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GUIDELINES FOR SUBMISSION OF MANUSCRIPTS

Original papers that fall within the scope of the Journal shall be submitted by e-mail. An Abstract of the article in about 150 words must accompany the papers. The length of research papers shall be between 5000 and 7000 words. However, short notes, perspectives and lengthy papers will be published if the contents could justify.

1. The paper may be composed in MS-Words format, Times New Roman font with heading in Font Size 14 and the remaining text in the font size 12 with 1.5 spacing.

2. Notes should be numbered consecutively, superscripted in the text and attached to the end of the article. References should be cited within the text in parenthesis. e.g. (Sen 2003: 150).

3. Spelling should follow the British pattern: e.g. 'colour', NOT 'color'.

4. Quotations should be placed in double quotation marks. Long quotes of above 4 (four) lines should be indented in single space.

5. Use italics for title of the books, newspaper, journals and magazines in text, end notes and bibliography.

6. In the text, number below 100 should be mentioned in words (e.g. twenty eight). Use "per cent", but in tables the symbol % should be typed.

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    1) Hoffmann, Steven (1990): *India and the China Crisis*, Oxford University Press, Delhi.

    2) Bhalla and Hazell (2003): "Rural Employment and Poverty: Strategies to Eliminate Rural Poverty within a Generation", *Economic and Political Weekly,* Vol.33, No.33, August 16, pp.3473-84.

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Indian Economic Global Spread and Normative Urges: Trade, Commerce and Culture

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Abstract

Conventionally, cultural globalization was first understood as a process of homogenization, as the global domination of Western mass culture became dominant at the expense of traditional diversity. However, a contrasting trend soon became evident in the rise of movements protesting against globalization and giving new momentum to the defence of local culture. Simultaneously, Western economic globalization gave rise to the notion that Western culture and economic values had taken a front seat in the entire globalization process. What is underestimated is the reality that Eastern, especially Indian economic globalization created a sense of universalization of particularism for the mutual benefit of various parties engaged in global trade, commerce, spreading language and norms throughout the known world. The current study narrates and explains, in an analytical way, the means of the spread of values through economic exchanges. My prime argument is that a string version of the economic globalization thesis requires a new view of the international economy - one that subsumes and subordinates national-level processes.

Introduction

The international economy is one in which the principal entities are national economies. Trade and commerce produce growing interconnection between these still national economies. Such an economic process involves an ever-increasing integration of more and more countries and economic actors into world market relationships. The form of interdependence between varied countries, small and large, remains not of a strategic kind but of exchanges of goods and values. Gradual adaptation and reconfiguration may produce new divergences and yet the results are mostly positive in most cases. In India's case, this is the message. Indian globalization had extended further and deeper than the visible globe. From ancient time, economic globalization, guided by positive cultural values, has greatly affected the outcome of commercial connections. During the Mauryan rule (4th-3rd century B.C.) Indian

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voyages on the Indian Ocean became part of a more general development in which sailors and merchants of various nationalities "began to knit together" the land borders of the "Southern Ocean", a Chinese term referring to all the waters from the South China Sea to the shore of East Africa. "Southernization" by Sino-Indian extensive commercial links with the outside world was analogous to 'westernization', and it is possible to argue that in Europe and its colonies, the process of "southernization" laid the foundation for "westernization" in subsequent centuries (Shaffer 1994). Trade between the Mediterranean and India had developed so well in the third century B.C. the Maurya King Bindusara (3rd century B.C.) could ask the Greek King Antiochus to send him "some sweet wine, dried figs, and a sophist". The riverine and trade-based urban civilization of Mohenjo-Daro and Harappa had artisans, who used wooden boats to carry cloths made of cotton fibers (Ratnagar 2004). Some anthropologists argue that the presence of shell artifacts and beads in the Indus Valley testifies that India was one of Mesopotamia's biggest trade partners. Exports from India included not only luxuries, but also small monkeys from India because pets remained popular with rich Mesopotamians (Kenoyer 2008). Andre G. Frank and others argue that there had been a systematic continuity for about 5,000 years downplaying any idea of inherent European exceptionality in building an economically unified world as part of universal economy (Frank and Gills 1993).

Methodologically, economic anthropology, in Kuhn's terms, is still in the "pre-paradigm" stage (Kuhn 1977:47-48). Although India's "ethics and values" in

domestic business has been vigorously evaluated, observing capitalism's moral lapses (Naoroji 1966; Jain 2001; Kanagasabapathi 2007; Swadeshi Academic Council 2003), there is hardly any full-length treatment of India's social and religious cultures that influenced international trade and commerce. Naoroji's treatment of British immoral trade restrictions on Indian goods, and export of Indian money to Britain has been well received among Indian scholars. Recently, Ritu Birla, in a brilliant exposition of the Marwari community's family law based amoral business code, has demonstrated the peril in using glorified capitalist framework in business (Birla 2009). The *Arthasastra* by Kautilya (fourth century B.C.), India's first political science text, has considered the state's participation in economic activities, activated by pragmatism rather than moral principles. No doubt, Kautilya has stipulated some rules for external trade, but recent scholarship views the text more as an ideal than reflecting actualities (Chakravarty 2001). However, the existing works depict global and political sphere of capital and market forces, but ignore aspects of globalization that historically comes into existence by creating socio-cultural relations leading to not only de-territorialization but also "glocalization" (compacting global and local dimensions in business and culture).

Rosenthal (2005) observes, "because of extensive proliferation of varied norms and values", modernists are not compelled by the bounds of tradition. The concept of "cultural amnesia" developed by Stephen Bertman (2000) refers to the crisis of memory out of selectively forgetting the past traditions. However, the multi-faceted

cultural values, viewed under the "Kroeber-Redfield Model", have both a "social structure" and a "cultural structure". Different levels of civilizations' cultural structures interact constantly with each other (Kroeber 1952; Redfield 1962). In contrast to Kroeber's cultural historical approach, Redfield begins with the socio-cultural aspect. In essence, Kroeber sees the task of cultural exchange as essentially a history of culture, with social structure and social organization subordinated. In this context, the central problem of today's economic interaction is the tension between cultural homogenization and cultural heterogenization. The homogenization argument has subsections in either an argument about Americanization or "commoditization". The normative dynamics of indigenization have recently come into vogue in some quarters in India. India's ancient global trade and exchange of goods stood for an intensification of human relations to create webs in people-to-people relations. The process in "general interdependence" calling for "internationalization" of business remained in line with India's national core norm to regard all people as "relatives". Utility achievement, argues Sen, may be "partial, inadequate and misleading" (Sen 1987:48). Admitting that the conceptual and methodological problems related to cultural influences in economic globalization are staggering, my qualitative analysis argues that India's evolving cultural systems throughout the ages led not only to increased scale and complexity, but also to an enhancement of the hierarchical aspects of economic power and prestige emanating from overseas trade contacts. However, the global economic transaction is a complex, overlapping order, which cannot be understood in terms of the neo-Marxist center-periphery models. Nor can we subscribe to simple models of push and pull, in terms of migration theory.

Whereas economic globalization in some countries has accelerated flows of labor, capital, and commodities, leaving some peoples uprooted and dispossessed (Hardin and Myers 1994), in India, electronic communication has created new "virtual communities" irrespective of physical distance, though not necessarily of language, creating dispersed long-distanced cultural groups having new wealth in new settings. A report estimates that the economic power of the overseas Indians now matches that of India itself (Lewis and Wigen 1997). Indians (or American Indians) in California subcontract their software businesses to India, providing a horizontal integration of business. Productive activities are becoming knowledge intensive rather than resource intensive. By using improved technology, India has risen to the top of the IT industry. Despite these positive economic results, a growing number of Indians argue that the powerlessness of the central government and many national institutions in the face of multinationals testifies to the omnipotence of economic globalization. Deconstructing the meaning of economic globalization in India, three prime conclusions are drawn. First, despite the fact that national economic cultures are constantly evolving, a sustained Indian worldview has influentially affected globalization that has outpaced globalization of politics and mindsets in India. Second, looking at the premodern period as a whole, we need to recognize the existence of different types of exchange and to consider

how they might have informed cultural encounters. Last, there is hardly any direct linkage found between economic globalization and increase of poverty, although India's national growth with development has well been verified.

An ancient explanation of why some people take up commerce and others do not is the differing resource endowments. Currently, in a materialist hopeful mode, many Indians cherish that economic globalization is about worldwide systematic interdependence, integration, mobilization, and redistribution of global resources that is likely to lead, at least in theory, to partial economic parity and equilibrium among the system members. As opposed to this purely mundane reason, in ancient India, ethics and moral values, along with material objectives, guided conduct in global trade and commerce. Many sacred texts testify that moral principles, including honest dealings, were taught, and basic norms were advocated in societies that functioned as self-regulating organizations. Passages from the *Vayu Purana* (fifth century B.C.) and *Ramayana* (third century B.C.) inform us that both spiritual and material urges the Indian merchants (Majumdar 1937). A basic premise of ancient Indian civilization was that the minimum interaction was the very anti-thesis of civilization. "Death of distance" was the cultural goal (Sharma, 2009). The Indian theme in global commerce can be depicted in these terms: every product is made up of only three things: first, raw materials (cotton, spices); second, the knowledge to build a finished commodity (boat building); and third, production urges as well as a country's unwritten traditions.

