Second and equally important was the realization of the majority of India's political establishment that it was imperative for India to build sound relations with the US, the sole hegemonic power in the changed international system. Indian leaders assumed that normalization with Israel would facilitate India's rapprochement with the US, since they believed that the American Jewish lobby had a major influence on the foreign policy decisions of Washington. Moreover, India is increasingly turning to Israeli and Western suppliers, especially since its ties with Russian sellers started souring in early 2010, when the Russians forced a repricing of the aircraft carrier *Admiral Gorshkov* from \$ 1 billion to \$ 2.3 billion (Dasgupta 2011:24).

Defence cooperation has always been the mutual strategic interests of both India and Israel. For India, advanced weapon technology, modernization of defence forces, military independence were (are) seen as being vital for national security. After the disintegration of the USSR, India's urgent need was to diversify its defence cooperation in accordance with advancement and modernization of armed forces (Kumaraswamy 1998). Moreover, the dramatic changes in India by the early 1990s significantly influenced the security perspective and encouraged a restructuring of India's defence capability (possessing the fourth largest army in the world). On the other hand, for Israel, arms exports have been an essential and integral part of its security sector since they lower the cost of production, offset the cost of research and development, reduce Israel's balance deficit, and provide employment (Itzhak, 2010:54). Home market alone was not sufficient for Israeli defence industries. India was perceived as an attractive market for Israel's defence industry. Moreover, one factor in the Indian policy change was the fact that Israel had developed expertise in improving the weapons' systems of Soviet origin, which could be utilized by India. Thus, India's search for technology and Israel's need to make its defence research as a viable economical entity became complementary. India and Israel improved their defence cooperation based on their security and commercial interests.

In addition, some significant developments in international politics also provided a viable environment for further improvement of India's relations with Israel. The Kargil confrontation (1999) between India and Pakistan, the terror attack in New York (11 September 2001) and on the Indian Parliament (13 December 2001), the war in Afghanistan (2001), American invasion of Iraq (2003) and the recent terror attack in Mumbai (November 2008) were the major developments which were considered as the vital security concerns by both India and Israel. Subsequently, both moved ahead and improved their defence cooperation in order to fight against the non-conventional security threat posed by various terrorist organizations. India's search for modern-equipments was provided by Israeli defence industries. The result of this improvement in the relation can be seen by the evidence that today Israel is the second largest weapons supplier (after Russia) to India.

Since January 1992, India's defence cooperation with Israel has experienced tremendous enhancement in various aspects. For instance, the Israeli Heron Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, the Indian AAD-02 Air Missile Interceptor, based on Israeli "Green Pine" radar, as part of India's Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), and the three Falcon air early warning control systems (AWACS) were built by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) for India. In July, 2007 India's Cabinet Committee on Security chaired by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh approved a \$ 2.5 billion defence project with Israel. Subsequently, in August 2008, India signed a \$ 2.5 billion deal with Israel Aerospace Industries Ltd. (IAI) and Rafael to jointly develop a new and advanced version of the Spyder surface-to-air missile system (Srivastava 2009). In March 2009, India signed a \$ 1.4 billion deal (the biggest defence deal) with IAI for the supply of an anti-missile air defence system, including seaborne and shore-based systems against missile attack (*The Times of India* 28 March 2009). The first of the three Phalcon combat aircraft equipped with AWACS was delivered to India on 25 May 2009 (*The Times of India*, 25 May 2009). The second of its three contracted Phalcon AWACS, or "eyes in the sky", from Israel landed on 25 March 2010 and the third one would land by the end of this year (*The Times of India*, 24 March 2010). Israel has emerged as one of the largest suppliers of military hardware to India. Moreover, there are defense news reports that the Indian Army is about to order thousands of Spike anti-tank missiles and peripheral equipment from Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd. in a \$1 billion deal. It's reported that Indian Ministry of Defence officials has ordered for 321 launchers, 8,356 missiles, and 15 training simulators, and peripheral equipment (Dagoni 2011).

Though there was a new government in India (United Progressive Alliance–UPA) in 2004 (also in Israel), this hasn't changed the already established strong level of military cooperation. While interacting with the media about the defence ties with Israel, the Indian Defence Minister A. K. Antony stated that "successive governments since 1992 have had defence ties with Israel. This is not new and this relation is not ideological, but purely based on our security requirements" (Kumaraswamy 2007). This was the clear message to dispel apprehensions of the left and silence the critics about the defence cooperation between both the countries. Further, A. K. Antony informed the Parliament that from 2002-2007, India obtained over \$5 billion worth of military weapons and systems from Israel. However, some commentator differed by arguing that in 2006 alone India's defence imports from Israel stood at US \$1.6 billion (Ibid). A Joint Defence Ministerial Committee convenes regularly to discuss military cooperation and military topics of mutual concern. One can argue that Indian and Israeli military cooperation is undoubtedly a key joint strategic interest in the bilateral defence relations by observing the present level of cooperation. There have been several high level visits of delegations from both sides in recent years in this direction. For instance, in June 2006 two Indian warships sailed to Israel on a goodwill visit. Israel's Deputy Chief of General Staff, Maj.-Gen. Moshe Kaplinsky led an Israeli military delegation to India in June 2007, and in January 2008 Admiral Suresh Mehta, Chairman of the Indian Chiefs of Staff Committee, visited Israel on 6 December 2009. Israeli army chief of staff Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazy paid a reciprocal visit to India.

Other Significant Areas of Cooperation

Besides these two key areas of cooperation, India and Israel have developed considerably good relations in other areas as well such as agriculture, irrigation, science and technology, space etc. Indian and Israeli trade has grown exponentially, from \$80 million in 1991 to about \$4 billion in 2008 (Lal 2009). Improvement of trade materialized \$4.1 billion in 2009 and \$5 billion in 2010 (*The Economic Times*, 12 October 2010). India is now Israel's second largest trading partner in Asia after Hong Kong. In addition to fertilizer and diamonds, agriculture, water and IT technologies are major areas of mutual trade. India and Israel signed five significant trade and economic agreements from 1993-1996 (Israeli Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor 2010), and negotiations on a free-trade agreement began earlier this year when Israeli President Shimon Peres met with India's Commerce Minister (Ora 2010). On an official visit to India in January 2010, Israeli Trade and Labour Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer said, "It is one of the aims of my visit here to try to push [a free-trade agreement with India] as much as possible. It is progressing quite well and I hope it will happen very soon."¹⁹

Moreover, one area of particular importance for India - and one in which Israel can make a significant contribution - is that of rural development. Interestingly enough, several joint ventures have been set up in the field of drip irrigation, floriculture, horticulture, water management and arid region cultivation. Israeli expertise in this respect is among the most advanced in the world. The contribution Israel can make toward advancing rural India is substantial- not only in enhancing existing production techniques - but by upgrading pre and post-harvest operations and inputs as well. Netafim is a Tel Aviv-based company that provides irrigation solutions for agriculture and landscaping and has carried out numerous projects around the world, including in India. India became Netafim's second largest market (after US) in 2008 and continues to grow. In 2008, Netafim opened a second factory in the southern Indian city of Chennai, making India the only nation to have more than one Netafim factory outside of Israel (Neal 2008). Invariably, the agriculture conglomerate, Jain Irrigation Systems, bought 50.01 per cent of Na'anDan Irrigation Systems for \$21.5 million in June 2007 in what is the largest investment by an Indian company in Israel (Sherman 2008).

In the field of space technology, the successful launch of the 300 kilogram Israeli satellite on 28 January 2008 by the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV-C10) from Satish Dhawan Space Centre in Sriharikota undoubtedly marks a new stage in India and Israel relations. Also known as Polaris, TECSAR has a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), a radar system which is more advanced than the OFEK generation satellites that Israel currently relies on. This all weather satellite is capable of providing images with a resolution of up to 10 centimetres. Joint missile defence and Polaris launch are a part of its willingness to consolidate military-security ties with Israel (Kumaraswamy 2008). At the same time, in the field of science and technology both the countries have made commendable improvement. The joint industrial R&D fund worth \$ 1 million between India and Israel has been set up to encourage

new investors (*The Hindu* 23 March 2010). In 2010, in his three day visit to Israel, India's Minister for Science and Technology, Prithviraj Chavan emphasised on cooperation in areas of renewable energy and computer sciences as the tremendous potential for both the countries (*Ibid*).

Melting Constraints

After analysing India's relations with Israel in various fields, it would be worth mentioning the nature of constraints which had considerable influence in the past and still seem to be determining factors in India's foreign policy towards Israel at least theoretically if not in practice. These constraints include India's stand on the Palestine question, India's relationship with Iran, role of the United States and Israel's relationship with China and Pakistan. But it must be viewed that most of the constraints have started melting with the changing contours of international relations. Now, international opinion has been changing in favour of India, as New Delhi has been recognised as a major player world politics. The debates have begun about a post-American world (Fareed Zakaria describes with equal prescience a world in which the United States will no longer dominate the global economy, orchestrate geopolitics, or overwhelm cultures)²⁰, and 21st century is being seen as the Asian century. Restructuring of the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) and other international forums to accommodate India into its rightful position will further add to India's strengths. In a significant development, speaking in the Indian Parliament (November 2010), the US President Barack Obama, supported India's quest for permanent membership in the UNSC (*The Hindu*, 9 November 2010). This support united all the P-5 (Five Permanent members of UNSC-the US, France, Britain, Russia and China [tacit support]) members on an equal stage with regard to the debate on India's inclusion in UNSC as a permanent member. In addition, the demand for India's inclusion in the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) and recognition of India as a responsible nuclear state put India out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) box.

In this context, Indian foreign policy should not be seen through the prism of the 1960s or 1970s. India has moved ahead. Today's India is not struggling for survival or political stability or having an economic crisis. India's stable democratic political structure has falsified most of the western political speculations. Sustainable economic growth (8 to 9 per cent annual) has forced the Bretton Woods Institutions (the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund-IMF) to give the appropriate position for India in the decision making bodies. Today's India is experiencing the tragedy of great power politics. John Mearsheimer argues that great powers go beyond survival and strive for the ultimate goal of achieving hegemony (Mearsheimer 2001). In this particular situation, India has to take a clear stand on issues of international politics whether it is nuclear proliferation, terrorism, Palestinian cause etc.

Moreover, India's relation with a country is not a one way track but one which has mutual advantages. The Gulf countries (Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Iran, Iraq etc) seek to promote their national (commercial) interests by having good relations with India in order to diversify the scope of relationship. In the same way India's quest for energy security compels it to maintain good relations with Gulf and African countries. If the Gulf is the major source of remittances for India, India is also the major flourishing destiny for investments of billions of the West Asian petrodollars (the money that oil exporters receive from selling oil and recycled in the form of foreign investments, buying luxury goods, arms and ammunitions). As far as the question of Palestine is concerned, India's stand is clear and it always sought for right of the Palestinian people and the independence of Palestine. While laying down the foundation stone for the Palestine chancery building in New Delhi in the presence of Palestinian National Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh reiterated the country's commitment to the cause of Palestine. He stated that "India believes that the solution should be based on the relevant U.N. Resolutions, the Arab Peace Plan and the Quartet road map resulting in a sovereign, independent, viable and united State of Palestine living within secure and recognised borders, side by side at peace with Israel." President Abbas also appreciated Indian policy towards Palestine while stating that "India is giving us support without us asking it."²¹ Similarly, India's relation with Iran is also independent and mutually beneficiary in nature. India has improved relations with most of the countries in the West Asian region.

As far as India's relation with Israel is concerned, the question now is not whether India should have relation with the same or not but whether Israel is a natural ally of India or not? Surprisingly, Islamic countries, such as Egypt (after Camp David Accord 1979), Turkey and Jordan (after Peace Treaty of 1994) have established full diplomatic relations and are maintaining good relations with Israel (Nora 2004:88; Halliday 2005:186). In addition, other countries like Pakistan, Morocco, and Tunisia have contact in various aspects with Israel. In this context, Indian foreign policy cannot be static towards Israel. At the same time, one cannot deny the implications of Israel's improved relation with Pakistan particularly in the field of arms trade on India's internal security. In fact it has been an acknowledged fact that the arms bought by Pakistan from any country (Israel or US) are being used by terrorist groups in Kashmir and in other parts of India. Moreover, a gradual global connection of the terrorist groups of all continents of the world becomes a matter of security concern for India and Israel in particular and for international peace and security in general. The relation of any country with another one on bilateral or multilateral level can be judged only on the basis of whether it serves national interest of the party s' involved in a positive sum gain or not. Therefore, India's relationship with Israel also comes under the same preview as other countries of the region.

Thus, Indian foreign policy orientation must be seen as a one on one relation on an equal level rather than improved relations with one (Israel) by compromising relationships with other states in the region.

Notes

1. In the Assembly's discussion of the question, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that his government had tried for years to solve the problem of Palestine, but, having failed, had brought it to the United Nations, For details see United Nations, ST/DPI/SER.A/47 20 April 1949, Background Paper No. 47, New York <http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/2248AF9A92B498718525694B007239C6>.
2. See Nehru's speech (March 1950), India: Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 3, Pt. 2, p.1699
3. The United States recognized 'the de facto authority' on the same day and followed it up with *de jure* recognition in January, 1949. Soviet Union announced recognition, on 17 May 1948. The United Kingdom accorded *de facto* recognition to the Government of Israel on 29 January, 1949, and *de jure* recognition on 27 April 1950. For details see Misra (1961:404).
4. See India: Constituent Assembly: Legislative Debates (Aug. 9-13, 1948), 6, Pt. 1, p.380.
5. For further, discussion about India's policy for the recognition of Israel and partition of Palestine see, Parthasarthy, G (ed.) (1985).
6. That the friendship of Arab states was the basic factor for the Indian government in delaying the recognition of Israel, for details see Hasan (2008).
7. See the explanation of the official spokesman of the External Affairs Ministry, Government of India, on 17 September 1950, *Hindustan Times*, New Delhi, 18, 1950, p.1.
8. Constituent Assembly of India (legislative) Debates (28 August 1948), 6 Pt 1, (7), August 28, p.381
9. India: Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 1, Pt. 1 (Feb. 27, 1950), p.495.
10. These principles formulated by Articles 12 and 13 of the Sixth Non-aligned Summit of Havana sum up the major basics of the NAM's strategy, However, the ideological bases of NAM may be understood in terms of *five Ds* – Decolonization, Disarmament, Development, Détente and Dissemination. For detail see Kochler Hans (1982).
11. For Realist the Cold War is understood as the bipolar (Superpowers-the US and the USSR) relationship based on strategic competition, which was a consequence of the geopolitical arrangement brought about by the Second World War, for details see Saull (2010).
12. According to Huntington contemporary international politics does not fit any of unipolar, bipolar or multipolar models. It is a strange hybrid, a uni-multipolar system with one superpower and several major powers. For detail see Huntington (1999).
13. By which Charles Krauthammer introduced the idea of American unipolarity. Further he argued that it has been assumed that the old bipolar world would beget a multipolar world with power dispersed to new centers in Japan, Germany (and/or "Europe"), China and a diminished Soviet Union/Russia. [This is] mistaken. The immediate post-Cold War world is not multipolar. It is unipolar. The center of world power is an unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies. For detail see Krauthammer (1990/1991).
14. On Egyptian stand on India-Pakistan War 1965 see Agwani (1966).
15. The national interest of a state is multi-faceted. Primary is the state's survival and security. Also important is the pursuit of wealth and economic growth and power. The concept is an important one in international relations where pursuit of the national interest is the foundation of the realist school. For details see Scott Burchill (2011).

16. For details see, India-Israel Bilateral Relations. Embassy of India-Tel Aviv, Available at <http://www.indembassy.co.il/India-Israel%20Bilateral%20relations.htm>
17. Exchange of Ambassadors and recognition of Israel are acts of sovereignty, in which I cannot interfere. I respect any choice of Indian government, stated PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, for details see Hasan (2008:87)
18. For the detail discussion regarding converging areas of Indian and Israeli interests in the field of combating terrorism, see Ilan (2002).
19. For details see, Ben-Eliezer to discuss trade relations in India (2010), January 18, Available at <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3832719,00.html>
20. By 'post-American world', Zakaria refers to the erosion of US pre-eminence as the sole superpower. He sees the "rise of the rest"—the growth of countries like China, India, Brazil, Russia, and many others—as the great story of our time, and one that will reshape the world. For details see Zakaria (2008).
21. President Abbas said relations between India and Palestine were developing day by day. New Delhi's gesture reflected its deep commitment and support that dated back to several decades. Mr. Abbas said relations between India and Palestine were developing day by day. New Delhi's gesture reflected its deep commitment and support that dated back to several decades. India is giving us support without us asking it. For details see, Special Correspondent, "India reaffirms commitment to the cause of Palestine", *The Hindu*, 8 October 2008.

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India and Myanmar Relations and the China Factor: An Overview

Ningthoujam Priyananda Singh

Abstract

Myanmar is critical for India's security, economic, political and territorial integrity. Development of better ties with Myanmar might largely reduce cross-border drug trafficking and separatist insurgencies in the North-Eastern Region of India. Moreover, Myanmar is the gate way and stepping stone in India's 'Look East Policy' which seeks to develop strategic ties with all the Southeast Asian countries, giving India expanded economic, security, and political opportunities. India, therefore, attempted to make good relations with Myanmar. So, in early 2000, India-Myanmar relations received a new momentum following the announcement of New Delhi's 'Constructive Engagement' policy. Though India has sharply criticized Myanmar's suppression of democracy after 1990, developments in relations since early 2000, made it amply clear that anti-insurgency, drug trafficking and regional geopolitical considerations had been given higher priority than democracy in New Delhi's approach to Myanmar. At present, India seems to be losing its grip as China has been rapidly strengthening its presence in Myanmar leading to a diplomatic dilemma for the regional power.

Key Words: Bilateral relation, border trade, China's factor, economy and strategic relation.

Introduction

India and Myanmar have been emotionally and culturally linked ever since Buddha's period. India was one of the leading supporters for Burmese independence and established diplomatic relations after Burma's independence from British. It is the only ASEAN member country with which India share both land and sea borders. Under the British Raj Myanmar (Burma) was the constituent part of British India till 1937. Both India and Myanmar have common features due to cultural links, flourishing commerce, common interests in regional affairs, economic and social systems. In retrospect, Myanmar and India are natural partners.

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Besides, there are a large number of ethnic groups in India's North East, who have their counterparts in Myanmar and their social interactions have been continuing since time immemorial. Myanmar is also the gateway to India's Look East Policy. Myanmar therefore, is critical for India's security, economic, political and territorial integrity and development of the North eastern region in particular.

Myanmar relations since 1948 (when Myanmar became independent) can be considered as being cordial and friendly up to 1962. Former Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and his counterpart of Myanmar U Nu were instrumental in cementing initial political and diplomatic ties between the two neighbouring countries. India provided Burma with military and economic assistance during that period.

But the relations with Burma totally froze from 1962. General Ne Win who seized power, nationalized all the private enterprises in Burma. He strongly believed that Burma is only for Burmese. He did not like the Indian diaspora in Myanmar and envisaged no role for them in business, trade and farming. He ordered the expulsion of Indian citizens from Myanmar. India had arranged ferries and aircrafts to lift its citizens out of Burma. The official figure shows that as compared to over 20 lakhs Indian residing in Burma in 1950s only three lakh thirty thousand persons were living in 1980.

India's war with China in 1962 and the military regime siding with the Chinese too had repressions on India-Burma relations. General Ne Win's idea of cocooning Burma from the rest of the world further distanced India. During Indira Gandhi's rule, India avoided contact with Burma and was critical of its suppression of democratic movement and maintaining a poor rights record.

There were no changes in India's policy towards Burma during the Rajiv Gandhi, regime as there was continued support to pro-democracy movement in Burma. His government provided refuge to thousands of pro-democracy movement activists after they fled Burma in the wake of military suppression. But during the Narasimha Rao, regime the policy toward the Burma was changed. The reasons for these radical changes in the ties can be attributed to both Myanmar for its isolationist policy adopted by the military regime and to India for its shift from an idealist or moralistic to realistic or pragmatic policy. So, India's Look-East policy was initiated in 1991 which seeks to develop strategic ties with all the Southeast Asian countries, giving India expanded economic, security, and political opportunities. It has been the main driving force for improvement in bilateral relation.

Indo-Myanmar relations underwent a radical shift after the NDA government changed India's foreign policy on Myanmar. The main issues governing Indo-Myanmar relations today are: North-east and the border, economic factors, the China factor and energy security. Both the countries have carried out joint operations against the insurgents and to curb drug trade. There

is a limited border trade between the two sides. However there is no change in China's balancing influence on Myanmar and in the area of energy security. The Indo-Myanmar annual trade in 2009-10 is worth US\$ 1.9 billion and India has invested in technology and transportation developmental projects, with a target of US\$3 billion bilateral trade by 2015.

Bilateral Relations

1948-1962 Relations were friendly and cordial during the days of Prime Minister Nehru and Prime Minister U Nu. India provided economic and military assistance .Both were members of the Non Aligned Movement.

1962-1988 Relations virtually froze with the military rule under Ne win adopting an isolationist policy. Domestic policies including the expulsion of ethnic Indians soured the relations. Myanmar's anti Soviet stance strained relations with India being pro-Soviet at that time. Myanmar refused to become a member of the Commonwealth. Indian Consulate in Mandalay had to be closed. Myanmar withdrew from NAM in 1979.

1988-Till Date India and Myanmar relation were strong due to cultural links, flourishing commerce, common interest of regional affairs and the presence of large number of Indian community in Myanmar. However, in 1988 the military Junta overthrows the democratic government in Myanmar. The violent suppression of the peoples movement for democracy under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi and latter's confinement in jail affected the relations between India and Myanmar. The strain in bilateral ties was amplified further following Myanmar policy of expulsion of the Indian community, on the one hand and the financial assistance provided to the pro-democracy activists by India, on the other. As a result of the sympathy of the Indian government to the pro-democracy movement, the relations only worsened. India had even accommodated a large number of pro democracy refugees in camps in NE India. All India Radio programmes also criticised the military regime. In 1993, India reversed its stance with a more realistic and pragmatic policy and started engaging the military regime. Since then the relations have been growing steadily save for a minor hiccup in 1995 when Aung San Suu Kyi was awarded the Nehru Peace Price for International Understanding. But the visit of Maung Aye, Vice Chairman SPDC, the second most powerful leader in the junta, in November 2000, helped a turn round in the relations. There has been all round progress in political, economic and military relations as well as cooperation in technology, HRD, infrastructure, education, space, health and other fields.

High Level Visits (Since 2004)

The high point in the bilateral relations was the visit of Senior General Than Shwe, Chairman, State Peace and Development Council from 24 to 29 October 2004. He was accompanied by a high level delegation comprising eight cabinet ministers. He met the Indian

President, Prime Minister and Vice-President. An MoU for cooperation in the field of Non-traditional Security Issues and an MoU on the Tamanthi Hydroelectric Project on Chindwin River in Myanmar were signed. The Chairman had categorically assured that Myanmar would not allow its territory for hostile activity against India.

There has been a regular and frequent exchange of visits by ministers from both countries. The Foreign Secretary of India had visited in Oct 2004 and June 2006. The Chiefs of Army, Air force and Navy had also visited Myanmar in 2005-06.

The visit of the Indian President Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam to Myanmar from 8-11 March 2006 was a landmark in that this was the first Indian head of state/government visit to Myanmar since 1987 when Rajiv Gandhi visited Myanmar. A number of agreements and Memorandums of Understanding were signed during this visit. In 2008, Myanmar's second figure Maung Aye to visited India. Indian Vice President Ansari and Indian military leaders paid a return visit to Myanmar in 2010. Earlier this year, Indian Foreign Secretary visited the country. Myanmar's Head of State, Senior General Than Shwe visited India from 25 to 29 July 2010. The two countries signed five pacts after Prime Minister Manmohan Singh held talks with visiting Myanmar military ruler General Than Shwe over a wide range of issues, including counter-terror cooperation, enhanced energy ties and collaboration in a string of developmental projects.

Recently, the Burmese President Thein Sein was paid a visit to India from 12 to 15 October, 2011 with the aim of improving Burma's bilateral relationship with India. Sein, a former military general, visited India in November 2008 as Prime Minister under the military Junta. Thein Sein's first visit as president of a normal civilian government is significant for two important reasons. First, the new government, although still dominated by military generals, is seeking to improve its international image by pursuing democratic reforms. Secondly, the Burmese government apparently irked the Chinese government, India's traditional rival, by halting a \$3.6 billion hydro electric project in Kachin state, a surprise announcement made on September 30, 2011.

Important Bilateral Agreements and MoUs

India has entered into a number of agreements and Memorandums of Understanding with Myanmar over the years.

In 1951 India and Myanmar signed a Treaty of Friendship.

A boundary agreement between India & Myanmar was signed in 1967.

Maritime boundary between the two countries was defined by a maritime delimitation agreement in 1986.

The first Border Trade Agreement was signed in Delhi in 1994.

A science and technology agreement was signed between the two countries in 1999 under which a Joint Working Group (JWG) was set up. The JWG has held four Meetings between 2001 to 04.

A Tripartite Agreement between India, Myanmar and Thailand has also been entered into for determining the tri junction point in Andaman Sea.

During 2003, seven agreements/MoUs were signed viz the protocol on consultations between the Ministry of External Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Myanmar; MoU for the deputation of teaching personnel from India for short term courses at Universities in Myanmar; establishment of the Joint Trade Committee; MoU on cooperation in Communications, IT and services; agreement on extension of a credit line of US \$ 25million to Government of Myanmar; agreement on Visa exemption for Official and Diplomatic passport holders and an MoU between HRD Ministry of India and Education Ministry of Myanmar.

During 2004 eight agreements /MoUs were concluded between India and Myanmar. Of these the notable ones were the MoU on the cooperation of Non-traditional Security Issues and the MoU on the Tamanthi Hydro Electric Power Project. In 2005 an MoU on Energy Cooperation was signed.

In 2006, MoUs on Cooperation in the Petroleum Sector, Cooperation in Buddhist Studies and a Framework Agreement for mutual Cooperation in the field of Remote Sensing were signed.

During the state visit of Myanmar President in India on 12-15 October, 2011, the two sides agreed on "enhancing effective cooperation and coordination between the security forces of the two countries in tackling the deadly menace of insurgency and terrorism". A pact on up gradation of the Yangon Children's Hospital and Sittwe General Hospital was also signed. Another pact was signed for programme of cooperation in science & technology from 2012 to 2015. This is the most important step for good relations between the two countries.

Look-East Policy

India's "Look East" policy, originally aimed at strengthening economic ties with its Southeast Asian neighborhood. Under the aegis of its look-east policy, India's policy toward Burma has changed significantly- from support for the pro-democracy movement to engaging a pro-military government. The policy shift began during the Congress government of Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao in 1991, and was augmented by the Bhartiya Janata Party government under Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee (1998-2004). The salient features of Indian foreign policy vis-à-vis Burma can be summarized under three main subjects: seeking

Burma's help in suppressing insurgency problems in Northeast India, to counter China's growing influence in the region, and to expand its international market in Southeast Asia via Burma.

Myanmar is the gate way and stepping stone in India's 'Look East Policy' which seeks to develop strategic ties with all the Southeast Asian countries, giving India expanded economic, security, and political opportunities. But, there is no significant positive impact of India's look east policies either on Indian side or on Myanmar sides. According to Dr. Tint Swe, India's look east policy has totally failed. While India wants to appease the Myanmar Junta, it also seeks to tell the people of the Northeast that it is implementing development projects for them. For the last two decades, the look east policy has not brought any sustainable development to the people of Northeast India as well as the Burmese people on the other side of the border. India is miscalculating and should realize why the look east policy has been failing nearly after two decades of experience. Under the look east policy of India, first introduced in the early 90s, India began to cosy up to Myanmar's Military Junta by building roads, opening limited border trade between the two countries, providing financial loans, giving technological assistance and even by supplying military hardware.

India has been vigorously pushing for warmer bilateral relationship to counter the growing Chinese influence in Myanmar, and to tame its growing insurgency in its Northeastern states, which use Myanmar's soil as a safe haven to fight against the central government. Despite India's efforts, Myanmar's military Juntas are playing their own game and using India to show the world that it has the support of the largest democracy. But India has not been able to achieve the objectives that it hoped through its look east policy till now.

The recent four-day visit of the President of Myanmar, U Thein Sein to India was significant in many ways. For starters, this is the first visit of the head of an elected civilian government of Myanmar to India after the military Junta gave up power. This visit will further cement the ties between the two countries and will further consolidate India's move to find a foothold in Burma as part of its 'look east policy'.