The third one makes up a difference. The buyers buy resources from the same sources but the key difference is the value system of each country. An archaeologist, Miller (2008), meticulously reconstructs a linkage between artificial materials and core cultural values of the Indus Valley people. If the Indus people could not find natural objects with attributes they liked, they simply created new materials using heat. From the abstract universe, they created the artificial stones of their micro beads for trade with Mesopotamia (Miller 2008:154-55). With their strength from "power" of the universe, the Indus builders constructed ships of the hypothetical sizes of the 60-gur (Mesopotamian unit for capacity or volume) vessels for open sea voyages during the "Bronze Age". This divine power was also good for acquiring superior community role (Polanyi 1956). Their spiritual values determined, to some extent, their trade goods for long-distance trade (Vosner 2008:230). There were several aspects in this unspecified value system. Recent findings dispute his thesis with varied success. Statistical data produced by Krishna and Mitra suggest that trade liberalization and domestic welfare economy have shown some improvement at least in selected sectors (Krishna and Mitra 1998). Political economist Panagariya concludes that there are high costs in high protection, emphasizing that even small tariffs lead to the withdrawal of products and high costs (Panagariya 2002). Data on educational attainment, infant mortality, monetary poverty, etc., are all aspects of living that demonstrate a large improvement during globalization in the last two decades. It is almost safe to argue that economic

globalization has led to "convergence", which means that large numbers of individuals are now competitive with the middle class, the 30th to 80th percentiles in income distribution (Bhalla 2002:11). Another researcher finds that by using the popular $1.00 a day poverty line, the percentage of poor people in the developing world has declined by 25 percentages between 1985 and 2000 from 37.4 to 13.1 percent (World Bank Report 2000). Likewise, Datt and Ravallion (2002) calculate that, between 1981 and 2001, the headcount measure of poverty fell by 45 percent (from 53 to 8 percent), largely because of globalization.

What is clear is that the combination of industrialization (2009-10), especially manufacturing as well as demands from the West, has led to industrial growth during three months in 2010 (16.8 percent); the projected national growth in India for the year 2010 is about 8 percent despite worldwide economic recession. All these suggest that there is "convergence" among the global trade, human capital formation, and the provision of social overhead capital. The onset of diminishing returns in the North and the flows of resources to India may assert themselves in producing some relief to the poor. If global growth continues at a rapid pace during the next half a century or less, it is possible that emerging market economies, including China and India, could attain levels exceeding those of Americans today. This implies that Malthusian notions of poverty are likely to become a distant memory as global income expands over time, and issues of inequality, rather than subsistence, will increasingly take the center stage in the poverty debate (Harrison 2007).

The functionalist perspective that tends to oversimplify the complex globalizations between exports and imports and multinational investments and domestic capital is not well defined (Stiglitz 2002). Analysts ignore the typical Indian bottleneck in the international flow of capital. Economic globalization does not automatically result in the creation of incompetent predatory state; dominance by local political elites wedded to parochial interests and alienated from the wider aspirations of Indian societies deserves to be scrutinized.

Globalization

India's cultural urges were visible from the early eras. Kautilya's *Arthasastra* (fourth century B.C.), India's first political science text, considers the state's participation in economic activities, including international trade. The text clearly distinguishes that commerce transacted in fortified cities, *nagaras,* from that transacted in designed centers for international exchange, *pattana (*Kangle1963:2.aO). V.K. Jain, in a chapter, finds that the opulent Jain traders in western India were regularly advised by their teachers and preachers to be truthful in business transaction (Jain 2001:344-69). In his work, *Satsthanakaprakarn*, Jineesvara Suri, dilates upon the code of conduct, which a merchant was expected to follow. He advises that a merchant should neither weigh less nor charge more.[1] Modern scholarship has paid much more attention to the sea route than to the overland routes, partly because of advantages to carry large volumes of trade. They have been interpreted as relics of a transit trade linking the easy sea route from Egypt to India with overland China and

beyond, since "the Kushana kingdom produced little that the luxury markets of the west desired" (Rodewald 1976:47-48). However, it does not follow, as is often assumed, that gold was being sent to India (Charlesworth 1970:137). Once it had been clear that bullion was what was wanted, bullion, probably, was sent (Rodewald 1976:51). In addition, what we see is that eastern people were both producers and consumers of luxury items. Business historians examine the histories of the business houses, in-house histories of different commercial companies, and accounts of commercial communities.

The recent study of Bengali scripts and seals provided new insights into the trade connections between Gupta-era Bengal and the early trade centers of South East Asian mainland. This evidence substantiates the existence of a luxury trade in horses, which were transported overland from India's northwest frontier down the Gangetic plain to Bengal, where they were shipped by boat to south China (Hall (n.d.):452:445 and Mukherjee 1989:1-5). A "global system", rather than an "inter-national" system, was visible from the early economic contacts between India and the vast outside world. Two variables – system-ness and stage-ness – could be observed (Therborn 2000:151-179). For various reasons, the Indus Valley's economy was expanding for long-distance trade (Shaffer and Lichtensten 1989:117-26). Even more interesting than the Harappan participation in the western trade in the third millennium was the sense of "inter-regional integration" that was a part of western and southern India during that time. The Harappans were part of an emerging and much larger world than they had known

before the rise of urbanization in the Greater Indus Valley and Baluchistan. This "cultural interaction sphere" was a unique configuration for its time, and its scope and significance has only recently become apparent (Reade 1996:189). An archaeologist, Miller (2008), meticulously reconstructs a linkage between artificial materials and core cultural values of the Indus Valley people. If the Indus people could not find natural objects with attributes they liked, they simply created new materials using heat. From the abstract universe, they created the artificial stones of their micro beads for trade with Mesopotamia (Miller 2008:145-57). Their spiritual values determined, to some extent, their trade goods for long-distance trade, concludes archaeologist Vosner (Vosner 2008:230). With their strength from "power" of the universe, the Indus builders constructed ships of the hypothetical sizes of the 60-gur (Mesopotamian unit for capacity or volume) vessels for open sea voyages during the "Bronze Age." This commercial contact was good for acquiring superior cohesive community life as well (Polanyi et.al 1966).

There is no convincing evidence for the presence of Mesopotamians in the Indus cities (Chakrabarti 1990). Dilip Chakravarti (1982) discusses the occurrence of "long barrel-cylinder" beads in the Indus Valley, Mesopotamia and Iran. These beads have similarities. The beads were in excess of 5cm, slender, occasionally with a slight thickening toward the center (Chakravarti 1982:265-70). Both demand and supply factors helped the process. Material records affirm that ships from *Meluhha* (Indus Valley) and *Magan* (Arabian Gulf) came to Mesopotamia during the reign of Sargon of

Akkad (2334-2279 B.C.). In the last half of the third millennium, the cultures of Middle Asia, the region between the Euphrates and the Indus and Central Asia and the Gulf, participated in a new, unprecedented form of international economic interaction (Possehl 1996:133). Mesopotamian and Iranian courts had themselves engaged in considerable trade with South Asia, and the Achaemenid court developed its own sense of the "Indian exotic." By Early Third Dynastic times, the agrarian Mesopotamian society became complex and contending hierarchical social orders, the "palace" and the "temple" became intense rivals. Politicized rivals, as both texts and archaeological records testify, demanded exotic materials as conspicuous displays of privilege and access. Some of these products were also used to maintain the elaborate Sumerian cult centers and their associated workshops. These products included copper, tin, bronze, silver, gold, lapis laxzuli, carnelian shell, ivory and various kinds of wood. By 2600 B.C., the Mesopotamian markets looked for them, but these things were not a part of the riverine landscape of the Tigris/Euphrates valley. The eastern trade became more useful for the people in the west (Reade (n.d.):188-89). The traders of the west moved from the protected waters of the Persian Gulf into the Arabian Sea, and then to the warm water of the Indian Ocean (Reade 1986:325-34). Persian sources testify that trade caravan routes extended from the Sasanian Persian Empire (224-651 A.D.) to Iraq and then to the province of Fars, eventually reaching India. Imperian Sasanian coins from Persia were discovered from Rupar in the Amble district in India (Daryaee 2003:4). Simultaneously, the great Mauryan Emperor

Asoka helped the process of spiritual globalization in the West. His efforts to propagate as a gift to all mankind the medicinal herbs and plants (amomum, nardum), which have been cited by Indian activists fighting against attempts of multinational agricultural and biotechnology corporations to patent native Indian trees and plants for private profit (Mehta 1998:25).

Economic globalization reached a new height linking Ethiopia, Rome and Greece, and the Selucid Empire with the Silk Road, linking central Asia, China and India. Polanyi argues that economic relations and transactions were "embedded" in an overreaching cultural and social framework, which set limits to market activity. Anthropologist also report that man's economic action is submerged in his social relationship (Polanyi 1957:46). A prime globalization urge came from the Hindu concept of perpetual motion that prepares the ground for economic expansion for an amicable contact with the outsiders. There was a cultural warning against isolationism in a parable about a deep-well frog, the proverbial - *kupamandaduka*- that persistently recurs in several old Sanskrit texts, such as *Ganapatha*, *Hitopadesa*, and *Bhattikavya*. The *kupamanduka* was a frog that lived its entire life within a well, knowing nothing else. The message is that cultural and economic history of India and the world would have been very limited had "we lived like well-frog" (Sen 2005:85-86).

India's scientific concepts about motion helped the economic globalization. In 1150 A.D., the distinguished astronomer Bhaskar described the idea of mechanical motion, an idea rooted in the Hindu belief in

the cyclical and self-renewing nature of things (Ganguly 1927:65-76). An American historian, Lynn White, argues that the concept of perpetual motion is a reflection of the Hindu belief in the cyclical and self-renewing nature of all things (White Jr. 1960:523). However, the scope of the concept is broader than that. In Bhasakara's computation, the idea of infinity is the core concept. He establishes mathematically what had been recognized in Indian theology a millennium earlier, that infinity, however divided, remains infinite (Basham 1971:498). The idea received wider attention, as in about 1200 A.D., Islam transmitted the Indian concept of perpetual motion to Europe, just as it was transmitting at the same moment Hindu numerals and positional reckoning (White Jr. 1960:523), thereby giving rise to globalization of knowledge-based deals.

Roman coin-finds throughout the Indian region, from Afghanistan to Ceylon - from the Gulf of Cambay to Bengal, in south of India, and in almost continuous series up the east coast of India – is important in showing the extent and continuity of Roman trade with India during the first five centuries A.D. There were Roman settlers in India. Large quantities of gold and silver coins struck by the Roman Emperors up to Emperor Nero (54 A.D to 68 A.D.), discovered in the interior of the Tamil country, testify to the presence of Roman settlers in the south (Sastri 1966). The existence of a Roman settlement is also known from the *Silappadikaram*, a Tamil literary work that describes vividly a quarter of the city of Puhur, or Kaveripattinam, which is at the mouth of the Kaveri River. These were the samples of collections of the scope of "world" traffic in several southern states in

India (Seshadri 1966:244-45). European soldiers, known as *Yavanas* and *Mleccha*, clad in complete armor, acted as bodyguards of Tamil kings (Smith 1961:400-401). Roman soldiers were also enlisted to guard the gates of the fort of Madura (Pillay 1965:Chapter Eleven). Thus, out of international trade, there developed some minor military and diplomatic relations. The American historian Richard Brown argues that because there were plenty of Roman coins in India, there must have been Roman colonies in India, and because there were Roman colonies, there must have been either Roman ships or Roman shipbuilders to introduce the "*oculus*", a decorative feature attached in the triangular tail areas on vessels (Bowen Jr. 1957:262-91). It is almost certain that the seagoing qualities of the Romans were not as great as stipulated by Richard Brown. Nor did the Romans take *oculi* to India. In contrast, Carroli Quigley, another American historian, argues that that Roman ships did not carry goods to India in Roman ships (Quigley 1958:25-38).

From around 1500 B.C., a second network, centered on northwestern China, was established. Because the Buddhists made many of the trade connections in earlier times, historian D.D. Kosambi asks an important question. "To what extent did the monks and Buddhist monasteries participate directly in the long-distance trade, the commerce of the great caravans?" He adds that archaeological evidence points to the monastic possession of great wealth. The famous Nasik inscriptions (some dated between 150 B.C. and 150 A.D.), demonstrate that the monks and their *samgha* received *aksaya-nivi* (everlasting donations). However, the inscriptions as well as the

Sino-Buddhist evidence indicate that many wealthy merchants from the famous *Dhenukakata* settlement in the south of India had good connection with the monasteries. The settlement was at the mouth of the Krishna River. The settlement had Greek traders, who traded with Alexandria, not Persia, as other sources alleged (Kosambi 1955:50-52;59-60). References in *Sangam* literature indicate that the *paradva*r landowners gradually diversified and increased their participation in coastal trade and one section of them figures as rich traders (Nattar and Pillai 1965:16-17). Rich merchants and traders, including Buddhist merchants, began to participate in the means of production of goods, and thus, there emerged long-distance trade that created surplus value as well as exchange of spiritual values (Ray (n.d.):354).

Support System

Trade guilds helped overseas commerce. Yavanas (Greeks, Romans, Jews, and Arabs) set up colonies on both the littoral and inland. These colonies in India presuppose the existence not of adventurers and freelance traders and explorers, who could not sustain centuries of growing trade. These foreign settlers set up a network of business organizations to devote to production and distribution. Merchants formed *pauras* (assemblies in Sanskrit), *nagarams* (towns in Tamil) were assemblies of merchants in important trade centers, working in cooperation with the *ur* or *sabha* (larger assembly). Even the Brahmins took to commerce in a large *Vaisnava* center in modern district of South Arcot.[2] Merchants came from South Sri Lanka to join the community of traders. The Sanskrit term

Vanij means export trader. Some Sanskrit and Tamil expressions such as *cettu* and *taniccettu* refer to monopoly of trade in certain exports. Marco Polo calls the Brahmin guild as *Abraiaman*, who were regarded as the best merchants in the business. Marco Polo adds that these Brahmin members of the province of Lar as so guild members that they would never "take what belongs to another." The foreign traders could easily entrust their goods to Indian businesspersons, who sold goods from abroad in the most loyal and faithful manner. Trade commission was given to these Indian traders for handling commodities, out of good faith, not on demand.[3] Travelers and foreign visitors testified Indian traders' integrity and high character in the medieval period. Even settlements in foreign countries colonized by South Indian merchants were constituted *Manigrams* (association of merchants), for instance Taku-apa in Siam, where a tank and temple of Narana were constructed by Tamil merchants during rule of Pallava Nandi Varman 111 (Ayyar 1947:269-80). Historian Sastri argues that the South Indian merchants under the guidance and assemblies had more freedom and scope for initiative and a better capacity for voluntary organization than in China.

Wealth Accumulation

Marshall G.S. Hodgson (1963) and William H. McNeill (1963) introduced a notion that the world's various peoples began to interact with intensively only after 1492. Samuel P. Huntington reinforces the notion by writing that most of the human existence contacts between civilizations were "nonexistent." As against this, K.N. Chaudhuri, drawing on central-place

analysis, argues that industrial production such as textiles, metals, glass and ceramics had long ago began the process of economic interaction having profound effects on international commercial relations (Chaudhuri (1990):297-337; Bentley 1998:237-254).

The Christian Armenians, who settled in northern Indian cities, including Calcutta, used to make formal trade agreements, although contracts could be made on a handshake (Curtin 1984:197). Referring to the Jewish-India merchants of the Middle Ages, the Geniza-papers report that trade was of cosmopolitan character. The most observant Jewish traders from the Sudanese coast of the Red Sea port of Aidhab and other ports in the Middle East coming to Malabar ports freely formed partnerships with Hindus, Muslims and "Oriental Christians." The partnership reflected a "completely international and inter-confessional reality and outlook" (Goitein 1953:37).

There are ample references in the Vedic literature to trade in distant lands for profit (Griffin (n.d.):20). The merchants offered prayer and oblation to seek divine grace for success in trade.[4] Although shipwrecks were common, yet hopeful merchants ventured regularly on sea voyage in ships with hundred oars, for trading in distant lands. They knew the theory "money makes money."[5] A Tamil sage, Thiruvalluvar, in his book, written more than 2300 years ago, went to the extent of compelling people to earn wealth. The book underscored that India should have enormous wealth.[6] The importance of wealth in life has been repeated in ancient *niti* literature.

Bhartrhari's famous stanzas "yasyasti vittam sa narah kulinath", renders that wealth has the "mysterious power" of elevating a family in its social prestige, of bestowing scholarship, learning and virtue, because all manner of excellence can be secured with gold or money (Gokhale 1977:125-26). In the Buddhist literature, the term *attha* in the sense of worldly things is often associated with *hita* (benefit) and *sukha* (happiness) (Carpenter 1960:187;190;211). Capital formation and wealth creation, some of the basic objectives in economic globalization, remained Indian objectives.

Referring to the commerce in white cloths with a red or yellow border during the nineteenth century, Lord Valentia reported that "Hindu Banyans" made profit of from 50 to 100 percent. Gold and ivory exports brought significant profit. Two French travelers, Ferret and Galinier, reported that the Indian Banyans made "immense profits" from the Red Sea business in Africa gold, musk, ivory.[7] The Eurocentric conventional explanation of this west-to-east flow of "money" is that Europe was required to send treasure to Asia, including India, because the West had to settle its trade deficit with the East. On the long term, the structural change in the composition of the returns from Asia gave rise to an enormous expansion of the export of silver and gold to the East. J. C. van Leur and argues that with the coming of the Portuguese the Asia trade a new era began leading to the decline of the vigor of indigenous Asian commercial institutions (Leu 1955). Company exports of cloth increased sharply to meet new demand in Europe during the "India Craze" of the 1680s and 1690s.

Hemispheric Integration

The large quantities of gold and silver coins struck by the Roman emperors up to Emperor Nero (A.D. 54-68), found in the interior of the Tamil country, testify to the presence of Roman settlers in the south in a hospitable atmosphere (Sastri 1966). Considerable changes in production also occurred in various parts of India from about 400 B.C. through to around 500 A.D. There was the growth of urban crafts, flourishing internal trade and international trading networks, which stretched to Vietnam, Indonesia, and China in one direction and to the Roman Mediterranean in the other. In India, however, there was a decline of trade and urban life as the focus for the artisan crafts shifted to the villages, where they were integrated into a caste system led by the Brahmins (Harman 2004:1-36).