Economic Importance

Myanmar is India's gateway to ASEAN as it is the only country of this grouping which has a land and maritime boundary with India. With India becoming a summit level partner of ASEAN and a member of the East Asia Summit, improved relations with Myanmar will be beneficial in many respects. Besides, Myanmar and India are members of some sub regional groupings such as the BIMST-EC and the Mekong Ganga Cooperation. China has raised its economic profile in SE Asia, particularly in Myanmar despite the sanctions imposed by the west. India should not be left behind especially in view of the large oil and gas resources

available in Myanmar and which is much needed by India to retain and increase the present economic growth rate of the country.

Security Considerations

The major security considerations are:

- Insurgency in the North Eastern States of India – Some of the insurgent groups have established camps in Myanmar and are operating from Myanmar's territory.
- Smuggling of arms (both through land and sea).
- Drug trafficking and narco-terrorism.
- Illegal immigration from Yunnan into Northern Myanmar and association of Chinese workers in road construction activities

Strategic Importance

The reasons for the strategic importance of Myanmar to India are:

- Myanmar is located at the tri junction of East Asia, South Asia and South East Asia.
- Myanmar is the second largest of India's neighbors and the largest on the eastern flank.
- Myanmar provides the Eastern littoral of the Bay of Bengal. An unfriendly Myanmar hosting foreign naval presence would pose a threat to Indian security.
- Myanmar has a big border with China in the north contiguous with the Sino-Indian disputed border which has many implications.
- India has both a land border (1640 km) and a maritime boundary with Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal. Four Indian states (Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram) border Myanmar (Kachin & Chin states and Sagaing Division)
- China can gain access to Indian Ocean through Myanmar.

Bilateral Trade

Bilateral trade has expanded significantly from US \$ 12.4 million in 1980-81 to US \$ 425 million in 2004-05. India's imports from Myanmar are primarily agricultural and forest

based products (especially beans and pulses) and main exports to Myanmar are primary and semi finished steel and pharmaceuticals. The balance of trade is heavily in favour of Myanmar. The Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) constituted the India-Myanmar Joint Task Force during the “Made in India” show organized by the CII in Yangon in February 2004. It has met often both in India and Myanmar and has helped in giving a big fillip to the bilateral trade. India in the past two decades has tried in several ways to appease the Burmese military government. But despite targeting a US \$ 1 billion trade in 2006-07, it fell short with a trade volume of only at US \$ 650 million. However, Indo-Burmese bilateral trade has been increasing with the trade amount reaching US \$ 557.68 million in 2005-06, which is 25 per cent up from the previous year, 2004-05, when it stood at US \$ 341.40 million. According to the Ministry of Commerce & Industry, India's exports to Burma for the fiscal year 2007-08 accounted for about \$ 185 million, while its imports from Burma is valued at around \$ 810 million, comprising mostly of pulses. Burma thus enjoys a substantial trade surplus with India.

Seeking to expand their economic cooperation and broad-base their trade basket, India and Myanmar agreed at the forth meeting of Joint Trade Commission on 26 September 2011 in New Delhi which was attended by the Union Commerce Minister, Anand Sharma, and the Myanmar commerce minister, U Win Mynint to set a \$ 3 billion trade target to be achieved by 2015 from the existing \$1.5 billion.

India has proposed that both countries work towards doubling bilateral trade by 2015. “We need to work towards broad-basing our trade basket. Let us encourage business on both sides to utilize Duty Free Tariff Preference Scheme and ASEAN FTA channels to diversify trade,” Mr. Sharma said construction of Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project comprising a waterway component by 2013 would completely transform the trade between the North-East India and the rest of the world. The cost of the project is \$120 million and it envisages a direct trade corridor between Indian ports on the Eastern seaboard and Sittwe port in Myanmar and then through river transport and by road to Mizoram, proving an alternative route of transportation of goods to North East India.

The countries also recognized the need to start collaborating to build a Land Customs Station at India-Myanmar Border (Mizoram) to facilitate the movement of vehicles and goods entering and leaving Mizoram. The border trade point at Moreh on the Indian side and the Tamu on the Myanmar side was stabilizing and had immense potential for normal trade. Mr. Sharma invited his counterpart to inaugurate the second border trade point at Zowkhatar Mizoram that would connect to Rhi in Myanmar. Both the ministers stressed the need for working on two additional border trade points-Pangsau Pass (Arunachal Pradesh) and Avangkhang in Nagaland. India and Myanmar have also expanded the list of items for border trade from 22 to 40.

India also informed its assistance to capacity building in agricultural research and improving the seed variety in Myanmar. Indian companies have shown interest in setting up gas-based units and invest in LNG infrastructure and pushed for Indian participation in the allocation of gas blocks in Myanmar. One third of India's imports of pulses and one-fifth of India's timber are from Myanmar. With the implementation of India-ASEAN FTA and the Duty Free Tariff Preference Scheme, Mr. Sharma expressed confidence that India could become one of the leading trade partners of Myanmar. Currently two items-pulses and wood products-accounted 97.5 per cent of Myanmar's total exports to India. Similarly, buffalo meat and pharmaceuticals accounted for 45 per cent of India's total exports to Myanmar.

The Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) has entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (UMFCCI) and the Myanmar Computer Federation. The Government of India has extended a number of general and project specific credit lines to Myanmar in the last few years for improvement of trade relations.

India is one of Myanmar's major trading partners and one of the largest markets for its goods. The most startling fact is that bilateral trade between India and Myanmar has grown more than eighty times in the last twenty eight years. From US\$12.4 million in 1980-81, India-Myanmar trade grew steadily, to reach a level of 995 million US dollars in 2007-08. The actual trade turnover may probably be more if trade via third countries, particularly Singapore, is taken into account.

India's exports to Myanmar, though small, range from primary commodities to manufactured products. Primary and semi-finished steel along with steel bars and rods constitute over one third of India's exports. Indian drugs and pharmaceuticals have also established a significant market presence. India's exports to Myanmar's in 1990 and 2007-08 were 72.16 million dollars and 162.98 million respectively.

India's imports from Myanmar between 1990 and 2007-08 stood at 215.35 million dollars and 809.94 million dollars respectively. The balance of trade is heavily in favour of Myanmar. Myanmar contributes to nearly one fifth of India's imports of timber, second only to Malaysia, as timber and wood products accounted for nearly 30% of Myanmar's exports to India. Myanmar is the second largest supplier of beans and pulses to India, next only to Australia.

Border Trade

The first Border Trade Agreement was signed in Delhi in January 1994 and was implemented in April 1995 with the opening of a cross border point between Moreh (Manipur, India) and Tamu (Sagaing Division, Myanmar). Subsequently both governments had agreed to

open four check posts which include Pangsau pass, Paletwa, Lungwa-Yanyong and Pangsha-Pangnyo between the nations. Opening of border posts will help in checking the border trade and making it official, curb the illegal trade of goods and monitor the activities of the insurgent groups between India and Myanmar.

The border trade which had a spurt in the beginning with export of Indian goods worth Rupees 31 crores and imports from Myanmar worth 15 crores in 1996-97 had declined to a level of Rupees 5 crores in export and import by 2004-05 according to official statistics.

The reasons for decline in the border trade are mainly due to a) rise of popularity of commodities imported from third countries by Myanmar (primarily China) which finds their way into India and b) frequent intimidation and monetary demands by numerous insurgent groups operating in border areas. Tran's border trade has failed to provide any benefit to local people and there are procedural hiccups for obtaining licenses as well.

Border Management

India and Myanmar have regular border post meetings at Moreh-Tamu. It has been agreed to have four more border posts to facilitate army meetings. They are at Lungwa (Mon district-Nagaland), Bihang (Churchandpur district-Manipur) and at Sapi and Zokawathar (Mizoram). A 400 km border with Myanmar is already fenced and is being improved by raising the height. A stretch of 14 km near the international boundary at Moreh has also been planned to be fenced. The fencing is important in view of the rampant narcotic trade along the Indo-Myanmar border.

Infrastructure Projects in Myanmar

The 160 Km India-Myanmar Friendship road on Burmese territory from Tamu to Kalemmyo to Kalewa was built by the Border Roads Organization and completed in 2001. It will also be maintained by India up to March 2008.

India is involved in the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway Project. India has extended project specific credit lines for up gradation of Yangon-Mandalay Trunk line, an optical fibre link between Moreh and Mandalay and ADSL systems in Yangon & Mandalay. Other projects at various stages of completion include construction/up gradation of Rhi-Tidim and Rhi-Falam road sections in Myanmar, the Kaladan Multimodal Transport project and the Tamanthi Hydro Electric power project. India has also offered to help Myanmar in improving its rail links such as the Yangon-Mandalay sector as well as connecting them to rail links on the Indian side.

A media report of June 2006 also indicates that the Indian Commerce Ministry has embarked upon an ambitious project to develop Sittwe port in Myanmar and to open up a sea route connecting it to Mizoram in North East India. For this purpose, the navigable river Kaladon in Mizoram is to be developed.

Oil and Gas

Myanmar has reportedly world's tenth biggest gas reserves estimated to be more than 90 trillion cubic feet. India has evinced keen interest to procure gas from Myanmar. ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) and Gas Authority of India Limited (GAIL) hold 30 % stakes in the exploration and production of gas in Myanmar's A1 and A3 off shore blocks located in Sittwe Area of Arakan State. The earlier proposal to bring the gas in Myanmar by a pipeline through Bangladesh to India had to be dropped because of unreasonable demands from Bangladesh. The latest proposal is to bring the gas through a 1575 Km pipeline (longer than the Bangladesh route) from Sittwe port in Myanmar through Aizwal –Silchar-Guahawti-Siliguri to Gaya linking it to Haldia-Jagadishpur oil pipeline in Gaya (Bihar). India has even offered to buy Myanmar gas and import it through ship till the pipeline is laid.

Military to Military Contacts

As early as 1995, India and Myanmar armies had conducted a joint military operation (called Golden Bird) against some North Eastern insurgent groups (ULFA, NSCN, PLA, PLF& KNA) though this operation was aborted after Aung San Suu Kyi was awarded the Nehru Peace prize for International Understanding. Myanmar resumed its military operations against the insurgents from Feb 2000 to May 2001.

In January 2000, the Chief of Army Staff General V.P.Malik met his counterpart General Maung Aye in Yangon and in Shillong and in turn the Number 2 of the SPDC had visited India twice in 2000. Since then there have been regular visits by the top officials of the three services of the two countries. In 2005-06 all the three Indian services Chiefs had visited Myanmar.

India has offered to provide battlefield training to soldiers and supply uniforms. India had also leased a helicopter squadron and offered help in maintaining Russian military equipment with the Myanmar Army. Since 2003, there have been joint maneuvers with the Myanmar Navy. There have been a number of port calls by the Indian Navy and a few by the Myanmar Navy.

True to the assurances of General Than Shwe during his visit to India in October 2004, the Myanmar Army had conducted military operations against the Indian insurgents operating in their territory in December 2005 and again in 2006. Recently, in a major diplomatic

initiative, India unveiled \$500 million for a host of developmental projects for Myanmar and decided to expand security cooperation with Myanmar that also enjoys close ties with Beijing.

Cooperation between India and Myanmar in Regional/Sub-Regional Context

ASEAN: Myanmar became a member of ASEAN in 1997. As the only ASEAN country which shares a land and maritime boundary with India, Myanmar is the gateway to ASEAN. The Ministry Of External Affairs has indicated that a few proposals for cooperation are under discussion with Myanmar within the framework of ASEAN's IAI Programme. Of these the Myanmar-India Entrepreneurship Development Centre is expected to be launched soon.

Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC): Myanmar became a member of BIMSTEC in 1997. BIMSTEC has identified six sectors of cooperation, for each of which a lead country has been designated. Myanmar is the lead country for the energy sector. Myanmar trades mostly with Thailand and India in the BIMSTEC region. Myanmar's major exports to India are agricultural products like beans, pulses, and maize and forest products such as teak and hardwoods. Its imports are chemical products, pharmaceuticals, electrical appliances and transport equipment.

Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC): Myanmar is a member of the MGC since its inception in 2000. MGC is an initiative by six countries – India and five ASEAN countries namely Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam – for cooperation in the fields of tourism, education, culture, transport and communication.

Forum on Regional Economic Cooperation among Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM): The BCIM initiative has attracted much attention in India, as it has the potential to bring three of India's neighbours closer to a joint pursuit of common prosperity through the increasing use of mechanisms of regional integration. The sixth forum of the BCIM was held in Delhi in March 2006.

The China Factor

At present, India seems to be losing its grip as China has been rapidly strengthening its presence in Myanmar leading to a diplomatic dilemma for the regional power. Myanmar's relations with China have traditionally been cordial. Of significance are the ever-growing Chinese investments in Myanmar and its involvement in mega development projects. China and Myanmar have been close allies since the time PRC came into being. For Myanmar, China's substantial economic, military and political support is vital in view of the sanctions imposed by the west and the mounting pressure by the regional and international forum.

China's huge interest in Myanmar is four fold (1) friendly relations with Myanmar help secure the very important Indian Ocean lane, (2) Myanmar offers an attractive market and transit of their product to India, and (3) China intended foray into the Indian Ocean may be driven by the security of its energy 'life-lines', (4) Myanmar has reportedly the world's tenth biggest gas reserves estimated to be more than 90 trillion cubic feet, and China has evinced keen interest to procure gas from Myanmar. What is significant is that the increasing presence of China in Myanmar denies India the status of security manager and weakens its influence over the South Asian nation. There was a time when India's predominance and hegemony over Myanmar was covertly accepted by the major international actors.

Currently, India seems to prefer diplomatic means to ensure that Myanmar will not be exploited by hostile powers against India's interest. The problem however is that Indian diplomacy so far has failed to arrest or slow down Chinese inroads into Myanmar. It is possible that Myanmar may lean further towards China in the future because Myanmar sees China as a generous and a natural ally. India on the other hand has been perceived as dominating and demanding. This scenario certainly has created a major dilemma in responding to the challenges created by the ever increasing Chinese influence in Myanmar.

The Indo-Myanmar relations since 1948 (when Myanmar became independent) can be considered as cordial and friendly (from 1948-1962), frozen or strained (from 1962-1988) and flourishing since then till date. The reasons for these radical changes in the ties can be attributed to both Myanmar for its isolationist policy adopted by the military Junta regime and to India for its shift from an idealist or moralistic to realistic or pragmatic policy adopted. India's Look East policy has been the main driving force for improvement of relation. The reasons for the strategic importance of Myanmar to India are Myanmar's location at the tri-junction of East Asia, South Asia and South East Asia. It is the second of India's neighbors in size and the largest on the Eastern flank. Moreover, Myanmar provides the Eastern littoral of the Bay of Bengal. Unfriendly Myanmar hosting foreign naval presence would pose a threat to India's security and it has a long border with china in the north contiguous with the Sino-India disputed border which has many implications. India has both land border (1600km) and a maritime boundary with Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal. The most important reason is India's security China can access the Indian Ocean through Myanmar. But India's concern stem from the possibility of China's nuclear submarines, missile-craft and strike aircraft using their bases in countries like Myanmar to threaten India's Eastern parts, sea-lanes and even the A&N Islands- China's espionage attempts are indicated by India's seizure off "Yu Mang Sing" off A&N Islands.