The rise of the merchant class having links with foreign trade in pre-Mughal period was closely associated with certain developments in technological and commodity production and the process of the modernization of parts of the early economy (Gokhale 1977:125-130). Particularly, the role of silver import to India generated a debate about wealth accumulation. The flow of silver toward Mughal chief Port of Surat and other ports during the Mughal rule remained an issue in the balance of payment issue. An English merchant in 1660 reported that Asian ships from several countries coming to Surat had increased from 15 to 80 ships over the previous decade (Moreland 1923:85). Asian merchants brought six million rupees each year in silver coin from Mocha, the equivalent of 76, 5421 Kgs of pure silver, and a far greater quantity than the combined imports of the Europeans (Moreland 1923:85). The Dutch Company's exports of cloth increased sharply to meet new demand in Europe during the "India Craze" of the 1680s and 1690s. In addition, despite the expansion of Company trade between India and Europe, silver continued to move through West Asian traditional trade, the caravan routes of Ottoman Egypt and Arabia and the sea-lanes of the Red Sea and Persian Gulf (Brennig 1983:481). The flow of silver into western India expanded the silver-based Mughal monetary system.

Useful and authentic Cairo Geniza Records, dated between 1080 and 1160, record the nature of early medieval trade between India and the Middle East. Abraham Ben Yiju, a Jewish trader from al-Mahdiya in Tunisia, had a bronze factory in southern India, where he produced bronze ware. Among other places, he lived in *Manjarur* (Mangalore). Customer in Aden ordered articles made at his factory. Ben Yiju sent merchandise from south India to merchants in Aden for consumption there and for export to Egypt and North Africa; different kinds of iron were in great demand in Aden and the Adenese traders paid in gold and silver.[8] In 1703-04, six ships arrived from Amsterdam carrying 5,749 Kgs of silver.[9] K.N. Chaudhuri supplies data for silver export from London to the East India Company factories in Bombay. Trade balance reinforced with the arrival of silver was in India's favor. Glamann's analysis on the Dutch-Asiatic trade shows clearly that there was a link between the European demand for Asiatic products and the rise in the export of silver and gold (Glamann 1958:62-69;263). Demand was increasingly for those products, such as cotton, silk, and coffee, which came

from areas where gold and silver was needed to keep trade flowing, namely Coromandel, Bengal and, for coffee, Mocha (Gaastra 1983:460). However, both India and China, silver wages were substantially lower compared to those in northwestern Europe.

Culture of Modernity: Globalization

Cultural orientation and value systems have influenced the policies of parties and groups in economic globalization in India. Nevertheless, the proper locus of politics and articulation of contemporary economic globalization remains puzzling.

First, the Indian variety of socialism, with its internal contradictions, is an alternative form of capitalist modernization, which argues that globalization itself internationalizes class exploitation as it produces a new economic fragmentation of the globe. As the earlier promise of welfare and equality recedes, in the communist dominated provinces, West Bengal and Kerala, the left parties bring globalization issues into limelight for political objectives. The powerful Communist Party of India (CPM) in West Bengal, welcoming foreign investments (for science city) in the state it rules, but vehemently opposes it nationally to discredit the central government for political reasons. Much against the Indian core value system in globalization, the "center-periphery" thesis holders view economic globalization in terms of the received knowledge derived from Karl Marx (1971). Oriented to Marx's theory of labor value, Professor Amiya Kumar Bagchi, a Cambridge trained distinguished economist, now Director of Development Studies in Calcutta, and a mentor of the "progressive youths of Bengal" has been a pioneer mover

in the debate about free trade and poverty (Bagchi 1996:2875). For the leftists, the idea of a bounded cultural community of nations seems suspect given recent shifts in the spatio-temporal contours of material world.

Second, for the religious revivalists, globalization is more than modernization, because it amounts to the civilizing mission to finish the work that formal colonialism was unable to achieve. Their ethnocentrisms, legitimately asserting against Euro-American hegemony or economic globalization are, in turn, "colonized" to the extent that they legitimize themselves in terms of an "alternative" development, which Gilbert Rist calls new "global faith". It is non-modern and non-scientific, and "non-historical" (Dirlik 2000). Equating Indian identity with Hindu identity, a logical but not a valid equation for a nation with large Muslim minorities and others, the Hindu Jana Sangh party opposed economic globalization on cultural grounds. It highlighted Hindu values projecting a cultural conflict between small-scale and large-scale industries, capital-intensive technology and village crafts, centralization and decentralization, and impure urban complexity and rural serenity (Saha and Carr 2001:91-120). The RSS party declared in early 1992 a renewed economic policy for *swadeshi,* arguing that globalization had been uneconomic and un-Indian. The party argued for a national capitalism without foreign investments and without large-scale import of foreign consumer goods. It produced a list of 326 products, by multinationals and possible alternative products made by Indian owned factories. The more pragmatic wing of the BJP that includes cosmopolitan moderates, want to

keep emotional connections with the European liberal forces. In Partha Chatterjee's words, the nationalists wish to copy the Western means in terms of technology and the institutions of state, but to resist Western cultural attributes (Chatterjee 1996:75). The BJP moderates, favoring Christian Democratic parties of Europe, favor globalization in a cautious way. For them the Christian democratic forces would be allies in the worldwide conflict between the Islamic forces and the democratic forces. However, the BJP supported a policy of economic liberalization, partly as an attempt to represent the interest of traders and industrialists (Hansen, 1996). The party sponsored an investment project, run by US-based ENRON in Maharashtra state in 1995, which eventually failed due to provincial mismanagement. However, the misrepresentation of ancient Hindu values has failed to prevent the increasing forces of secular globalization, because India had reached the controversial point of W.W. Rostow's "take-off", which has gripped Indian policy-makers, politicians and industrialists as well.

Third, a new pro-economic globalization stance soon became powerful due to adverse economic effects observed during the period of state socialism, which weakened market incentives while spawning a huge and inefficient public sector. Prime Minister Singh encouraged versatile democratic institutions, implicitly enforcing social contract, tempering market forces and maintaining some social order. Now he tries to bring India closer to the outside world without overtaxing the domestic industry. Even though he is ignored internationally, he tries to calm the anti-global critics at home. His relatively new economic globalization is based on his basic belief that nations that are economically interlinked do not shoot each other. His globalization urge is accelerated by India's new technology-based industrial base, which has been labor intensive. The national government and state administrations at various levels have done a significant job in helping technology for expansion of global trade. In Bangalore city alone, there are three universities, fourteen engineering schools, and forty-seven specialty schools of higher learning. Western industrialists get "brain shopping" there while Indian engineers work for software companies, such as Siemens, General Electronics, Samsung, and Nokia. In 2005, about 12 billion dollars of goods were exported, though it amounted to a fraction of that of China.

Fourth, over the decades, opposition to narrow leftist and rightist vague strategies came from intellectuals, the upholders of Indian norms as well modernization impulse. During the 1920s, Rabindranath Tagore, Asia's first Nobel Laureate, stirred crowds in India, China, and Japan by calling spiritual and economic combination for co-prosperity. Both he and Sun yat-sen, China's anti-imperialist exile, greatly admired the idea in economic transaction, soon to be dismantled by imperial Japan. Another Nobel Laureate, Amartya Sen argues that in globalization, the forces of ideological separatism, which is strong in parts of modern India, militate against global history but also against India's "own heritage" (Sen 1987).

Indian Movies

In much of India's human history of social relations, econo-cultural relations have transcended existing political divides. The spread of Hindi movie culture implies a profound quantitative increase in intensification of social relations of that ideal type. The economic globalization, accelerated by Indian movies, has changed the quality of international exchanges. Hollywood movies have failed to smooth the normative differences between the Islamic world and the West, because they have become the processes of the production of cultural differences, bringing the "center" to the "periphery" as a way of "grand narrative" of "totalizing" late capitalism, Indian Hindi movies with their smooth and distinct entertainment mode, have brought relief to econo-cultural globalization. One advantage of Indian movies is that there are no priori assumptions about the messages produced by the comic movies. The enforced "difference" of cultural space, to use the words of Appadurai (1990), has become "part and parcel" of a global system of domination by Hollywood movie culture. As a noted intellectual and journalist Shashi Tharoor writes, in the *Times of India*, "Bollywood is Indian culture's secret weapon", producing five times as many films as Hollywood, taking India to the world, by bringing its brand of "glitzy entertainment" to Indians abroad as well as others including "Syrians and Senegalese". In some Syrian houses, huge portraits of Amitabh Bachan, India's Marlon Brando and President al-Assad are on display. The movie culture of India has bridged the gap between the East and the West in several ways. On the other hand, China has had an essentially insular historic experience. The China-India contrast in ways

of dealing with foreign traders is a challenge to comparative analysis of the relations in commercial exchanges. China's defensive responses can now be contrasted with Indian openness. Today, when Chinese culture reemerges in arrogant pride in economic growth, it is likely to develop as an alternative civilization, although there was an open society under the Tang dynasty. In contrast, India is becoming a meeting place through economic globalization and culture. The appeal of Indian movies, including 1960 classic, *Mughal-e-azam*, comparable to *Gone with the Wind*, to Islamic populations and other countries in Eastern Europe has been enormous (Mahbubani 2008:169-70). As money earners, Indian movies have become solid sources of income; it is economic globalization on India's terms. In the same fashion, A. R. Rahman, 44, currently a sufist, the "Mozart of Madras", has succeeded in tying many forms of music together. He won two Oscars, a Golden Globe and the British Academy of Film and Television Arts (BAFTA) for giving *Slumdog* timely entertainment" (*India International* 2010). The "syncretic adaptive politics and culture" of hybridity, argues the postmodernist Homi Bhabha, "questions the imperialistic notion of purity" expressed culturally and economically as much as it "questions the nationalist notion of purity" (Bhabha 1989:64). Economic globalization, far from representing a coherent process of capitalist totalization, becomes an expected connection between different Indian socio-cultural activities. In the words of Michel Foucault, these exchanges become "moral subjects", not in the form of submission to an external rule (state control), but in the "mode of belonging" (Bayart 2007).

Some observations are due at this stage. First, ancient global interconnections in trade and culture remained thin and uneven, with most trade linkages centered on the large states and metropolitan cities. Second, the concept of Chinese type of fierce "scramble" has not appeared in modern India. Last, White, Jr., argues that, despite difficult communication, mankind in the "Old World at least has long lived" in a more unified realm of discourse than historians are ready to admit. The notion of "global unity", a cultural theme, had been present in the East for centuries (1960:526).

Millionaire its frenetic sound. "From the marketing perspective, it's a perfect fit", says a management expert, explaining that manufactures and economic managers want "proximity to Amitabh Bachan and a link to intelligencer" (*The Statesman* 2009, July 25). In February 2010, the film, *My name is Khan*, featured by super-star Shah Rukh Khan, grossed about two million dollars in America and Canada. The *Los Angeles Times* called it "a sweeping epic in the melodramatic Bollywood manner" and yet it emerges as a potent", factor in globalization.

Conclusion

In some coins, found near Bangalore, there are standing figures of Gaius and Lucius Caesar. The Indian archaeologist M. Seshadri observes that Augustus might have struck these varieties of Roman coins, especially for trade with South Asia. In the first century A.D., Coimbatore District produced beryls of a sea-green variety, which was greatly admired in Rome; Also, Indian gems were in demand in Rome. More importantly, the large number of hoards of Roman gold and silver coins

mostly of the period of Augustus and Tiberius certainly indicates the prosperity and economic stability of India (Seshadri 1966:244-45). This was terminal trade, dealing with commodities produced in India, as opposed to the transit trade (Chinese silk), which reached the Indian markets from China and other countries of Asia (Wheeler 1955:173).

The foundational pillars of Immanuel Wallerstein's "modern world-trade" existed in India in medieval period. There was an impressive array of features related to globalization. India had commercialized agriculture and expanding handicraft production, accumulated substantial growth in monetization and urbanism. Based on human labor, farming and manufacturing flourished. *For David Held and his coauthors, economic globalization appears as the result of processes that have been evolving, though not necessarily continuously, for a long period (*Held et. Al. 1999). *In this view, globalization is neither an open, nor a predetermined process that substantially transforms, but not eradicate such institutions as states, religious institutions, and families.* In pepper cuisine, the Romans developed a "taste of India" (Parker 2002:89). Essential difference between contemporary economic globalization and India's early globalization may not be wide because in Indian globalization, there had been capital formation, wealth accumulation, and convenient and free exchanges of goods and commodities covering a wider area. Pacifist Indians were aware of the need of accumulation of wealth through international trade. The Hindi word *gatha forca pital* was derived from the Vedic *grathin* meaning

capitalist. From the Pali literature, we know that in the fifth century B.C., trading communities, engaged in international mostly overland commerce, included monks, pilgrims, pedlars, horse traders, acrobats, actors, students and tourists (Chandra 2007). Pre-colonial Indian economic network featured many intertwined threads linking business operation and related social connections that could be understood and judged from the standpoint of a "world economy." Moreover, cultural globalization is bound up with globalization's economic dimensions. Thus, the long history of Indian globalization is better conceived in a plural rather than unitary phenomenon. This sharply contrasts with some pre-capitalist world economies designed by China, Persia and Rome, creating world empires that introduced a uniform political system, which dominated the various inter-related societies within their boundaries and with enough agricultural surpluses to maintain artisans and administrative stratum. On the other hand, India's "world-economy" was different with no political unity and with the redistribution of the surplus via the market.

Because the anthropology of economic globalization is still in the "pre-paradigm" stage (Kuhn 1997:48-49), Polanyi claims that empirical markets do not necessarily behave in accordance with the market of economic theory (Polanyi et al 1957: 268;250-56). Nevertheless, as Niels Steensgaard legitimately claims that the small-scale peddlers' international trade in the medieval period in South Asia was not "primitive", considering the complexities in business transaction. He adds that the European joint-stock companies in the early seventeenth century did not transform the Asian trade structure; they were not superior to the peddlers and the redistributive enterprises (Carracks 1972:21-22). Indian scholars have taken a comprehensive perspective in India's global trade and travel over land-routes and sea-lanes, arguing that the Indian pre-colonial economic globalization made the Indian Ocean as the central space (Chakravarti 2007:4-5). A.G. Hopkins's "periodization" schem, posits that "archaic globalization" was broadly associated with the sixteenth century mainly with the commencement of European trade. Many Indian scholars argue that Indian business people traded in high-value luxury goods such as spices, gems, and cloves long before the early medieval period (Hopkins 2001). This early economic globalization was "multi-polar", to use the phrases of C.A. Bayly, which involved "push and push" factors; the international exchanges of goods involved the active participation of the traders of "Gujarat, Bengal, coastal China and Japan" (Bayly 2004). In the end, the moot question is how to treat the antiglobalists' wish to achieve "justice" with Amartya Sen's "capabilities variables", and identify the cultural limits of national identity. Often, analysts ignore the sources issues from which differing normative and ethical positions emerge.

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Perils of "Security": Identity and Nation-Building in South Asia with Special Reference to India and Pakistan

P M Joshy

Abstract

This paper problematises the notion of 'Security' in the context of the process of nation-building in India and Pakistan. Nation-building is basically an 'exclusionary' process which distances the 'Self' from the 'Other' both within and outside the cartographic setting of the "nation-State." Here 'Security' is the running force which masks violence in the name of 'protection.' The stereotypical images about the 'Other' justify violence against it and on a majoritarian line the process of nation-building has been progressing in South Asia. In this progression the victims are the minority communities and the violence against them is facilitated and rationalised in the name of "securing the nation."

Introduction

In his inaugural address at the seminar on "India's role in South Asia: Challenges and Opportunities for the 21st Century" (27th Sept 2010) at Pondicherry University, the Chief of the Indian Army Staff Major General V. K. Singh focused upon various security issues confronting South Asia. He spoke about: "military leverage to the betterment of the region, rather than for showing our flag." The intention may be appreciable. But it is not concomitant with the experiences of the region as distinct nation-States. 'Military' is a major source of energy for the very existence of the states of South Asia with independent "nation-States." In the process of nation-building the 'Military' is equated with 'Security' and the 'images' about it are very significant for distancing the 'Self' from the 'Other.' In this context the 'Military' represents "showing flag" rather than being an agency which has the capability to foster cooperation and friendship among nation-States. The experiences of India and Pakistan are the best examples in the region. In the first part of the study we will focus on the complex relations between the notion of 'security' and the construction of identity and subsequently map the ethnic plurality of South Asia. The final part of the article

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contextualises 'security' within the framework of the nation-building process in the states of India and Pakistan.

Identity and Security

Security is a core concept in the theory and praxis of inter/national politics. Realists generally viewed that the international system is 'anarchic' and the states are the 'rational' 'self-centered actors' (Morgenthau 1950). Realism in International Relations (IR) therefore focused on a state-centric, power-oriented, and militaristic discourse of security and it reads narrowly into the role of history, ideology and culture as manifested in the concepts of State, national interest, and nationalism and how it shapes state power and international relations (Chowdhry & Sheila Nair 2003). Neither does it pay attention to the ways in which anarchy/insecurity may be constructed or how the roles of ideology, culture, history, or state practices themselves may produce anarchy in IR (Das 2002:76-89). The weak structuralist and totalising position of realism was theoretically challenged at different levels (Wendt 1987; Tickner 1988 and Walker 1989).

The postmodern, critical constructivist and feminist scholars questioned the orthodoxy of realism in IR (Der Derrian & Shapiro 1989; Weldes 1999 and Doty 1996). The critical constructivists problematising the conventional assumption that international relations is in a state of perpetual anarchy, view security as what David Campbell calls "representations of danger" (Campbell 1998:1-13) instead. The question of 'representation' is one aspect that was totally discarded by the traditional IR theorists. The politics of identity is an important contribution of constructivism to IR (Hopf 1998 and Katzenstein 1996). Katzenstein viewed that 'culture, norms and identity also matter in national security.' For the critical constructivists, objects of security and insecurity are not ontologically separate things. Rather, they are mutually constituted in a variety of ways that may privilege a certain conception of identity over others. Operating within a framework of meanings, assumptions, and distinctive social identities, the representation of the 'Other,' their identities and what constitutes insecurity 'imaginaries' are left open to the dynamics of interpretation, whereby relations of identity may also be produced, enforced, and reified in a conflictual manner (Muppidi 1999: 124). Further, construction of identities influencing security dynamics may not simply be confined to rigid interstate dynamics, but may also be mediated by "complex network of social relations, cultural traditions, and political structures..." involving state security elites themselves (Niva 1999:152). Thus, critical constructivists assume that all social (in)securities are culturally produced (Weldes 1999:1). It is the "cultural process through which insecurities of states and communities… are produced, reproduced, and transformed" (Weldes 1999:2).