China is the major supplier of military hardware to Myanmar. China's military sales to Myanmar include jet fighters, armoured vehicles and naval vessels valued at around \$ 2 billion. China is helping Myanmar to modernize its naval bases in Hiangyyi, Coco, Akyab, Zadetkyi Kyun, Mergui and Khankphyu. China has a maritime reconnaissance and electronic intelligence

station in Coco islands and is building a base at this location. The ultimate aim is to secure a corridor to the Indian Ocean from South China via Myanmar. Thanks to China, the Myanmar army is the second largest in South East Asia (after Vietnam) and it has expanded from 180000 men to more than 450000. The Chinese have built an all weather road from Kunming in Southern China to Mandalay in Central Myanmar.

In the year 2004, China gave Myanmar \$ 200 million in aid. The trade between the two countries has more than doubled in five years to \$ 1.1 billion in 2004 as per Chinese Government statistics. China is officially Myanmar's third largest trading partner after Singapore and Thailand not taking into account the informal border trade. According to a report in Time (January 30, 2006), "more than \$ 400 million in trade funnels through the Jiegao Border Trade Economic Zone each year. China exports household appliances, chemicals and medicines and Burma ships back jade, sea food and timber". China therefore, as evident from a range of its investments from hydropower to mining to natural gas, is competing India. China, the biggest investor to Burma, invested \$ 10 billion during 2010-2011 fiscal years. New loans worth \$ 7.4 billion have also been announced in the past couple of years.

India is concerned with China's increasing engagement with Myanmar's military junta, especially in improving the naval facilities including the setting up of four electronic listening posts along the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea. Indian Foreign Secretary (prior to the visit of the Indian President) in reply to a question on India-China rivalry replied that "It is not appropriate to look for India-China rivalry at every nook and corner of Asia. The India-Myanmar relations stand on their own" and remains comprehensive in nature.

While India's concerns are understandable, Myanmar must have also realised that it is being stifled by China and must look for an alternative in India particularly in view of India's rising economic potential and mutual strategic and security interests.

Besides Myanmar also playing the balancing game of diplomacy, the goal of the Myanmar government is to be able to cooperate with both India and China. Myanmar needs the support and partnership of both countries for two similar reasons – economy and politics. Besides, Myanmar has been receiving financial assistance from both New Delhi and Beijing. Because of similar interests and geographical proximity to Myanmar, both India and China are likely to remain engaged and continue their investments as well as try to influence Myanmar move. So, both Asian giants are very important to Myanmar and that's why Myanmar also played a balancing game with India and China. Moreover, India has not yet achieved the economic and political profile that China enjoys regionally and globally, India is increasingly bracketed with China as a rising or emerging power or even a global superpower. And China's economic, political and military influence in the country has already become so strong that it would be hard for Yangon radically to reorient its foreign policy.

Hence, China by virtue of intensified presence in Myanmar is challenging India's supremacy in the region and is threat to India's security.

India's Counter Strategy to Chinese Influence to Myanmar

Myanmar and China are natural and close partners. Both countries are dominated by people of Buddhist faith and economically and culturally linked to each other. Besides, China is the main supplier of everything from weapons to food grains to Myanmar. So, India has found it very difficult to counter Chinese influence in Myanmar and India-China frictions are growing, and the potential for conflict remains high.

At first, India had tried to counter China's influence in Myanmar by supporting the country's pro-democracy forces. India should begin to evaluate the strategy for good relation with Myanmar, concerned that it had only served to push Myanmar closer to China and take a greater interest in development work to reduce Myanmar's heavy dependence on China.

To more effectively counter Chinese presence in Myanmar, India will have to seek to have good relations with Vietnam, Taiwan, Japan and other South East Asian countries strategically, diplomatically as well as through trade and commerce. But India's challenge remains formidable.

Conclusion

The relations between India and Myanmar have been chequered with numerous ups and downs. However things have improved since the visit of Senior General Than Shwe in October 2004 and two years later, the then Indian President Abdul Kalam visit to Myanmar. In 2008, Myanmar's second figure Maung Aye visited India. Indian Vice President Ansari and Indian military leaders visited Myanmar last year. Earlier this year, Indian Foreign Secretary and Foreign Minister visited the country. Myanmar's Head of State, Senior General Than Shwe visited India from 25 to 29 July 2010. Recently, the Burmese President Thein Sein paid a visit to India from 12 to 15 October, 2011 with the aim of improving Burma's bilateral relationship with India. And because of these frequent exchanges of visits between senior leaders of the two countries, relations have been on the upswing gaining from strength to strength every year.

India's long term interests may be better served by a democratic regime in Myanmar but the present approach is to help Myanmar in building its democratic institutions without embarrassing or isolating the junta but through official and diplomatic channels.

The strategic and security considerations outweigh India's concern for democracy in Myanmar. Despite India's improving relations with China, the China factor does have an impact on India's relations with Myanmar. However it is also in Myanmar's interests to have

an alternative source in India for its economic betterment. It has been proved beyond doubt that economic sanctions have not deterred the military regime in pursuing its agenda. So diplomatic persuasion and economic aid linked with progress in democratic reforms may be a viable solution. Hence India is perhaps on the right path in engaging the military junta in a constructive manner but should be watchful of the efforts of the other nations in region to introduce a semblance of democracy in Myanmar and because of Burma's strategic location and proximity to China, it is crucial for India to befriend Burma.

So, India is concerned with China's increasing engagement with Myanmar. India has found it difficult to counter Chinese influence in Myanmar, with China selling everything from weapons to food grains to Myanmar. China and Myanmar are natural as well as the closest of partners and China's economic, political and military influence in the country has already become so strong that it would be hard for Myanmar radically to reorient its foreign policy. Besides, with Myanmar also playing balancing game of diplomacy, the goal of the Myanmar government is to be able to cooperate with both India and China. So, Myanmar is critical for India's security, economic, political and territorial integrity at present as well as in future and India's challenge remains formidable.

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The Politics of Regionalism in Jammu and Kashmir (1947-2007)

Surinder Mohan

Abstract

Since its accession to the Indian union, Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) has been facing several inter-state and intra-state upheavals. As an enduring inter-state problem between India and Pakistan, J&K attracted enormous international attention but comparatively its intra-state hostility got a lesser notice. This article, by delving into the historic debate of the politics of regionalism, explores the Kashmir-centric leadership and New Delhi's calculated denial of other two regions, Jammu and Ladakh's, genuine demands. The article argues that both governments' approach of denial is the major reason behind J&K's prolonging intra-state dispute which, through internal chaos, is maintaining a cycle of unbridgeable "regional-paradox". In this context, the article argues that calculated rifts have been institutionalised in J&K's political system which constantly causes crises to recur. This discussion re-examines J&K's regional problem, however, it is based on the historical record rather than abstract theories of regional politics.

Key Words: Regionalism; Kashmir; Jammu; Ladakh; political crisis; intra-state conflict; politico-regional tensions.

Introduction

The state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), since its merger in the Indian union, has been facing several inter-state and intra-state upheavals. Within the state, regionalism is one among various longstanding issues which made its three distinct regions: Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh, longstanding enduring rivals (Evans 2001:170; 2005:35-36). Due to Jammu and Ladakh's persistent hostility with Kashmir region, some scholars have established J&K as "a complex" state. However, the reasons cited for this complexity go beyond the geographic dissimilarities of the state because "its population is divided into a bewildering multiplicity of religious, ethnic, linguistic and cast groups." In reality, its three regions majority communities: viz, Hindu, Muslim and Buddhist, have self-motivated political angularities and orientations against each other which, finally, divides the state "internally along fault-lines of region, ethnicity, language, caste and political affiliation" (Bose 1999:153).

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In the post-independence period, once the institutionalisation process began in J&K, however, the progress of mass politicisation was extended to all regions. But the Kashmiri leadership's forefront role, during pre-independence period, against the autocratic rule of the Dogras helped Kashmir to emerge as the centre of attraction and power (Puri 1981:91). Since 1947, the continuous growth of regional consciousness within the state strengthened and hyphenated socio-political differences which are, among several other, critical source of persisting tensions (Bose 2001:56).

After acquiring political power, the National Conference replicated the logic of the modern nation state with all its instrumentalities. The Kashmiri leadership "sought the status of an autonomous republic in the Indian union to safeguard and nurture the interests of the Kashmiris". But within the state, it "reverse[d] the logic... Kashmiris—the majority community—were reluctant to share political power" with other two regions: Ladakh and Jammu (Behera 2007:108). Further, Sheikh Abdullah "underlined the need to *unify* all the people of the state under the single banner of Kashmiri identity". This imposition was not accepted in Jammu and Ladakh on the ground of regional identities—as Kashmir was identified with the people who were linguistically "Kashmiri speaking" (Behera 2000:82).

After merger into the Indian union, , the J&K Constituent Assembly created a unitary state with a clear concentration of powers in the Valley through disproportionate representation of other two regions in the Constituent Assembly and the state assembly (Bamzai 1962:789-88). At present, Jammu consists of a land area of 26,293 square kilometres with 45 percent of the state's total population. But it has only 37 members in the legislative assembly, nine members less than Kashmir region (Election Commission of India 2002).¹ The pre-1990 data shows that the Kashmir Valley returns one member for 89,353 inhabitants, where Jammu returned one for 95,620. In parliamentary elections, Jammu returned one member for more than 1.75 million people compared with one member for 1.33 million people in the Valley. However, Ladakh constituted nearly 60 percent of the state's area (95,876² square kilometres), but due to its 2.27 percent share in the total population it has only 4 seats in the state assembly (Government of Jammu and Kashmir 2007; Tremblay 1992:156). However, the last two census surveys, 2001 and 2011 have shown that more than a couple of the decade's disparity between the two regions has been abridged to a certain extent. At present, the population proportion is tilted towards Kashmir (see table 1) but the average population per constituency is somewhat equal. Now the average population per constituency between Kashmir and Jammu regions is in accordance with the present seat sharing. But it took several decades to reach this position.

Table1: Average population and area per constituency in J&K

Region	Total Seats	Population			Average people/seat			Area in sq. km	Average/sq. km
		2011	2001	Pre-1990	2011	2001	Pre-1990		
Kashmir	46	6907623	5476970	4010202	150166	112543	89353	15948	347
Jammu	37	5350811	4430191	3537957	144616	119735	95620	26293	711
Ladakh	4	290492	236539	170541	72623	59135	42635	59146	14786
Total	87	1254892	10143700	7718700	122468	97138	88709	101387	1165

Source: Government of India (2011) and for pre-1990 data Behera (2000:220).

Kashmiri Domination and Jammu's Response: 1947-1953

Since 1947, politically and constitutionally, the checks and balances in the state have been lacking. Sheikh Abdullah built a “monolith structure” based on “one party state”³; “one organisation”; “one leader”; and “one constitution”. The meaning of this classified structure was simple: one party rule by the National Conference under Sheikh Abdullah’s leadership with its manifesto *Naya Kashmir* (as the constitution of the state) (Puri 1968:221; 2003:5143). In the initial days of accession, this type of structural set up gave Kashmiris room to dominate the state and calculated perusal to deny the rightful share of non-Kashmiris within the power structure. Sheikh Abdullah focused more on the turmoil of the state and maintained that “it [is] unrealistic to talk of parliamentary opposition...when Kashmir itself [is] going through a critical phase...[and] the National Conference [is] the only political party which could deliver goods” (Singh 1980: 63). Therefore, representation of Jammu and Ladakh was not given importance under the National Conference which had no base in nearly half of the state and ninety percent of the non-Kashmiri region.

On the other side, in short, the centre failed to preserve the rights of non-Kashmiris. In 1951, during the first election for the Constituent Assembly, the National Conference rejected opposition candidates on technical grounds and thus denied Jammu a voice in the assembly. Instead of shaping and strengthening the political institutions, it subverted the democratic process of the state. Due to unreasonable rejection of opposition candidates, with New Delhi’s nod, the National Conference won cent per cent assembly seats (Korbel 1966:221-22; Ganguly 1996:95). Scholars note that Sheikh Abdullah used the state apparatus extensively for patronising the National Conference “as the party and administration were two wheels of the same vehicle and hence were inseparable”. Thus Abdullah started empowering “the *majority community*—the Kashmiri Muslims—by giving them jobs and land” which were *denied* to

them during the pre-independence period by the Hindu ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh (Behera 2000:83; Puri 1981:95; Coapland 1981:233-35). The “termination of hereditary rule and the abolition of landlordism without compensation”⁴ “threatened the interests” of upper-caste Hindus and of the Maharaja over the fertile land of the state (Lyon 1967:113). To legitimise his government’s actions, Abdullah published periodic data of communal representation and composition in state staff,⁵ thus imposing statistical legitimacy to silence his critics (see Ledejinsky 1952:185; Bamzai 1962:787-89; Ganguly 1996:96). In similar manner, Behera notes that Abdullah’s regime continued its policy of non-Kashmiris alienation throughout its initial period:

The print and electronic media in the state were employed for propagating the National Conference policies. The government has established a community broad casting system, ‘tuned to radio Kashmir fixed and sealed’.... [The] school text books were rewritten and several social education centres educated the public about [National Conference’s] ideology of *Naya Kashmir*. Most of newspapers were government controlled or strictly censored. Overall, the unitary nature of Jammu and Kashmir state structures and the parochial policies of the National Conference government favouring the Valley in political, economic and administrative matters left Jammu and Ladakh feeling neglected and marginalised (Behera 2000:84) (Emphasis added).

On the other side, the exodus of the Muslim Conference cadres and the deportation of key leaders, after the 1947 raiders attack followed by informal division of the state, left a political ‘vacuum’ in the Jammu province (Puri 1981:93-94; see also Behera 2000:2007). Subsequently, the National Conference never allowed any political opposition to take root either by joining hands with them or by rejecting their legitimacy. Finally, this political vacuum was filled by the Praja Parishad—a brainchild of Balraj Madhok⁶—which was ideologically close to the Rashtriya Swayamasevak Sangh (RSS) (Behera 2000:84; Jaffrelot 2009:199-235).