Thus, in the new literature of international relations (Campbell 1998; Krause and Williams 1997; Lipschutz 1995 and Weldes et al 1999), security is conceptualised as a productive discourse that brings forth insecurities to be operated upon. This contests the dominant conceptual paradigm of security that sees insecurities as essential variables, while focusing attention on the acquisition of security by given

entities. It underlines the processes through which something or someone (the 'Other') is discursively formed as a source of insecurity against which the 'Self' needs to be secured (Anand 2005:203-215). Thus, discourses of insecurity are about 'representations of danger' (Campbell 1998; Dillon 1996). Insecurities are inevitably 'social constructions' rather than givens—threats do not just exist out there, but have to be produced. All insecurities are thus culturally shaped in the sense that they are produced in and out of ''the context within which people give meanings to their actions and experiences and make sense of their lives'' (Weldes 1999:1). Insecurities and the objects that suffer from insecurities are mutually constituted. That is, in contrast to the received view, which treats objects of security and insecurity themselves as pre-given and natural and as separate things, we treat them as mutually constituted cultural and social constructions and thus products of processes of identity construction of Self–Other. The argument that security is about representation of danger and social construction of the 'Self' and the 'Other' does not imply that there are no 'real' effects. What it means is that there is nothing inherent in any act or being or object that makes it a source of insecurity and danger (Anand 2005:203-215).

Security is inextricably interlinked with identity politics. How we define ourselves depends on how we represent others. This representation is thus integrally linked with how we 'secure' ourselves against the 'Other.' Representations of the 'Other' as a source of danger to the security of the 'Self' in conventional understandings of security are accompanied by the dehumanisation and stereotyping of the 'Other.' The 'Other' gets reduced to being a danger and hence an object that is fit for surveillance, control, policing and possibly extermination. This logic of the discourse of security dictates that the security of the 'Self' facilitates and even demands the use of policing and violence against the 'Other' (Foucault 1979; 1988 and Anand 2005). Central to the concept of postcolonial insecurity is what Sankaran Krishna calls postcolonial "anxiety", defined as an ideological drive of postcolonial state leaders to achieve successfully the "modern enterprise of nation-building"(Krishna 1999: xvii-xix). According to him the process of nation-building makes the 'Others' not only in its 'cartographical limits' but also beyond it (Krishna 1994). Interestingly, central to the metaphor of creating a nation as something "ever in the making but never quite reached", is the idea of nationalism (Das 2002). The unfinished project of nation-building in South Asia generates so many 'Others' both within and outside the statist territorial boundaries. The dominant discourses of International Relations are not sufficient enough to address these complex issues in South Asia (Chatterjee 2008:177-208).

Ethnic Mapping of South Asia

South Asia is a region of rich complexities and the configuration of these intricacies and diversities most often precipitates political polarisations and mobilisations which quite often lead to violent conflicts among different communities of the region that cut across state borders. Generally speaking, these conflicts are a modern phenomenon and are intertwined with the logic of nation-building

and interest articulation within a competitive capitalist system (Joshy & Mohanan 2010). South Asia encompasses eight states-India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Maldives and Afghanistan. The region consists of a number of religions that originated in the Indian subcontinent like Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism as well as those religions that arrived here like Islam, Christianity and Judaism. This religious diversity has had a clear cut influence on the social fabric of South Asia. India has a multi-religious composition in which 80.46 percent of the total population is Hindu, 13.46 per cent are Muslims, 2.34 per cent are Christians, 1.875 per cent are Sikhs, 0.41 percent are Jains and the remaining 0.65 per cent belong to other faiths. Pakistani society too confronts linguistic, ethnic, cultural diversities within the dominant Islamic religion. The Punjabis (60 per cent), Sindhis (12 per cent), Pukhtuns (14 per cent) and Baluchis (4 per cent) are the four ethnic groups in Pakistan. Mohajirs, the Indian migrants in Pakistan, comprise 8 per cent of the total population. Hindus and Christians are tiny minorities in Pakistan. It has been noted that 61 ethnic groups exist in the small state of Nepal. However, religion plays a major role in South Asia not only as belief systems of the people but also as agents of convergence within the state. Islam is the official religion of Pakistan and the Maldives, Hinduism was the official religion of Nepal and Mahayana Buddhism is the official religion in Bhutan. Both India and Sri Lanka follow secularism as their state policies (Momin 2009:21-38). In this scenario, the majority-minority relations are controversial topics for research. The process of nation-building in the recalcitrant clay of

pluralist realities caused large scale exclusions and most often the minorities have been the victims of this progression. Indeed, scarce resources and competing claims in the society always perpetuate conflicts and tension.

The nation-building process in multi-cultural societies like those in South Asia has been progressing on a majoritarian line. The homogeneity of the nation is imaged according to the cultural values of the majority community and it is on this premise that national identity has been moulded. As far as Afghanistan is concerned, after the Cold War it experienced the Talibanisation of the state and society. But Taliban did not succeed in its efforts to integrate the whole nation under the Islamic ideology professed and practiced by it. In its dealings with the smaller ethnic identities, Taliban pursued a policy which had a strong Pushtoon bias. Sri Lanka consists of 74 per cent Sinhalese, mainly concentrated in the south, west, and central parts of the country; and Hindus and Muslims besides Christians comprise almost 26 per cent of the total population. The Tamils comprise 12.6 per cent and they have settled in the northern and the eastern parts of the island nation (Kukreja 2008:237). The British colonialists politically integrated the island and during this regime a new Sinhala entrepreneurial class gained ascendance. Later on, the colonial power was transferred to this class combine (Kloos 2009:186-87). In the post-colonial era due to large scale marginalisation, Tamils asserted for equal rights. They were discriminated against through governmental policies especially in the five major areas of land, language, education, employment, and power sharing.

These eventually turned into violent conflicts (Kukreja 2008:237). Quite differently, the state of Bangladesh is a counter symbol of pure religious nationalism propagated by the elites of Pakistan. In 1971, territorial-ethno-linguistic and cultural nationalism gave birth to Bangladesh (Sheth 1989:383 and Mishra 2000). Muslims comprise 86 per cent of the total population, Hindus 13 per cent, and tribals 1 percent. The tribal population also enjoys linguistic-cultural-religious variations (Momin 2009:34). Two thirds of the tribal population are located in the Chittagong Hill tracts. This border area is conflict prone because these tribal sections have been revolting against the state's attempts of 'Bangladeshisation' (Phadnis 1986:18-20). These voices were regarded as anti-national and a security threat to the nation.

Nepal is a country of hybrid ethnic and linguistic groups. Urmila Phadnis broadly classifies the population of Nepal into three categories- Tibeto-Burman, Indo-Aryan and Austro-Asiatic (Phadnis 2001:72-73). However, the economic resources are concentrated in the hands of a tiny section in the Terai area. The slow pace of societal change and non-competitive nature of the Nepali economy have been the principal causes of inter-ethnic conflicts in Nepal (Phadnis 1986:14-16). The Bhutanese society emerged as a result of co-mingling of various ethnic groups which are identifiable across the region (Phadnis 2001:71). Bhutan's population comprises of three major ethnic groups-Bhutiya (50 per cent), Nepalese Grung (35 per cent), Sharchops (15 per cent) (Momin 2009:34). The Bhutanese polity is a coalition of different elite sections of various communities legitimized by those

communities (Phadnis 1986:16). The State of Bhutan has had an image of sacrosanctity till the 1980s. Because of its ethnic complexities and feudal structure it has generated its own form of ethnic conflicts (Sinha 2008:282-308). Bhutan witnessed ethnic tensions during the 1990s, in the aftermath of the new citizenship act, which marginalized many members of the minority Nepali community located in the southern part of country by making them stateless (Momin 2009:36). The people of Maldives are mainly migrants from Sri Lanka, Arabia and Africa-which renders a multi-ethnic texture to that state. Around the 12th century, people of this nation were massively converted into Islam, even though ethnic diversity has prevailed in the state. The Divehi language essentially derived from Elu (an old form of Sinhala) has provided a greater degree of cultural homogeneity to the state despite its regional and dialectical differences in the north and in the south. Phadnis (1986:17 and 2001:75) views that both the Islamic religion and the Divehi language provide a strong national identity and cultural distinctiveness to the state. However, the homogenising imperative of the modern nation-state is employing the process of coercion as well as consensus. Often minorities are labeled as 'anti-national.' The Mohajirs in Pakistan, the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka, the Nepalese in Bhutan and the Chackmas in Bangladesh are best examples of this. As a strategy to legitimise their regime, the ruling classes of these states have been using the 'anti-India' card. Because of the blurred ethnic boundaries between India and her neighbours, the internal developments in these countries have ramifications in India. The next section of the study delves much

deeper into the process of nation-building in the two important states of South Asia - India and Pakistan.

'Security' and Nation-Building: Experiences of India and Pakistan

The idea of 'nation' is modern and it is identical with 'homogeneity.' The homogeneity is coterminous with security and Western discourses on society and polity are biased on this particular aspect. The emergence of nationalism in the West is linked to various developments and it is viewed as a corollary of 17th century British rebellion against Monarchy (Khon 1967), the 18th century struggles against Iberian colonialism (Anderson 1991), the French revolution of 1789 (Alter 1989) etc. As Hobsbawn said: "the basic characteristic of the modern nation and everything connected in it is its modernity" (Hobsbawn 1990:4 and Smith 2005). In fact, the modern nation-state is an embodiment of a particular production relation and the gradual transition from the 'absolute statism' to the modern State (Anderson 1986 and Anderson 1979) demarcates the emergence of nationalism in the West. Here nationalism is pertained to protect the interests of the dominant class, who sought internal coherence for the smooth functioning of the modern capitalist system. In fact, the values of western modernity rest on the premise that human nature is rational and rational superiority over passions prompted them to take no risks in their social life (Locke 1960). In this respect, the *raison de etre* of modern nation-State is the notion of security and the State becomes an overarching authority as concerned with the security of people (Dillon 1996). Here, the enlightenment project itself

could be seen as a 'security project' and it lays emphasis upon the rational equality of all human beings beyond their cultural divisions. The homogenising imperative is embedded in Western modernity.

The West is claimed as the 'security community,' an outcome of their homogeneous disposition. The homogenised, secular western model of nation-state becomes the symbol of development and security. Here homogeneity is equated with 'security' and plurality is termed as 'insecurity' and 'weakness.' However, it is viewed that 'the homogeneity and stability of the western democracies has a history of violence and it is either by coercive assimilation, forced migration or genocide that the modern nations have come out' (Mann 1999:22). Contrary to the West, nationalism in the East has emerged as a response to discriminative colonial practices. The colonialists had legitimised their regime in the colonies with their rationalist discourses. The inception of nationalist sentiments first came out in the writings of the newly emerging intelligentsia who questioned the very rationale of Orientalist criticisms that viewed the civilisations of the East as 'primitive, dark and superstitious.' In fact, nationalism emerged in the East as a response to Western modernity. Partha Chatterjee notes:

'Eastern' nationalism… has appeared among 'peoples recently drawn into a civilisation hitherto alien to them, and whose ancestral cultures are not adapted to success and excellence by these cosmopolitan and increasingly dominant standards.' They too have measured the backwardness of their nations in terms of

certain global standards set by the advanced nations of Western Europe. But what is distinct here is that there is also a fundamental awareness that those standards have come from an alien culture, and that the inherited culture of the nation did not provide the necessary adaptive leverage to enable it to reach those standards of progress. The 'Eastern' type of nationalism, consequently, has been accompanied by an effort to 're-equip' the nation culturally, to transform it (Chatterjee 1996:2).

However, the native attempts were statured around a central theme that focused on how to catch up with the Western world without losing their cultural distinctiveness. Chatterjee viewed it as contradictory: "'It is both imitative and hostile to the models that it imitates…''It is imitative in that it accepts the value of the standards set by the alien culture", and in the same coin it "rejects the alien intruder", "rejects the ancestral ways as the obstacles to progress" and "yet also cherished as marks of identity"(ibid). However, the intercourse of the East with Western modernity produced multifaceted responses. One response is as Richard G. Fox viewed it, the "hyper enchantment" of identities - which contradicts with modernity's basic values and at the same time functions within its frame (Fox 2005:235-49). The Hindu Right (Sangh Parivar) in India is an example, that it whole heartedly accepted Western modernity in its institutional level and at the same time contradicted with its basic values. When we trace the genealogy of the Hindutva, it goes back to the late 19th century, especially in the writings of Dayananda Saraswathi, Swami Vivekananda, Sri Aurobindo, Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, V D Savarkar and Golwalkar (Sharma 2003 and Kuruvachira 2006). On the one hand they celebrated a glorious Indian past and criticised the perverted present and at the same time envisaged the importance of western modernity for the progress of Indian society.

The extreme version of Hindu assertion, the Hindutva, has embraced the western science and technology and viewed it as an essential pre-requisite for attaining the Hindurashtra. They are so fascinated by the West, especially its technological /military superiority and their existence as 'homogeneous' nations. The Hindu Right argues that the pluralist existence of the Hindu society is its weakness; therefore they "homogenise" and "militarise" the nation towards the 'Hindurashtra' (Savarkar 1984 and Golwalkar 2000). According to the Hindu Right, the idea of Hindurashtra is the reinvention of the glorious Hindu/Indian past, and the only way to re-invoke the tradition and purify the present Indian society. In this process, Hindutva justifies ethnic cleansing. The Hindu Right forces in India has been crystallising the Hindu 'Self' by positing the Muslims, Christians and the Communists as the 'Other,' and legitimising the violence against the 'Other' by manipulating historical facts. The Hindu Right has territorialised the nation and in various ways Muslim/Pakistan is represented as the 'Other' of Hindu/India. In a similar manner the ruling classes in Pakistan had been using the 'anti-India' card for regime legitimacy. In this gamut of relations, 'security' is the legitimising force which distances the 'Self' from the 'non-Self.'

In the preface of his book Adeel Khan says: "Nationalism is a way of dealing

with a world where 'everything melts in the thin air': It is a form of self-love in which individuals celebrate their group identity, and like all forms of self-love gets its strength more from its hatred of others than its love for its self." He continues, "Nationalism is probably the only form of self-love that gets its life-blood from an institution, the modern state" (Khan 2005). The modern nation-State is the embodiment of nationalism which is characterised by its homogeneous existence. According to Shiv Visvanathan the notion of nation "smacks of togetherness, fixities, boundaries" (Visvanathan 2003:2295). As far as South Asia is concerned nationalism is "border-crossings, a reciprocity of opposites" (ibid).The policies of the colonial masters integrated the nations economically and the nature of mobilisations against colonialism by native political elite determined the cartographical setting of South Asia. The 'cutting and shaping' has progressed on a majoritarian line and in the postcolonial period to a greater extent the painful history of the past has been manipulated for distancing the 'Other' from the 'Self.' In the postcolonial period, the old political practices got transformed into more sophisticated mobilisations and maneuverings (Joshy & Mohanan 2010). However, the nation-building process in a multicultural society like South Asia has been progressing on a majoritarian line and most often the victims are the minority communities. The notion of security is the running force and by creating 'Others' both within and outside the territorial parameters of the nation, the postcolonial state has been perpetuating an 'insecurity syndrome,' which dehumanise the Other by generating a chain of images through various mediums which include the national rituals commemorating various epochs in the history of the 'nation,' cricket matches (Nandy 1985 and Krishna 1993) and other regional engagements. War is also a tool which provides a vast canvas for caricaturing the 'Other' and strengthening the 'Self.' In a logical progression of insiders/outsiders, purity/ pollution, civilised/uncivilized, the ruling class has been sustaining an enemy image about the 'Other.' The 'Other' is represented as a 'security threat' to the defined order and the violence against it is legitimised on the grounds of securing the 'Self.' Sajal Nag (2001:4758) notes:

The project of all nation states is nation-building by which it is constantly shedding portions of its own people from its purview and thereby creating its own outsiders. The nation-states spearheaded this process because it emanated from logical requirements of an industrial system. This state formation requires homogeneity; it also requires loyalty. Therefore dissent was a disqualification for its citizenship.

The seeds of ambivalence and violence are inherited in the notion of nation. It steps from the idea of 'static' citizenship, 'problematic nature of identity,' 'positivism between territory and people,' 'fixity of boundaries,' and the 'genocidal nature of the exclusionary process' (Visvanathan 2003: 2296). However, the idea of nation remains central to most attempts to define legitimate political communities (Harris 1990). Since independence, the states of South Asia have been facing two overlapping problems, namely, 1) the internal constraints over developing and sustaining a nationalist image and 2) legitimately positing the

nation-state in the web of a modern world system. The colonialists ruled these societies with their rationalist discourses and questioned the legitimacy of these societies to become nation-states because of their multi-ethnic composition. Here the notion of the nation is posited against a pluralist reality. In this backdrop the States of South Asia emerged with an emphasis on the possibility of an imposition of a rational socio-political order above multiple ethnic realities. However, the contradiction between the attempts to homogenise and the resistance directed against it in favour of heterogeneity, determine the future course of South Asian politics.

In India, the contradictory policies of colonialists in their dealings with natives had given considerable inputs to the emergence of the nationalist movement. There were three 'master narratives' in Indian nationalism. One was a secular nationalism propagated by the Indian National Congress; the other was religious nationalism-mainly in two streams: Hindu nationalism and Muslim nationalism. The third one was caste based assertions of the deprived sections (Varshney 2002:55-59). All these streams evolved in their opposition to colonialism. Coincidently, religious nationalism progressed in parallel with the dominant version of nationalism propagated by the Indian National Congress. The Hindu nationalist assertion, especially large scale mobilisations in the 19th century like the 'cow protection movement' by the Arya Samaj and the Urdu-Hindi controversy, generated 'insecurity complex' among the Muslim elite (Nag 1999). Some eloquent sections among Indian Muslims demanded a

safeguard against the possible 'tyranny of the denominational majority' (Ahamad 1997). The Muslim identity mobilisations culminated into the partition of India and the birth of a new nation-state, Pakistan. Sajal Nag says: "Two centuries of divide and rule politics of the colonial state and five decades of communal mobilisation logically culminated in the partition of British India" (Nag 1999:4755). The partition caused massive bloodshed on both sides. Large scale displacements, refugee flows, pain, miseries, all generated deep rooted psychic assault against the people of both countries. From 1947 onwards, the leadership of both India and Pakistan has been very much eager to harp on the cause of division. The problem of Kashmir has sustained itself as a 'symbolic site' as well as a 'burning site' of that great tragedy, partition. From this point the process of nation-building started in these countries in diametrically opposite ways, generating new forms of security issues. A. K. Pasha notes: "Midnights children-Pakistan and India-remain locked in an unending spiral of mistrust, conflict and war. In their political imagination, in mutual relations, in constructing national identity, for these intimate enemies security is not simply restricted to the state; it remains a durable feature of the practices of civil society" (Pasha 1996:286). The question of Kashmir is the core determinant of relations between India and Pakistan and the elites of both these countries have been manipulating this issue for regime legitimacy. The whole gamut of intellectual fashioning by governmental machineries sought to perpetuate stereotypical images about the 'Other.' Coincidently, the civil society has been reproducing these statist projects.