However, like RSS, the Praja Parishad used religious theory to challenge Abdullah’s political moves. It accused Sheikh Abdullah for three reasons: (1) over the issue of Islamisation of administration; (2) for his government decision of closure of the Sanskrit Research Department; and (3) his government’s decision on language which made Urdu compulsory for all—despite Jammu region’s affinity with Hindi and Dogri. Moreover, before initiating “agrarian reforms” the National Conference pre-calculated the Dogra Hindu and Muslim benefit that fundamentally altered “the pattern of social organisation of the state to [Jammu’s] disadvantage” (Gupta 1966:366). In order to reduce the Kashmiri dominance, the Praja

Parishad responded by demanding J&K's complete integration with the Indian union. As a result, in 1952, a popular agitation was launched against Abdullah's rule and existence of J&K's separate constitution within the Indian union. The Parishad raised its demands in the form of a nine point programme, that were against the National Conference's policy program: (1) "the abrogation of Article 370"; (2) J&K's full merger into the India union; (3) full implementation of the Indian Constitution; (4) no differentiation between state subjects and Indian citizens; (5) Supreme Court of India's complete jurisdiction over the state; (6) removal of custom barriers between the state and the centre; (7) "fresh elections to the Kashmir Constituent Assembly"; (8) investigation of corruption charges against state officials by an impartial tribunal; and (9) Jammu and Ladakh's merger with the Indian union, "if not of the whole state" (Tremblay 1992:160).

Over the next few months, Praja Parishad's slogan of *Ek Vidhan, Ek Nishan, Aur Ek Pradhan* (one constitution, one flag and one Prime minister) were echoing in the streets of Jammu. It was followed by the Parishad's early morning processions (*Prabhat Pheris*) which raised the most popular slogan of Jammu: "*Ek desh main do vidhan, do nishan, do pradhan, nahin chalenga, nahin chalenga* (in one country, two constitution, two flags, two chief's will not work, will not be tolerated)" (Akbar 2002:143; Puri 1981:98). Parishad effectively organised and mobilised the Jammu locals especially students. The Abdullah administration was harsh on the Parishad agitators due to which several protesters died on the spot. Despite this, the Praja Parishad, remained focused to question Abdullah and his logic-paradox:

If Sheikh Abdullah hated the Two-Nations Theory and his principles were the same as those of the Indian polity, then where was ground for not accepting a full accession? Where was the need for a state constitution as distinct from a national constitution? Why should Sheikh Abdullah retain the title of Prime Minister from the royal dynasty – if he had fought the Princely system and already unseated the Maharaja, if other heads of state governments all over India were called Chief Ministers, and if the title of Prime Minister is reserved only for the head of the national government in New Delhi? What was the rationale for having a separate state flag (as in princely times) instead of a national flag that all other Indian States had? Why should an Article 370 exist, giving the state a special status, even though other princely states had acceded fully without any constitutionally sanctioned provisions? (Mookerjee *et al*, n.d.).

As a consequence of severe opposition, Sheikh Abdullah, under the Delhi Agreement, accepted the restricted jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the national flag along with state's own and, a limited application and applicability of fundamental rights (Tremblay 1992:160-161). In 1952-53, under the leadership of Shyama Prasad Mookherjee, the Parishad's cause for Jammu was on rise. But his untimely death in Srinagar jail⁷ complicated the matters and proved a severe blow to a well organised movement. Mookherjee's death acted as catalyst for Jammu's regional cause. It generated anti-Abdullah demonstrations in various parts of state and north Indian cities with slogans like "*Ghaddar Abdullah ko Phansi Do*" [emphasis added]. To this vehement opposition of Hindu nationalists, Abdullah responded strongly. He said, "if he could fight Muslim communalism of Pakistan, he would give a similar fight to Hindu communalists in India" (Puri 2003:5144).

In the short run, however, "Mookerjee's demise attracted wide publicity in India where the affairs of...Jammu and Kashmir became the subject of public debate with a widely accepted belief that he had been murdered" (Lamb 1993:198). But in reality, due to Mookerjee's demise both New Delhi and Srinagar felt relived. In 1953, after Mookerjee's death, whatever charisma the well groomed movement had, immediately disappeared when the Jan Sangh and the Praja Parishad jointly rolled it back in favour of government's invitation for negotiation. They accepted Balraj Puri's "devolutionists" position rather than their old integrationist agenda. Finally, the Praja Parisad failed to continue its movement and restricted itself to its limited social base in those areas where the National Conference was not popular. On the other hand, after land reforms, the low caste Hindus and Muslims from Jammu region turned in favour of Abdullah. As a result, within Jammu region, Abdullah's pure politics confined Parishad to a small section of society: the Hindu landlords; *jagirdars*; and *sahukars* (money lenders), whose support (Behera 2007:111), was not sufficient to raise the level of a protest required against a well defined and deep rooted political party—the National Conference.

Ladakh's Grievances: 1947-1953

The Buddhist majority Ladakh was also not satisfied with the transfer of power from the Maharaja to Kashmiri domination but the Shi'ite Muslims, who dominated the Kargil *tehsil* of Ladakh, were in support of Kashmiri administration. The Buddhists of Leh were against identifying themselves with the Kashmiris and, simultaneously, wanted the protection of their distinct religion and culture. Thus, they were alienated by the iniquitous power structure and partisan policies of Sheikh's government. The Muslim refugees in the Valley received sufficient state aid, but no resources were sanctioned for rehabilitating the Buddhist refugees of

Zanskar area, nor was any financial aid given to reconstructing and restoring the *gompas*. The small relief provided by the Government of India never reached Zanskar; it was distributed among the Muslims of Suru Karste in Kargil *tehsil* (Koul and Koul 1992:183). Even the agrarian reforms targeted the *gompas* which was strongly criticised by the Buddhist clergy and, eventually, they were rescued only after Nehru's intervention.

The decision of the National Conference government to impose Urdu in the Ladakhi schools along with discontinuation of scholarships for backward areas children were highly condemned by the Ladakhi Buddhist community. Moreover, the grants-in-aid for three schools run by Shias, Sunnis and Buddhists provided by the Dogra Maharaja was resented. In the first budget, no allocation was made for Ladakh's development. Kushak Bakula, Ladakh's representative in the assembly, strongly protested for not even mentioning the name of Ladakh in the budget (Puri 1981:97; Koul and Koul 1992:183). On 4 May 1949, Cheewang Rigzine—the President of Ladakh Buddhist Association (LBA)—submitted a memorandum to Prime Minister Nehru. It conveyed that Ladakh is not bound by a decision of the plebiscite and would like to be governed directly by India or be integrated with the Hindu majority Jammu after forming a new/different state or be merged with East Punjab. He even reminded Nehru if India would fail in all options then Ladakhis would be forced and left with a final option—to rejoin Tibet⁸ (Behera 2000:89). Finally, the National Conference accepted the demand for a central administrator but, in practice, this was never implemented.

The Issue of Internal Autonomy

The National Conference members in Ladakh and Jammu sought internal autonomy from Kashmir Valley. In 1950, Balraj Puri, a prominent pro-autonomy activist, individually submitted a memorandum to Nehru demanding internal autonomy and devolution of powers to small regions. In response, the Praja Parishad was ready to withdraw its movement provided New Delhi extended the principle of autonomy to Jammu and Ladakh (Puri cited in Lockwood 1969; Mookerjee *et al.* n.d:88-94). Similarly, the Ladakh unit of the National Conference called for the institution of an elected statutory advisory committee for Ladakh whereby, without prior notice, no measures affecting the political, economic or religious life of Leh *tehsil* would be approved by the Constituent Assembly. Ladakh demanded the following:

- “adequate representation in the legislature and civil service”;
- “establishing the Panchayat and Ruler Development Departments”;

- “a Ministry of Ladakh Affairs headed by a popularly elected Ladakhi member of the Legislative Assembly”;
- “development funds for constructing roads and canals and promoting agriculture and horticulture”; and
- “replacement of Kashmiri people by local personnel” (Behera 2000:90).

Kushak Bakula argued that Ladakh would bear the same status with Kashmir as Kashmir has with India. Further Ladakhis wanted Bodhi—the mother tongue of the Ladakhis—to be made the medium of instruction for school education and training in medicine, law, engineering, agriculture and forestry. Initially, Sheikh Abdullah and Nehru shared their view over this complexity and agreed by granting limited regional autonomy to Jammu and Ladakh. The basic principle committee of the Constituent Assembly was entrusted with this task which prepared a plan to establish five autonomous regions: Kashmir Valley, Jammu, Gilgit, Ladakh and a region comprising the districts of Mirpur, Rajouri, Poonch and Muzaffarabad, where each would have an executive head and council of ministers responsible to the provincial legislature. However, the plan was soon abandoned without any reason and clarification (see Bushan 1985:185). As the head of the state, Abdullah refused to lend his ears to the legitimate demands of Jammu and Ladakh. In October 1968, however, Abdullah organised a State People’s Convention in order to bridge the gap of confidence and to build unanimous “consensus between conflicting viewpoints” of regional leadership (Lockwood 1969:395). But the weeklong conference failed to yield any result, where, interestingly, Jammu and Ladakhi leaders were demanding the same privilege from Abdullah which he fought against the Maharaja and demanded from India.

The scuffle between three regions began when contrasting ideologies intersected each other i.e. the Praja Parishad’s approval of Dixon Plan for division of state through regional plebiscite, Balraj Puri’s lone voice for regional autonomy, Kushak Bakula’s ultimatum to respect Ladakhi grievances or their merger with Tibet, and Abdullah’s dual-policy to achieve more by paying less. With these demands, the conflict between differing identities and regions within the state proved yet another ‘Pandora’s box’; overflowing with divisions and regional aspirations which doomed the collective interest of J&K. As Kashmir region failed to achieve an independent Kashmir; Jammu and Ladakh attained neither regional political autonomy from dominating Kashmiris nor a complete merger in the Indian union (Puri 1981; Behera 2000).

Regional Policy under Bakshi and After

After Abdullah's removal from office, Ghulam Mohammad Bakshi started trying to create a balance in the regional politics. In the Jammu region, he stopped suppressing the Praja Parishad against the Abdullah group and by including non-Brahmins as representatives in the party positions. This move by Bokshi stopped Parishad to strengthen its base. Therefore he seized the Parishad as well as the emergence of other secular organisations. Likewise, he weakened the Abdullah group's power dynamics by taking a pro-India stance. Conversely, when secular parties like the Praja Socialist Party and the Democratic National Conference (in 1954 and 1958 resp.) tried to challenge him, he denounced them by questioning their rationality and levelled them as "instruments of Indian interference in Kashmir" (Puri 1966:230; Behera 2000:109-10).⁹ Bakshi used every coercive instrument to suppress the opposition's movements. He assured that the rights and privileges secured for the state, as a whole, would be shared in equal measures by the people of different regions.

Both in the government and party leadership, however, Jammu and Ladakh were better represented throughout his regime. In 1957, two out of six ministers were from Jammu and Ladakh was represented by Kushak Bakula as a Deputy Minister of Ladakh Affairs¹⁰ for the first time. In comparison to the total neglect of the Abdullah government, Ladakh better during Bakshi's regime. During the Second Plan (1956-1961), his government invested Rs 86.65 lakh in the region's development. However his government did not initiate any major agricultural, industrial or power generation projects. But his government treated Jammu in equal terms to Ladakh. Therefore, both Jammu and Ladakh continued their uproar against Kashmiri dominance (Behera 2000:111). In 1966, the Jammu Autonomy Forum (JAF) was formed which demanded internal political autonomy. The JAF was ideologically close to the Indian Socialist Movement and was also supported by the Jammu and Kashmir Youth National Conference (Puri 1983:36). In its memoranda, the JAF demanded: (1) democratisation of the state political structures; (2) a neutral civil administration distinct from the National Conference Organisation; and (3) economic amelioration through a planned economic policy (Behera 2000:118).

Due to the lack of collative response of all political players in Jammu, this massive movement also failed. The Plebiscite Front blamed the centre for this move to divide the state. In response, the Congress party surprised all by blaming foreign forces behind JAF's legitimate demands. Finally, to break the dead-lock, a new group was formed—the Ekta Front. To solve the issue, on linguistic and religious line, some influential upper-caste Hindu elites suggested a

formula of trifurcation of the state, like: merging Jammu into Himachal Pradesh; and giving Ladakh a unitary status or being directly administered by New Delhi (Samaddar 2001:68; Bose 2001:57). Through communal polarisation, a majority of Kashmiri leadership wanted to consolidate their Muslim support by integrating Muslim majority areas and eventually to get rid of the Hindu part of Jammu by grooming an idea called “Greater Kashmir” which favoured the state’s division on the basis of communal fault lines (Puri 1981:193-95). These formulas were highly criticised by almost every major organisation. At last, the JAF’s objectives emerged as the lasting solution. In contrast, the new chief minister, Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq, rejected both formulas (Karan Singh’s and the JAF’s) and used the state machinery to suppress these demands (Koul and Koul 1992:220; Puri 1983:42-44).

On the other hand, the people in Ladakh were very unhappy with Sadiq’s move of withdrawing the central administration.¹¹ The Buddhist Action Committee (BAC) also demanded the status of Schedule Tribe; a full cabinet ministry; a settlement of Tibetan Buddhist refugees in Ladakh; and compulsory introduction of Bodhi language as compulsory up to high school. The state government, however, introduced only a cabinet minister in the government and it refused to deal with the rest of demands due to fear of the Kargil based group, the Muslim Action Committee (MAC) (Koul and Koul 1992:231). In 1967, these actions forced Kushak Bakula to submit a memorandum to revive the old scheme. Sadiq responded by promoting new leadership against the Buddhist’s of Leh by supporting Kushak Thiksey against Kushak Bukula and favoured Muslim leadership of Kargil. Sadiq’s politics paid dividend when two differing communities of the same region got divided (on the basis of politico-religious dominance of Kargil’s Muslims).¹²

In order to completely shut out every move of secular organisation to challenge his regime, Sadiq—like Bakshi—divided the Jammu community by fuelling the Jan Sangh which harmed the region’s secular demands. For this genuine service, as a reward Sadiq extended some power to the Jan Sangh. Thereby, he successfully clinched his narrow political aims and the Jan Sangh got a share in appointments, promotions and transfers of the government employees in Jammu region (Behera 2000:119-20). In order to reduce regional tensions, Sadiq appointed the Jammu and Kashmir Commission of Inquiry, headed by P. B. Gajendragadkar (known as the Gajendragadkar Commission) to recommend the measures for equitable sharing of resources among the three regions.¹³ The commission reported:

The Jammu [and] Kashmir state has been a single political entity for over a hundred years, it cannot be denied that geographically, ethnically, culturally and historically, it

is composed of three separate homogeneous regions, namely Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh.... Even if all the matters were equitably settled...there would still be a measure of discontent unless the political aspirations of the different regions of the state were satisfied. In fact...the main cause of irritation and tension is the feeling of political neglect and discrimination, real or imagined, from which certain regions of the state suffer (Puri 1983:51-52).