In India, the nationalist struggle enabled the Congress to create an ideological hegemony in society. In the post-colonial period new connotations like 'national development,' 'national interest' and 'national security' had totalised the security thinking in India. In contrast with Gandhi's visions on state and development, Nehru promulgated a new, modern, developmental nationalism (Chatterjee 1996) which had a 'silencing effect' on the society (Mohanan and Joshy 2010:1-8). He envisaged a modern developed India with heavy industrialisation and big dams which were labeled as 'temples of development.' Rightly speaking, he had simplified persisting social realities in India with an argument that 'heavy industrialisation would replace the caste and religious identities with class based identities.' However, this developmental nationalism was preoccupied with the process of nation-building, which envisaged a national identity above pluralist realities. However, the new developmental culture excluded a vast chunk of the population; eventually they were evacuated from their homeland. The dissenting voices were labeled as 'anti-national' and dealt with severely. In short, the narcissist practices of nation-building distanced the 'Other' both within and outside the territorial boundaries of the nation. Let us discuss the nation-building process in Pakistan.

Ideological engineering is an essential aspect of legitimate existence of a nation-state, which seeks 'individuality,' and 'separateness.' As far as Pakistan is concerned this has been a daunting task. It has been facing quite a number of problems which varies from the 'problem of differentiating Pak culture from Indian,' 'the ambiguity regarding the role of religion in State affairs,' 'legitimacy of Muslim nationalism' etc… Indeed, Pakistan is not a product of a popular struggle, but Muslim nationalism erected from the 'fear of the Hindu majority' and subsequently, this fear psychosis has been used by the ruling class for uniting the nation and sustaining regime legitimacy. In fact, the Pak movement was a movement of Muslims rather than Islam (Amin 2009)[1], and its national leader, Jinnah was ambiguous on the nature of the political system and what role Islam has to play in the system. The imposition of Urdu as national language is another issue which caused a clash between the cultural reality of the State and the Statist ideology (Khan 2005:68-77). The creation of Pakistan was legitimised on the premise that the linguistic and ethnic divisions could be surpassed by the dominant Islamic identity. This nationalistic perspective took an intolerant attitude towards hybridism and diversity. However, even though Pakistan remains Islamic, Punjabi ethnic identity is the core determining factor in the affairs of the State. 80 percent of the army and 55 percent of the federal bureaucracy is from Punjab. Punjabi domination in state affairs is being legitimised by equating Punjab's interest with that of Pakistan's. The assertion of other ethnic groups is considered as 'anti-national', implying that they are pro-Indians (Samad 2009:208-214). Pakistan has had four spells of direct and indirect military rule and several failed coups and each was justified on the grounds of national security (Cohen 2004:7) meaning threat from India. Indeed, the Pakistani national Self is moulded by positing India as it's 'Other.' Pakistani ruling elite has been using the 'anti-India card' for regime legitimacy for quite long. In fact,

there is tension hanging over the constraints of nation-building, regime legitimacy and the growing urge for democracy.

After Jinnah, Pakistani politics has been facing deeper systemic crisis displaying a bewildering array of shifting allegiance and alliances. In its sixty years of existence, Pakistan has been administered by martial law regimes for nearly 30 years. At other times, the army has more directly pulled the strings of puppet democratic dispensations. The great influence of the military always keeps the Pakistani state as 'praetorian.' The State upholds a 'political economy of defense' over a 'political economy of development' (Talbot 2003:1-3 and Kukreja 2003:58). The dominant influence of the Punjabi ethnic community over the military and the bureaucracy is a major determinant of the political horoscope of Pakistan. This trajectory emanated mainly out of the loss of East Pakistan (the pre-independent state of Bangladesh) which changed the balance of the political power in Pakistan. East Pakistan comprised of more moderate Islamists and with its secession Punjabis became the dominant ethnic community in Pakistan (Cohen 2004:9). Veena Kukreja notes: "Pakistan's traumatic and uncertain political history exemplifies a struggle between the forces of authoritarianism and constitutionalism, or a conflict between state and civil society" (Kukreja 2003:XII). In this scenario, Pakistani elite has been positing India as its 'Other' and justifying a militaristic State. Najam Sethi, a critic of the Pakistani State observes:

The Pakistani State has come to be fashioned largely in response to perceived and propagated, real and imagined threats to its national security from India. The mentality and outlook of the Pakistani State is therefore that of a historically besieged state. That is why conception of national security, defined in conventional military terms, dominates the Pakistani State's thinking on many issues. Indeed, that is why state outlook dominates government policies. That is why Pakistan's foreign policy runs its domestic policy rather than the other way round. That is why Pakistan's economy is hostage to Pakistan's Cold War conceptions of 'national security' rather than being an integral part of it. That is why Pakistan is more a state-nation rather than a nation-state (Sethi 1999:7).

The State-led nation-building process in the states of India and Pakistan has entered into a crucial period where nuclear weapons have become the symbol of national honour and security. The decline of the 'Congress system' and the ascendancy of the Hindu Right forces in India in the late 80s have changed the security situation in South Asia. The Hindu Right forces, broadly the Sangh Parivar, strictly follow the 'Hindutva' agenda; and portray the Muslim/Pakistan as the 'Other' of the Hindu 'Self.' Through various mobilisations like the Babri Masjid-Ramajanmabhoomi issue, Common Civil Code, Shah Bano controversy, Mandal issues- the Sangh combine has 'securitised' the society along the line of insiders/outsiders, purity/pollution, civilised/uncivilsed. The nuclear explosions became the testing ground of showing "national loyalty" and those who opposed the Bomb were regarded as 'anti-national' or 'pro-Pakistani.' On a hyper-realist ground, the political leaders of the Hindu Right legitimised the explosions

(see Singh 1998:41-52).The Sangh Parivar generated a chaonistic nationalism and military jingoism through the Hindu Right organisations working in civil society. In this scenario, it is evident that the State produces 'insecurity complex' at various levels and through the realm of civil society this has been reproduced in umpteen number of ways (Joshy and Seethi 2010:163-73).

In response to the nuclear misadventure of India, Pakistan exploded five nuclear devises. In a post-Chagai statement, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said: "Our hand was forced by the present Indian leadership's reckless actions" (Ram 1998). However, Pakistani nuclear tests strengthened the hands of the Hindu Right. The ruling elites of both India and Pakistan benefited from this hasty action. Ian Talbot says, 'fifty years of nation-building based on animosity to the neighbouring 'Other' State culminated in Pakistan's 'settling the account,' by conducting five nuclear explosions at a test site in Baluchistan. Henceforth, Pakistan and India were to face each other across the Wagah border armed with the Hindu and Muslim bombs' (Talbot 2003:366).

Concluding Observations

From this discussion it is evident that the notion of 'Security' plays a pivotal role in the process of nation-building. The experiences of India and Pakistan are best examples of how the nation-building process has been progressing in South Asia. In this progression, the minorities are excluded and imaged as the 'security threat' to the nation. The dominant discourses of International Relations are not sufficient enough to understand the 'political complexities' of

South Asia. A Constructivist approach to the region would add much flavour to the understanding of the intricacies and complexities of relations in South Asia. "Security" is the running force for the legitimate sustenance of the states of the region and it is inextricably interlinked with identity politics. The successive Congress governments in India maintained a 'national identity' by inculcating the 'images' from the Indian nationalist struggle and also the new connotations like 'national development,' 'national security,' 'national interest' were also employed for the 'integrity' of the "nation." However, dissenting voices were regarded as anti-national and dealt with severely. Indeed, the Congress, especially under the leadership of Nehru tried to transcend the rigid cultural compartments with secular credentials. On the contrary, the Hindu Right forces in India ascended by inculcating a series of issues and the common denominating factor is the critical notion of "Security." They questioned the secularism of the Congress and promulgated aggressive cultural nationalist sentiments through various mobilisations across India. The Hindutva politics of representation legitimises anti-Muslim/anti-Pakistan stance in the name of 'securing' the Hindu body politic at various levels. 'The Muslim' is seen as a 'threat' to national, state and international security. Likewise, the ruling class in Pakistan has been sustaining a stereotypical image about "Hindu/India", the 'historical threat to the nation.'

Notes

1) Amin viewed that the militants of 'political Islam' are not interested in discussing religious dogmas. The 'Political Islam' have an unwholly aliance

with imperialism. It aligns itself with 'dependent capitalism' and 'dominant imperialism.' It supports the 'sacred charecter of property' and 'legitimizes inequality.'The British succeeded in dividing India through its policies and it 'persuaded the Muslim leaders to create their own state, trapped from its birth in political Islam.' It is evident that political Islam could not move out from the borders of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, the two epic centers of political Islam, without the strong support of the United States.

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