The commission further recommended setting up statutory regional development boards for the three regions and political conventions such as equal number of cabinet ministers from Jammu and the Valley; a full-fledged cabinet minister for Ladakh; and the deputy chief minister representing different region (*Ibid* :52). Although, the Sadiq government set-up boards comprising the experts and civil servants, but it failed to implement the commission's major suggestions.

Under Sheikh Abdullah's Second Tenure

After resuming power in 1975, Sheikh Abdullah again took a U-turn like his numerous past reiterations. Instead of fulfilling the commitments recommended by the Gajendra gadkar Commission—to create federal structures and recognising the constitutional set up—he continued his old policy of alienation against the people of Jammu and Ladakh through inadequate share and by refusing from his commitments like, regional autonomy. After little relief from 1953-1973, due to this unwillingness to share political power with non-Kashmiris, the state again turned chaotic. In the 1977 state elections, Abdullah tried to restore the Kashmiri autonomy which he lost in the 1975 Accord. The National Conference openly campaigned against the Janata Party by rousing communal slogans, like: voting for the Janata Party is like voting for the Jan Sangh; Janata's victory would be dangerous for Islam, etc (Behera 2000:140-43). For electoral politics, with this political appeal, Abdullah reminded the Jinnah of 1940s' and his two-nations-theory's relevance. As a result, Sheikh Abdullah managed victory by opening "the gates for the large-scale use of religion in mass politics", a weapon others followed afterwards¹⁴ (Swami 2008). He raised his voice in favour of Kashmiris and, as a result, swept Kashmir. But, in Jammu region, this hypothesis acted conversely where all National Conference candidates were humiliated by being defeated in all constituencies (Varshney 1992:221).

After election, in early 1978, students were demonstrating and complaining against irregularities in recruitment of teachers. But the administration reacted harshly and some

students died in police firing. This incident again proved to be another flash point and generated massive regional demonstrations. Soon Abdullah took a U-turn when the Jammu based political leadership formed All-Party Jammu Action Committee (APJAC) to challenge the government. On 26 December 1978, the APJAC adopted a unanimous resolution demanding statutory, political and democratic set-ups at the regional, district, block and *panchayat* level. In sum, this movement enlarged the scope of regional autonomy. Abdullah denounced the movement by levelling it “against Kashmiris” and refused to initiate any dialogue on the question of “regional imbalances” (*Hindustan Times*; cited in Behera 2000). He dismissed the demand for internal autonomy and maintained that Jammu is getting more than its due share on the basis of government figures of allocation of funds (see table 2).

Table 2: Development Allocation to Jammu, the Valley and Ladakh (1975-79)

F .Year	Due outlay (Rs lakhs)			Actual outlay (Rs lakhs)		
	Jammu	Kashmir	Ladakh	Jammu	Kashmir	Ladakh
1975-76	1,725.77	2,025.17	87.53	1,812.59	1,753.88	271
1976-77	2,256.78	2,648.30	114.45	2,217.06	2,308.47	360
1977-78	3,217.80	3,776.05	163.2	3,102.83	3,584.22	470
1978-79	4,107.99	4,820.68	208.3	4,431.84	4,012.99	692.14
Total	11,308.34	13,270.20	573.48	11,564.32	11,659.56	1,793.14

Source: Behera (2000:146).

Finally, to resolve the matter students, the APJAC and the state government respected veteran leader Jaya prakash Narayan’s appeal of harmony and peace. However, Jammu lost due to lack of unity and unbridgeable differences over effective demands. All political groups took eight long months to reach a final decision—by the time movement lost its momentum. The Jan Sangh was blamed by Puri’s group for an underground deal with the government, as it had not taken Puri’s faction of APJAC in confidence (Puri 1993:39). Though this movement failed, it yielded result when a commission was formed, headed by Justice S. M. Sikri, to suggest the measures for readdressing regional imbalances in development allocations, government services and admissions in professional institutions along with constitutional nuances to satisfy regional aspirations. The Sikri Commission recommended setting up a State Development Board headed by the Chief Minister. It also formulated a formula for financial allocation to the regions based on their population, area, backwardness and natural resources. For the public services, the Commission advised the government against reservation on the basis of community, caste and district. It also recommended the scrapping of interviews for admissions

in professional institutions. But, like its predecessor, this report also met the same fate—the government never implemented it (Behera 2000:147).

Similar to the 1978 Jammu incident, an incident took place in Ladakh, where police fired and lathi charged Buddhist agitators “against the decision of the district authority to transfer a diesel generator from Zaskar to Kargil”. The Ladhaki leadership, like Jammu’s APJAC, also formed All-Party Ladakh Action Committee (APLAC) and demanded regional autonomy (*Ibid* :148-49). In January 1981, the APLAC launched a regional level agitation against the Abdullah government. To look into their grievances, Abdullah appointed a ministerial sub-committee to substantiate their demands: installation of ‘hydroelectric projects, improved communication, adequate reservation of seats in professional institutions, marketing facilities, construction of small dams, industrial development, tourism, transport facilities, irrigation projects, development of culture and language, and the status of Scheduled Tribe for Ladakhis’. The Abdullah government promised to forward their demands and request for more grants from the Centre (*Ibid*). On the other hand, to put pressure on the state government, Ladakhi representatives met the Prime Minister and conveyed their grievances.¹⁵

Agenda of Jammu and Ladakh: Insurgency Period (1989-2007)

After 1989, the state witnessed growing communalisation of political idiom and strategies. In Leh, the trouble began with a minor scuffle between Buddhist and some Muslim youth which sparked large scale violence between the two communities. The Ladakh Buddhist Association (LBA) demanded that Ladakh should be given separate constitutional status as union territory and accused the ‘Kashmiri Sunni Muslims’, who dominate administration and business, for influencing local Muslims against Buddhists in the region. Again, this agitation fuelled the old demands, like the underrepresentation of Ladakhis in the state services.¹⁶

Allegedly, however, there is an intra-regional angle besides New Delhi’s partiality. The Valley of Kashmir, a bone of contention between India and Pakistan, is compared with the rest of J&K state. This gives the people of Jammu a reason to complain. According to them most of the central aid is consumed by the Valley, though the ratio of population in both regions was more or less the same for almost five decades (see Government of Jammu and Kashmir 1994). Only in the recent times has the population dynamics begun to take a major shift in the Valley’s favour (see table 1 for clarification). Likewise, the sales tax collection (in 1994-95) from Jammu amounted to Rs770 million; but the Valley’s share was only Rs120 million. The income tax collection was almost zero in the Valley and normal in Jammu. Regarding this situation, the

president of the Jammu Chamber of Commerce, Ram Sahai said: "It is almost as though we are being penalised for being loyal to India, while those who subvert the country are rewarded" (Nalapat 1996; also see Jamwal 1996; Om 1996). A 1988 study revealed another contrary fact that while more than 95 percent of the Valley's villages were electrified, Jammu's share was not satisfactory (Raza 1996:100). Against this background, i.e. the economic disparity, the resolution for the state autonomy failed to yield support from Jammuities and Ladakhis. On 26 June 2000, contrary to Kashmir Valley both regions vehemently opposed it.

Against Jammuities and Ladakhis accounts, however, several scholars also refer to the other side of the story which depicts the apathetic socio-economic situation of the Muslims in the Valley vis-à-vis Pandits and Dogras (particularly, Pandit community's over-representation in the public and banking sector jobs) (Jha 1991:34-37). Ghosh explores another angle to inter-regional hostility. His analysis breaks the part-fact and part-fiction cycle by shedding light on J&K's strange complexity:

It may not, however, be fully correct to see the economic problem of [J&K] in regional terms. While Srinagar and Jammu districts are relatively developed than the rest of the state's...hilly districts in all the three regions of Kashmir, Jammu and Ladakh.... Geographical, resource endowments and technological factors constitute the basic causes of the intra-regional variations. Secondary and tertiary economic activities are mainly concentrated in Srinagar and Jammu districts. Growth impulses are weak or even absent in other districts. The maximum labour force is dependent on primary activities. Long winter months in the Kashmir region and some sub-regions in Jammu hinder not only early maturity of crops but cause large scale seasonal unemployment (Ghosh 2002:13).

During his term, Farooq Abdullah systematically dismantled the Ladakh Affairs Department and other related development forums. Moreover, he gave a meagre representation to the Buddhists of Ladakh in his cabinet. This led to the communalisation of a region which in the past, despite religious differences, witnessed cooperation. The Buddhist agitators called a boycott of the Kashmiri Muslims and forced them to flee the Leh market after closing their business. The LBA raised the slogan "free Ladakh from Kashmiris" and demands. They blamed the Kashmiri ruler for this planned and systematic hypocrisy and erosion of their culture. The Kashmir Valley reciprocated and a number of Buddhist students and businessmen were forced to leave the Valley.

Finally, both communities stopped their mutual meetings and inter religious marriages. The LBA sought to build bridges with a Hindu ideologue, the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), in order to press the Centre for its demand in October 1989, after a series of talks between the Ladhaki leaders, the LBA leadership agreed to compromise and withdrew its demand in favour of the Autonomous Hill Council. This demand was revived in 1991 when the Congress government again came into power. In 1992, the LBA reached an agreement with the Ladakh Muslim Association (LMA) to achieve a new demand—the Hill Council. Finally on 9 May 1995, the P. V. Narasimha Rao government passed the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Council Act, which provided an autonomous council each for Leh and Kargil, and an inter-district council to advise them on matters of common interest (Behera 2007:117-18). But the restricted and overlapped power of the Hill Council—with other authorities and the state government—again failed to satisfy the Ladakhis. Thus, once more, they revived their old and original demand for the status of Union Territory. Before the 2002 assembly elections, according to a new strategy, the Ladakhi Buddhist leadership resigned from Farooq's government. In the mean time, all other political leaders resigned from their respective parties' viz. Congress, National Conference and BJP by reorganising their own organisation—the Ladakh Union Territory Front (LUTF).

After suffering political and economic neglect at the hands of successive state governments, the several decade old separate statehood demand of Jammuites resurfaced. The Jammu Mukhti Morcha (JMM), a Hindu regional outfit backed by the RSS and other right wing organisations, demanded the trifurcation of the state to “end the sense of deprivation and identity crisis of the people of Jammu and Ladakh regions” (see Madhok 1987; Grover n.d.). It maintained that, “Ladakh can be given the Union Territory status and Jammu can get identity of a separate state”. The JMM justified its demands by citing the logic of self-sufficiency: i.e. the “region has enough industrial, tourism, hydro electric and agricultural potential to meet its basic needs” (*Hindu* 2004). It raised the issues of Jammu's poor representation in the secretariat services.¹⁷ It blamed successive Valley-dominated state governments' for Jammu's poor share in the state services. According to it, in the civil secretariat, Jammu's representation was less than 10 per cent (Grover n.d.). Some reports maintained that “95 per cent jobs, right from Class IV to the secretary level, in the civil secretariat are in the hands of Kashmiris” (*Tribune* 2007). According to Behera, the approximate “proportion of the employees from the Valley and Jammu in the State Secretariat and regional services were 99:8 and 99:1 respectively”, this justifies the JMM activist's grievances. Additionally, “All 12 corporations of the [J&K] government had their headquarters in Srinagar with almost 100 per cent of the employees from the Valley”. On the basis of “a statement made in the State Assembly in 1988-89, some 43,000

out of 69,000 registered unemployed youth belonged to the Jammu region. Of the state's tourism budget, nearly 90 per cent was spent on the Valley every year" (Behera 2002).

This disparity is maintained and supported by even separatist leaders. On 7 June 2007, the Kashmir Administrative Services (KAS) list of selected candidates was released which had more candidates from the Jammu region than from the Valley. Against Jammu region's parity over Kashmir, Sajad Lone, the Peoples Conference chairman, threatened to launch an agitation to stop the process of 'reducing the Kashmiris to minority in the fields of politics, academics and bureaucracy'. He even threatened to initiate a civil disobedience movement by *gheraoing* the civil secretariat if the administrative services list was not cancelled (*Tribune* 2007). In Jammu region, however, like previous failed tactics and movements (of the Jan Sangh and the Parishad), the JMM formulated many differences to grab votes from the Jammu region but failed to generate mass movement and ended up by confining itself to strikes and memorandums. Another major blow to this movement came from within when the Jammu State Morcha (JSM) as an electoral face, with proper RSS backing, emerged to contest 2002 elections. It divided BJP's Hindu vote and ended up helping the Congress party to win most of Jammu's seats. In the assembly, instead of increasing the voice of a separate statehood, it reduced right wing organisations representation to negligible levels. However, the Congress benefited from its stand on Jammu region's chief minister after Mufti Mohammad Sayeed's tenure.¹⁸ PDP however tried to retain power by raising the old traditional logic, 'an ethnic Kashmiri must be at the helm of power'.

Conclusion: The Road Ahead

To embark on the path of regional peace and harmony, the state government and New Delhi must first understand that the pursuit of a monolithic state system is not accommodative. Therefore, it is not congruent to the regional aspirations of Jammu and Ladakh. On their part, both these regions look at the Kashmir region as a client of the Central government. Undoubtedly, Kashmir strengthens India's secular character as well as acts as a hedge to Pakistan's "two-nation theory".¹⁹ Thus it surfaces heavily in New Delhi's decision making. These political and strategic calculations favour the majoritarian Kashmiri community and diametrically act against Jammu and Ladakh's genuine demands. In the name of national interest, New Delhi pushed three regions in to a prolonged protracted zero-sum game in which Kashmir enjoys superiority within the state and also outside support from New Delhi. At the end of the day, it helped to boil than the cool hatred pot.

Now the uphill task before the decision makers is whether J&K's three regions will be able to recover from six decades old preservative political system in which Kashmir-centric leadership has triumphed. A critical appraisal of J&K politics indicates that the intra-state hostility, except insurgency, has also imprisoned democracy in the state—a recent case in light is the Amarnath land controversy. The continuation of this enduring hostility will continuously shadow the three regions populace's dream to live in peace. The maintenance of *status quo*, by New Delhi, will never allow the people to realise that democracy, as a mean and discipline, is a necessary condition for normalcy, co-existence and development of the state. To address it, there is an urgent need to stress upon three points. First, there is need for clarity on several issues which mostly act as major source of misperceptions and misinterpretations in the conflict torn state. In the past, several misperceptions have given edge to hardliners, Hindutva and separatist, over the elected government to divide the regional populace through massive “rally-around flag” tactics. Due to this, New Delhi and the state government took those routes which acted against Jammu and Ladakh's interests. Second, due to external hostility i.e. India-Pakistan rivalry, Kashmir's extraordinary edge over other two provinces should be minimised, as the long term linking of the State's domestic issues with external power's behaviour is truncating or slowing-down development. And third, New Delhi should transform its focus from conflict management to conflict resolution. A recent three member team of interlocutors, however, is a good move in this direction. By having a multi-focal attitude to resolve various issues, interstate and intrastate will uplift the confidence level of the people that will strengthen institutionalisation of the state.

Eventually, the state government and New Delhi have to recognise and readjust Jammu and Ladakh's demands (if not to fulfil completely) to correct the decades old contradiction between monolithic and regimented Kashmiri nationalism and the regional aspirations of Jammities and Ladakhis. Probably, this is the only hopeful mechanism which could provide its people a chance to forget the turbulent past's divisive regional politics and institutionalise norms which could not only strengthen its democracy but also accommodate their aspirations with a sense of achievable justice.

Notes

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1. In 1996, J&K assembly elections numbers of seats were increased to 87, excluding 25 seats for *Azad Kashmir* and the Northern Areas. New seat share is: 46 for Kashmir Valley, 37 for Jammu and 4 for Ladakh (see Election Commission of India 2002).
2. According to the J&K government's official website, the area of Ladakh is 97,000 square kilometre (including 38,000 square kilometre under Chinese occupation).
3. It means a unipolar political system where opposition should be absent.
4. Abdullah government passed 'two pieces of legislation': 'the Abolition of Big Landed Estates Act and the Distressed Relief Act (see Ganguly 1996:96).
5. Behera (2000) notes that regional representation of Jammu and Ladakh in the civil service was already low due to Kashmiri Pandits higher representation in the state government. It reduced further in the tussle between Pandits and the Valley Muslims over government jobs, therefore, the claims and needs of Gujjars, Bakarwals, Dogras, Ladakhi Buddhist and Ladakhi Muslims were largely ignored.
6. Madhok believed that the New Delhi has no interest in the Jammities grievances. This led to the understanding to form a regional party which would challenge the Abdullah's government for Jammu's cause.
7. Mookerjee entered Jammu without permit thus, defied the J&K government's ban and was arrested.
8. According to Dr. Karan Singh, "Ladakhis were feeling uneasy and insecure under the Sheikh's administration. They felt that their position in the new dispensation with only two members in the State Assembly was extremely precarious and made them totally subordinate to the Kashmiris" (quoted in Behera 2000:89).
9. The Democratic National Conference was maintained as the 'pro-merger party' when it demanded the extension of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Union Election Commission to the state. Similar charges were made against the Praja Socialist Party, despite its favour for Kashmir's autonomy. Finally, the Democratic National Conference demanded J&K's closer constitutional integration with India.
10. He was given very less power nearly equal to the District Officer with office located in Leh. He had no powers regarding allocation of funds, job creations or other.
11. Sadiq constitute a ten-member Ladakh Development Commission chaired by Kushak Bakula, the Minister of State for Ladakh Affairs, and Agha Ibrahim Shah, Member of Legislative Council from Kargil, as the vice-president.
12. In 1969 several violent incident happened in the Ladakh region, where protesters stoned and burned each other's shrines.
13. Bakshi led National Conference supported the formation of this commission and suggested decentralisation of power to locally elected bodies at *tehsil* level, district and provincial levels with a cabinet at the top of the affairs. But the Congress, the Plebiscite Front and the Jan Sangh opposed it. None of them appeared before the commission.
14. ¹ In 1983, Mrs. Gandhi also joined his wand-wagon of religious provocation when in an address she sympathised with Jammu's Hindu for feeling insecure in the Muslim-majority state (see Varshney 1992:221).
15. ¹ In meeting with Indira Gandhi, Kushak Bakula and P. Namgyal demanded regional autonomy and tribal status. They argued one member representation of huge Leh district in the assembly is inadequate and proposed four legislative members from Ladakh and one Parliamentary seat for Leh.
16. During 1987-89, Ladakh had only 2 employees in the secretariat out of 2,900 employees; and it got only Rs21 lakh out of Rs100 crore from the prime minister's Special Assistance Fund. Similarly, for Jawahar Rozgar Yojna, the Valley got Rs7.2 crore and Ladakh got only Rs20 lakh (see Behera 2007).

17. 2 out of 35 secretaries/commissioners were from Jammu region along with total employee representation of 8 percent.
18. As a single achievement, Ghulam Nabi Azad became chief minister of J&K which changed the history of state's power sharing (see Behera 2002).
19. Pakistan was formed on the basis of Muslim ideology, as a home for South Asian Muslims. But this religious integrity was challenged in 1970 when civil war broke in Eastern part of Pakistan. East Pakistan's majoritarian Bengali community was brutally dealt by the armed forces of Western Pakistan. Soon after, in late 1971, the Muslim nationhood become an ideological myth of yesteryears when East Pakistan broke away and become an independent state of Bangladesh. This bloody disintegration of so called South Asia's Muslim homeland, Pakistan, and creation of "Bengali republic on ethos antithetical to two nations-theory" (Quayes 2008:131) question Pakistan's claim over Kashmir on the basis of the religious ideology.

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Research Note

Society of the Spectacle: Postmodernism and Mass Culture in the Indian Context

N Rohinkanta Singh

Abstract

Postmodernism is generally understood as a term that involves a radical break, both with a dominant culture and aesthetic, and a new social and economic moment, which has variously been called media society, the 'society of the spectacle' and 'postindustrial society'. The world has come across with the Postmodernism but where is the Indian connection and how does it pass away in front of our eyes. Has India given enough justification that we have experienced the postmodern society or is at the height of this fragmented society? This paper looks into the critical analysis of postmodernism in Indian connection with perspectives drawn from secondary sources. Indeed, media has played a pivotal role in bringing these new waves of culture. However this seems to be concentrated only in few metropolitan cities that scholars and critics notice. There are quite a few obliquely self-reflexive writings on this topic but hardly any that can do justification to this field. It is here that this intends to intervene and fill the yawning gap.

Key Words: Commodified, Metropolis, Mass culture, Media culture, Mass consumerism, Postmodernism.

Introduction

Postmodernism is a collective and a widely accepted term coined by popular writers and social thinkers across the globe. It is related to the art, architecture, or literature that reacts against the earlier modernist principles, by reintroducing traditional or classical elements of style or by carrying modernist styles or practices to extremes. Postmodernism is a kind of society that began to emerge after the Second World War and is variously described as postindustrial society, multinational capitalism, consumer society, media society, technological society and so forth. Since, the postmodernist era has emerged through a series of complementary changes within society, it is not possible to locate the historical time. This society has not emerged either as an accident and or by a cause of an event. It is a kind of cultural change that forms gradually over a period of times and finally takes over in front of our eyes.

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“This is primarily a phenomenon of Western culture and a movement which has arisen in reaction to the modernism of Western civilization. At the same time ‘it is a part of the broader and deeper changes going on in the world today’. This is because of the widespread influence of Western culture throughout the world and the fact that the process of modernization continues to bring capitalism, urbanization, technology, telecommunications, and Western popular culture to virtually every corner of the globe.”² In short, it arouses the culture of “Just do it,”¹ freedom of wearing what you like, and practicing what you wish.

Are these cultural changes happening in India? If not then what can we make out of this so called “Postmodern wave” in India? When more than 72.2 per cent of people belong to rural India and practice traditional rural agriculture; and more than 70 per cent of them are illiterate (according to the latest data released by the Indian Government website: *censusindiagov.in*), how far does this term ‘postmodernism’ relate to India? However, should we ignore it without engaging with it? our so called ‘(tycoon) sons of the soil’ generation of Lakshmi Mittal, Tata, Ambani have made their place among the ten most richest in the world (Forbes Magazine 2008, world 100 most richest people), and proud Indian females like Indra Nooyi, CEO Pepsico and Naina Lal Kidwai have been included amongst the world’s most powerful females. Of course, a sizable number of Indians (read NRIs) are working in the world’s biggest software companies and in NASA in the US. Moreover, since India produces one million graduates more than Americans annually, why can’t we the “Incredible India” generation claims our own space in this postmodern world?

According to Indian perspectives, the notion of postmodernism is still very complicated; however, one can argue that a new wave of postmodernist culture in India emerged along with the Indian economic liberalization and globalization. The rapid urbanization and development in the metropolitan cities in India clarify the emergence of drastic cultural change. The booming up of multinational corporates and high architectural changes, in the Indian big cities, the skyscraper buildings, better transport and communication, shopping mall cultures, multiplexes, and development of science and technology, Internet, mass media and globalization of *Bollywood* film industry show the immense cultural changes in the Indian society.

In a postmodernist society, we notice new types of consumption, planned obsolescence, rapid rhythm of fashion and styling changes, the penetration of advertising, TV and the media generally to a hitherto unparallel degree throughout society, the replacement of the old tension between city and country, centre and province, by the suburb and by universal standardization,

the growth of the great networks of superhighways and the arrival of automobile culture. These are some of the features which would seem to mark a radical break with that older pre-war society. The so called metropolitan culture emerges during postmodernism.

Historical Discourse on Postmodernism

Postmodernism began to be used in the 1970s as a term for a traditionally and locally inspired approach in architecture, in contrast to the a-historic and super-rational functionalism. It has been widely accepted that Postmodernism is a disputed term that has occupied most of the recent debates about contemporary culture since the early 1980s. In its simplest and least satisfactory sense it refers generally to the phase of 20th century Western culture that succeeded the reign of high modernism, thus indicating the products of the age of mass television since the mid 1950s. More often, though, it is applied to a cultural condition prevailing in the advanced capitalist societies since the 1960s, which are characterized by a superabundance of disconnected images and styles—most noticeably in television, advertising, commercial design, and pop videos.

Many other intellectuals claim then that postmodernism is a matter of new opinions in a large scale scientific knowledge or political programme (Lyotard 1984), that consumption is now more central than production (Jameson 1983), that political changes around 1990 in Eastern Europe were pristine examples that sowed the waves of postmodernism (Madison 1991) that bureaucracies are replaced by 'postmodern organisations' (Clegg 1990) or that contemporary identities are fragmented and fluid (Shotter and Gergen 1994; Gubrium and Holstein 2001).

Postmodernism: Perspectives from Arts and Culture

Popular culture is termed as pop culture and is popular within a specific social context. It is strongly represented by what is perceived to be popularly accepted among society. Otherwise, popular culture is also suggested to be the widespread cultural elements in any given society that are perpetuated through society's vernacular language or lingua franca. It comprises the daily interactions, needs and desires and cultural practices that make up the everyday lives of the mainstream. It includes mass media, consumption, and also pertains to fashions, food habits, and many facets of sports, literature and entertainment.

It has been noted that the idea of culture drastically changed during the post Second World War, where most of the people wanted to be free from the fear and terrors of war. People

want to celebrate life itself – happiness of being alive and subsequently leading to the emergence of infamous (for the reason that it entirely breaks down the traditional system of thought, especially, the states and the church notion of ethics) Woodstock in the beginning of 1960s, where the whole world unites and enjoys the high pitch songs of “Rock N Roll,” dance, fashion, drugs and so on. This also leads to the beginning of the hedonistic culture or the hippies’ culture. This social and cultural change relieves the people from the paranoia of war and other forms of violence. The whole world notices this cultural change and it travels across the world.

Most notably, Mats Alvesson stated that “the idea of culture in postmodernism is of different spheres such as high and low (mass) culture and the break with elite ideas of a specific space and function of art make it possible to point at some label which seem to work broadly, in a diversity of fields. The effacement of the boundary between art and everyday life, the collapse of the hierarchical distinction between high and mass and popular culture, a stylistic promiscuity favouring eclecticism and the missing of codes, parody, pastiche, irony, playfulness and the celebration of the surface depthlessness of culture, the decline of the originality/genius of the artistic producer and the assumption that art can only be repetitions.”³

Pop culture finds its expression in the mass circulation of items from areas such as fashion, music, sport and film. The world of pop culture had a particular influence on art from the early 1960s, through Pop Art. When modern pop culture began during the early 1950s, it made it harder for adults to participate. Today, young and elder generations participate in pop culture directly or indirectly. The celebrity culture has often been regarded as the most elitists’ popular culture of this era.

The notion of pop culture and mass culture towards postmodernism is seen as a commercially oriented culture; mass production for mass consumption. From the European perspective, this culture is synonymous to American culture. Most of the scholars defined pop culture as an authentic culture of the people. However, this conception can be problematised because there are different categories of people who are shaped and informed by various ways of cultural practices and conceptions. Neo-Gramscian hegemony which is a political dimension to popular culture defines the popular culture as a site of struggle between the resistance of subordinate groups in society and the forces of incorporation operating in the interests of dominant groups in society. Postmodernist approach to popular culture would no longer recognize the distinction between high and popular culture.

Lyotard emphasized that “Postmodernist architecture comes before us as a peculiar analogue to neoclassicism, a play of allusion and quotation that has renounced the older high modernist rigor and that itself seems to recapitulate a whole range of traditional Western esthetic strategies: we therefore have a mannerist postmodernism (Michael Graves), a baroque postmodernism (the Japanese), a rococo postmodernism (Charles Moor), a neoclassicist postmodernism (the French, particularly Christian de Portzamparc), and probably even a ‘high modernist’ postmodernism in which modernism is itself the object of the postmodernist pastiche.”⁴

In fact, the architectural change in postmodern society is the height of modern architectures. Postmodern architecture is indeed developed within the modern architecture, or in other words, it is the highest architectural development of modern architectures. In response to this, Mats Alvesson clearly explains that “Postmodernism in terms of literature and other arts, is notoriously ambiguous, implying either that modernism has been superseded or that it has continued into a new phase”.

He also narrated that Postmodernism may be seen as a continuation of modernism’s alienated mood and disorienting techniques and at the same time as an abandonment of its determined quest for artistic coherence in a fragmented world. From this statement we can clearly understand that postmodernism is a very crude term. While a modernist artist or writer would try to wrest a meaning from the world through myth, symbol, or formal complexity, the postmodernist greets the absurd or meaningless confusion of contemporary existence with a certain numbed or flippant indifference, favouring self consciously ‘depthless’ works of fabulation, pastiche, bricolage, or aleatory disconnection. He further stated that, this term cannot usefully serve as an inclusive description of all literature since the 1950s or 1960s, but is applied selectively to those works that display most evidently the moods and formal disconnections that are described above.

Photography emerges as one of the most popular cultures in postmodernism but today’s photography did not appear as a challenge to painting from the outside, any more than industrial cinema did to narrative literature. The former was only putting the final touch to the program of ordering the visible elaborated by the Quattrocento; while the latter was the last step in rounding off diachronies as organic wholes, which had been the ideal of the great novels of education since the eighteenth century. That the mechanical and the industrial technologies should appear as substitutes for hand or craft was not in itself a disaster – except if one believes

that art is in its essence the expression of an individuality of genius assisted by an elite craftsmanship.

Here, as an example, we can cite the great painting of Mona Lisa, the masterpiece of Leonardo da Vinci, a painting that many know, but only a few had seen. However, due to the postmodern culture of mass media and technology, it has now been seen by the people across the world; through photographs, pictures, films and so on. Even the photographic version of this painting can be seen sailing across the streets of every nook and corner of the world. This is indeed a brilliant example of postmodernism.

At a Glance: Postmodernism and Mass Media

Post modernism and media cannot be discussed in isolation. Media dismantles events and produces and reproduces it (the event) in the postmodern society. Popular media highlights the effects of postmodernism more distinctly. In the postmodern society, media has proved itself in providing freedom to people; vis-a-vis the fact that they enjoy the freedom given to them, especially, the three freedom of press in India: freedom of circulation, freedom of information, freedom of publication. Thus media plays an important role in the debates of postmodernism. R Wesley Hurd clearly explains in his article, 'Postmodernism' that the image and fiction are promoted as reality in contemporary music, television, and print media by producers who understand the power of visual image to present a fictional reality that we will accept as reality itself. He also further noted that dissolving the distinction between fiction and truth is justified by the postmodernist, because truth itself is fiction; all we ever get are the fictions of our language games. Indeed, how effective is media in the discourse of postmodernism in India? What trends they employ in postmodernism? How far do they bring the truth in various events towards the society? These are the core themes to be debated in the Indian context.

The quintessential example of postmodern media production is MTV. We can notice from its montage - the fast, fragmented production editing to its underlying visions, that MTV represents the "cutting edge" of postmodernism applied to consumer media. MTV's editors "collage" is a jumpy, stream-of-consciousness presentation that leaves older viewers baffled by its pace and apparent incoherence. But to the postmodern "generation-X" crowd who make a steady diet of it, MTV's randomness is normal. MTV's twenty-four-hour parade of images, pseudo-documentaries, hedonistic dating-scenario game shows, engineered-and-reengineered reality shows, music videos, and cutting-edge advertisements, relentlessly assault one's visual

and auditory senses, leaving viewers feeling fragmented and transient within a decentred plural-reality: the postmodern world.

Sometimes the truth seems to be lost in the multiple narrations from different sources of media. The hegemony and monopoly laid by the media houses and its deeply commercialized nature leads to over exposure of the acceleration of broadcasting news and information and have given a negative effect that has lost the sense of quality. However, we can access more details than the truth of the event itself and this is due to the professionalism and highly competitive nature of the media today. As an example, the recorded version, media stylizing in covering the big events, like *Bollywood Film Fare Award* and other reality TV shows gives a lasting effect to the TV consumers. In the heart of the realism there is also a representation and that's the hyperreal and is beyond recognition. It is the construction of the real where reality doesn't exist. In other sense one can also say that any event has an afterlife in postmodernism. Afterlife means different journeys in miniature forms like DVDs, online, media and so forth.

How central is the image becoming the heart of postmodernism? Photography is a pristine example and it is the iconography of reality where the photograph imitates the notion of an authentic event or situation. In short, photograph is considered in postmodernism as the end of the eye that gives ability to see directly and is referring to the technological eye (read third eye). "Capital no longer corresponds to the order of political economy. The whole apparatus of the commodity law of value is absorbed and recycled in the larger machinery of the structural law of value, and thus connects with no longer the order of the real, but by the hyperreal. The entire strategy of the system lies in this hyperreality of floating values."⁵

Perhaps, postmodernism in all kinds of fields easily leads to exaggerations of similarities and broad trends. It is worth mentioning Baudrillard, who points out that in postmodern society nothing is in original, only copies or the reproduced reality are to be found, what he calls simulacra. Here we can again narrate the example of Da Vinci's masterpiece "Mona Lisa". Millions of copies exist all over the world, but the one that can be termed original or high art (archives, museums etc.) is the one that commands maximum monetary value. Bringing the debate to the Indian scenario, we can contextualize the well known phenomena of remixing old *Bollywood* songs, video CDs, DVDs and so forth.

Similarly, there is no original, in painting, no recording that is hung on a wall, or kept in a vault; rather, there are only copies, by the millions, that are all the same, and all sold for the

same amount of money. Another version of Baudrillard's 'simulacrum' would be the concept of virtual reality, a reality created by simulation, for which there is no original (like Avatar, the movie). This is mainly due to the notion of 'dialectic enlightenment: science produces a better world'.

Trend towards Cinema and Mass Culture

The centrality of postmodernism lies in the notion of culture. We have noticed that globalization changes cultures before our eyes. Postmodernism divides mass culture and high culture. As an example, a figure of veiled woman represents the third world women. Technological culture churns out popular culture within the mass culture. According to Lyotard, "postmodern society is dominated by the technology which is the knowledge of the scientific".

When we look into popular culture, aka pop culture as it is generally accepted, in the contemporary Indian context, we can distinctly put forth the most happening and commonly appreciated trends in almost every nook and corners in India, both in urban and rural India, such as, the trend behind the *Bollywood* stars, and the highly exaggerated cricket stars. Cricketers like, Sachin Tendulkar, Virender Sehwag, M.S.Dhoni *etc.* are overtly promoted by all the medium of communications so much so that these players are now becoming household names in both urban and rural India. The induction of recent trends like, T20 Champions League and IPL (Indian Premier League) have finally taken over all the popularities in India. Perhaps, what these star 'do' and 'don't do is what 'high culture' is, and it is often raised from the 'popular culture' itself in the contemporary Indian culture. The website <http://www.scribd.com/doc/1187032/Characteristics-of-Culture> has quoted, "Popular culture is deemed as what is popular within the social context - that of which is most strongly represented by what is perceived to be popularly accepted among society. Popular culture often contrasts with a more exclusive, even elitist 'high culture', that is, the culture of the ruling social groups."

"Waves of enthusiasm for particular products fuelled and boosted by the communications media, are propagated with lightening speed. A film sparks a fashion craze, or a magazine launches a chain of clubs that in turn spins off a line of products."⁶ Pop culture finds its expression in the mass circulation of items from areas such as fashion, music, sport and film. After the Indian economic liberalization, *Bollywood* film industry has also been in the peak of commercialization and globalization and it started in the beginning of 1990s according to the popular film critics like Nikhat Kazmi and other popular film journalist in India. Fashion became more important to the film industry mainly during the 1990s as beauty contests became

prominent and models like Sushmita Sen, Aishwariya Ray and others model came to the film circuit.

The world of scientific movies became real after the catastrophic 9/11. In fact, 9/11 gives a clear example of metatheory. Similarly in India, the serial bomb blast in Mumbai, Delhi and the 26/11 terrorist attack in Mumbai lead to the emergence of the ugly sites of mafia and thus the *Bollywood* mafia film genre or gangster movies in India became real. The gangster *hindi* films like *Company*, *Satya*, *Munna Bhai MBBS* et cetera have a cult in their particular genre. They deal with the notions of mafia world by different symbolic representations like *Munna Bhai MBBS* heightens the violent site of gangster in a comedy version and others like *Satya*, and *Company* dramatized it through action and thrillers. Nostalgia film is a crisis of time which is unable to focus at present and links to schizophrenia. According to Lacan, “schizophrenia means language disorder”. You lose your capacity to define temporary existence which is the breaking down of language i.e., the experience of fragmentation of time.

In postmodernism, in *Bollywood*, the figure of the prostitute has become central to provide the hue and cry of women (weepy women) that helps to arouse the pathos in dramatising the melodramas. Cinema became the most popular culture after Indian economic liberalization (1991 onwards). Multiplex culture is a clear example of this contemporary society. What makes cinema different from theatre is the unanimated object that takes the centre stage in cinema. Discourse of stardom has its own style or performance and celebrity culture dominates.

Media stars are spectacular representations of living human beings, distilling the essence of the spectacle’s banality (read originality) into images of possible roles. Stardom is a diversification in the semblance of life, the object of identification with mere appearance which is intended to compensate for the crumbling of directly experienced diversifications of productive activity. Celebrities figure in various styles of life and various views of society which anyone is supposedly free to embrace and pursue in a global manner. These popular public figures themselves represent the paradigm of incarnations of the inaccessible results of social labour, they mimic by-products of that labour, and project these above labour so that they appear as its goal.⁷

Emergence of Consumer Society

With the overviews from popular criticism, Postmodern is within the postindustrial and postcapitalist society where postmodern is accepted as the highest form. Postmodernism leads

to the emergence of highly sophisticated consumer culture. Inanimate objects become more inhuman in postmodern's fascination for consumption. Everything in this world is commodified. The modes of production became produce and reproduce. Here let's take Fredric Jameson statement, that "image is the highest form of commodification."

Since India became the destination for multinational corporations, Indian market forces have reached their heights. In postmodern India, the labour power has changed to corporate power. As an example, Mumbai once had the biggest textile industry in India which is now facing the threats of extinction (read wiped out). The new waves of Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) and other leisure and hospitality industries swept the labour in the metropolitan and other big cities of India. In other sense, commodity is valued only when it is being sold or comes to market. Commodification becomes an important aspect of postmodernism, where productivity occupies the centrality of discourse.

"The independence of the commodity has spread to the entire economy over which the commodity now reigns. The economy transforms the world, but it transforms it into a world of the economy. Commodities are now all that there is to see; the world we see is the world of the commodity."⁸

Ironically, consumption is more central than production in postmodernism according to many prominent scholars. Its new products are utilised not only to the elite class but also to the lower class and it even reaches all the remote areas of our country. The differences of lower class and high class has almost come to the point of extinction and it is now coming together to one and that is the consumer society (in a mature ideology). Temple was the only place where classless destination was once considered. But the emergence of Big Bazaar changed Indians not only by providing a taste of shopping in air-conditioned environs but by also creating a classless destination called 'malls' where the Mercedes owner as well as its driver shop side by side. Besides this the Chick Shampoo (sachet) for 50 paisa and 1 rupee are affordable to even the rickshaw puller and it is available all over rural India, thereby making beauty accessible to all. Air Deccan that give wings to million hungry passengers and recently, Tata Nano known also as peoples' car has given shape to an auto-rickshaw into a post-modern mode. This is indeed happening and slowly transforming our culture into a postmodern culture in front of our eyes.

"We are now in multinational or consumer capitalism (with the emphasis placed on marketing, selling, and consuming commodities, not on producing them), associated with

nuclear and electronic technologies, and correlated with postmodernism.”⁹ Classical Marxism determines that “production is the point of origin whereas circulation has its different ways”, however, Bordry criticizes that “Marx is unable to come up from economic to production where during the 1990s production takes over economy”. Mass culture is the production of capitalism in postmodernism.

Specifically, the advent of electronic computer technologies has revolutionized the modes of knowledge production, distribution, and consumption in our society and indeed, some might argue that postmodernism is best described by, and correlated with, the emergence of computer technology, starting in the 1960s, as the dominant force in all aspects of social life. Shifting the focus from the idea of production to materialist economy is in the realm of production. Boudrillard says “the end of production is what is called to be brothel of substitution”. Let us put an example of a young and fresh graduate, who was tired of knocking each and every door of corporate houses in India, finally gave up and concluded that ‘prostitution is the only institution where freshers are treated as royal’.

Conclusion

In order to understand and clarify the doubts relating to postmodernism in the Indian discourse we need to debate more on historically based analysis, critical articles, philosophical discussions and ethical reflection. As postmodernist Don Cupitt seems to have noticed, it is important to avoid a cultural situation, where entertainment fills our lives all the time. Or let this study put it this way: The kind of entertainment we often see now is sometimes so shallow that it should be challenged and perhaps replaced.

The issues of authenticity come to light from this study and the question whether technology really occupies our society still remains un-answered. It shows that the postmodern world totally emerged due to technology, where every walk of human life is a question of technology. Is this technology just meant to cater to the consumer society and to bring over acceleration and production of consumer goods to expand their business or is it the race between the business rival. What is the position of third world countries in this race? We can even raise the question of targeted group for this technologically developed nation. We have now noticed the dramatic changes of culture in the society and that is the effect of postmodernism and its technology and mass media.

It is true that technological transformation can be expected to have a considerable impact on knowledge. This flow of global knowledge is possible due to the advancement of

media and its popular culture. Media plays a tremendous role in achieving this free flow of knowledge around the world. The world is becoming smaller and smaller, and the advancement of technology and media shows us the information of entire networks of NASA's space launch throughout the world, and is a good example of the achievement of media and its technology. One can access to any part of the world through media. Different programmes in different TV channels like BBC, CNN, and National Geography show the details of everything happening across the planet with visuals and voice over. It would be more accurate to say that it has itself been legitimated as a problem, that is, as a heuristic driving force. Before it came to this point, scientific knowledge sought other solutions.

This study comes to the solution that it is quite unsatisfactory to execute the discourse of postmodern in the Indian perspective. However, this study claims that in this contemporary developing scenario, postmodernism is a popular label and a big banner for a rather broad spectrum of artistic and intellectual orientations, as well as about a range of novel social trends and forms.

India is catching up with her western counterparts in terms of science and technology, economy and power along with marketing strategy by utilizing Indian innovative thoughts and creative minds. It is quite clear that India is experiencing and going through a postmodern phase, but somehow it is concentrated only in the metropolitan cities. We are in such a state that we cannot afford to ignore postmodernism and at the same time cannot take it for granted. The notion of postmodernism can prove to be helpful to India only if we take on board its central logic of difference. It will not only help in consolidating its vast multicultural diversity but also pool in multiple talents from its length and breadth in order to alleviate all the ills plaguing it now.

Notes

1. The use of this particular tag line of NIKE, does not represent what the brand wants to portray to consumers, I am strictly using this tag to interpret the freedom into the changing trends of postmodernist society.
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